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ABSTRACT
This study researches a rapidly growing area of interest in the financial services industry, that is, 
operational hsk management, with special focus on the mitigation phase. Operational risk 
management has accelerated in importance in the financial services over the last two decades for 
many reasons, not least of which is the well-known catastrophic failure of large banks such as 
BCCI, Barings and Indymac, as well as the recent Global Financial Crisis. One of the main drivers 
behind such bank failures was the failure of the banks' managements to manage effectively and 
efficiently their operational risk exposure. The focus of this study is operational risk mitigation in 
the United Arab Emirates Commercial banking industry.
A controversial issue with operational risk was deciding on an agreed and accepted definition 
within the financial services industry. It has been defined by Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision as "the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and 
reputational risk." This definition captures a wide spectrum of risk categories such as fraud risks, 
people risks, legal risks and compliance risks, to name a few.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a Committee of banking supervisory authorities 
established by the central bank Governors of the Group often countries in 1974, published in June 
2006 a document called the "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards - A Revised Framework Comprehensive Version" known as Basel II Accord, which 
requires banks, among many other things, to sustain capital adequacy to cover their operational risk 
exposures. This Accord was the result of a number of consultative documents issued by the same 
Committee which focused increasing attention on the need for operational risk adequate and 
efficient management. Bank managements are facing increasing pressure to ensure that operational 
risk exposures are being managed effectively and efficiently. This extended the main momentum 
for the study, being the first independently sponsored study of how the UAE commercial banks 
have developed their operational risk management frameworks as a basis for mitigating the range of 
operational risk exposures they encounter. The operational risks that prompted the current Financial 
Crisis and how they were mitigated in the context of the UAE commercial banks gave further 
momentum to the research.
The study addresses the various key players in operational risk management and is, therefore, inter- 
disciplinary. The foundations from which the field work was undertaken were based on theoretical 
propositions in the area of decision making since the process of mitigating an operational risk is 
rooted in making a decision. Multiple case studies were used in the design for the research to 
answer the research question and establish the practices in operational risk mitigation in the UAE 
commercial banking industry. Leading UAE commercial banks were carefully chosen as 
representatives of this industry.
The findings of the research are in line with the conclusions of Basel Commiltee on Banking 
Supervision that the main responsibility for operational risk management, and therefore mitigation, 
is vested in operational managers. The analysis demonstrates that (hey do not do this independently, 
but are supported by other experienced people in this field. A model and check-lists of operational 
risk management, and therefore mitigation, is proposed demonstrating the complexity of the whole 
process due to the nature and the scale of operational risks. The thesis concludes by discussing 
some further potential research suggestions in this ever-growing area of interest.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This Chapter provides background to the research and introduces the research main and 
secondary questions as well as the researcher's objectives. The methodological framework 
for this study, the case study approach, along with an overview of the research design are 
outlined. The Chapter concludes with an important part, that is, a discussion of the 
'Contribution to Knowledge' followed by the structure of the thesis.
1.1 Background to the Research
1.1.1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
"In order to encourage better risk management practices, the Committee is keenly 
interested in efforts by financial institutions to effectively manage and mitigate 
operational risks."
This quote from the operational risk Consultative Document (BCBS 1 2001, p. 12) to 
BCBS (2004) Capital Accord captures both the aim (encourage better risk management 
practices) and focus (operational risk mitigation) of this study.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published its first Capital Accord: 
"International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards " in 1988
'BCBS is a committee created in 1974 by the Central Bank Governors of the Group of Ten nations The 
purpose of BCBS is to encourage convergence toward common banking approaches and standards. It 
formulates broad supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends statements of best practice in 
banking supervision in the expectation that members' authorities and other nations' authorities will take steps 
to implement them through their own national systems (Marrison 2002).
(BCBS 1988). This Accord addressed credit risk2 . A revised edition that addressed market 
risk3 was published in 1996 (BCBS 1996), hereafter; referred to as Basel I4 .
BCBS published its second Capital Accord to address operational risk (OR): "International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards " in 2004 (BCBS 2004), and 
revised editions in 2005 (BCBS 2005a) and 2006 (BCBS 2006) hereafter; referred to as 
Basel II 5 . Basel II is now enforced in most countries in the world (Moosa 2007).
Recently, BCBS published its third Capital Accord in December 2010: "International 
Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring " in response to the 
deficiencies in the financial regulation revealed by the Global Financial Crisis from 
liquidity risk6 perspective, hereafter; referred to as Basel III7 . Nevertheless, in this study, 
there will be more focus on Basel II for two reasons:
2 The Business Dictionary defines credit risk as an investor's risk of loss arising from a borrower who defaults 
payment.
5 The Business Dictionary defines market risk as the risk that the value of a portfolio, either an investment 
portfolio or a trading portfolio, will decrease due to the change in the value of the market risk factors. The 
four standard market risk factors are stock prices, interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity 
prices.
4 Basel I is the first of the BCBS Accords, primarily focused on credit risk and later was revised to include 
market risk. Assets of banks were classified and grouped in categories according to the credit risk they carry 
(Marrison 2002).
5 Basel II is the second of the BCBS Accords, addressed credit risk, market risk and OR, and primarily 
focused on recommendations on banking regulations. The purpose of Basel II is to create an international 
standard that banking regulators can use when creating regulations about how much capital banks need to 
allocate to guard against the types of risk banks face (Basel II).
6 The Business Dictionary defines liquidity as the risk that a given security or asset cannot be traded quickly 
enough in the market to prevent a loss or make the required profit.
7 Basel III is the third of the BCBS Accords focused on strengthening bank capital requirements and 
introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity risk (Basel III).
1. Basel II is more concerned with operational risk management, measurement, 
sources and other operational risk areas (Basel II, p. 140 - 152); whereas, Basel 111 
is concerned mainly with liquidity risk management (Basel III, p. 1).
2. Basel III is not due for final implementation, yet. It will officially be introduced in 
two stages: January 2015 and January 2018. Until then, Basel III will undergo 
analysis of financial institution feedback, monitoring and updating (Basel 111, p. 41).
During the last twenty, years many changes and developments have taken place in the 
banking industry. The failure of major banks such as BCCI, Barings and Societe Generate 8 
as well as many other major bank failures (See Robertson and Austin 2008 for a 
comprehensive list of bank failures during the last twenty years9) demonstrate the 
consequences and dangers of not managing Operational Risk efficiently and effectively. 
Since the beginning of the recent financial crisis that started in the year 2007, (hereafter 
referred to as the Financial Crisis) and up to 31 st Dec. 2010, the updated 'failed bank list' of 
FDIC (2010) contains 155 failed banks in the Unites States of America (USA) alone.
Recently, a paper published by the Bank of England (BOE) indicates that as a result of the 
Financial Crisis the global banking system has arguably undergone its biggest episode of 
instability since the start of World War 1 (BOE 2008).
8 For a detailed analysis of BCCI case see Kerry and Brown (1992) and Angclos(2005), Barings case see 
McConnell (1998), for a perpetrator's view of the Barings case see Leeson (1996) and Socictcc General sec 
Rayner and Alien (2008).
9 In the history of United Arab Emirates banking industry, there has been no records of bank failures except 
for the non-UAE bank known as Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) which merely had a 
branch in UAE (see Kerry and Brown (1992) and Angelos (2005) for a good illustration of the BCCI case).
Preparations for this research project commenced prior to the beginning of the Financial 
Crisis, which prompted the Dubai debt crisis 10 (hereafter referred to as the Dubai Crisis, 
and both the Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis will together be referred to as the Financial 
Crises) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Nevertheless, the Financial Crisis could be 
predicted (Patrick 2010). The author of this thesis argues that since the Financial Crisis 
severely impacted developed countries with the most sophisticated financial systems, it 
could also impact developing countries, such as the UAE, due to less mature financial 
systems. The implication is that there is a greater need to understand the operational risks 
that have contributed to the Financial Crisis, which seem to have been under estimated, and 
how they were mitigated, and keep an 'open eye' to examine the operational risk mitigation 
processes in order to predict and prevent recurrence of similar crises (Lilico 2008).
Diversification in the UAE commercial banking illustrates the extent to which banks are 
moving into new business areas, such as stock wallets, insurance and real estate financing. 
A drawback is that new business areas come with risk imbedded in them, for various 
reasons (such as using new information technology (IT) applications) hence, instigating 
additional risks (As-Sardi 2009).
10 With the onset of the Financial Crisis, Dubai's real estate market declined after a six-year boom while the 
UAE commercial banks were extending loans at bubble pricing. Dubai government asked all providers of 
financing to major real estate firms to extend the debt maturities, which exceeded U.S.S59 billion. As a result, 
thousands of employees were laid off and banks lost liquidity; resulting in a stalled economy in Dubai (Smith 
and Kiwan 2009).
Basel Accords recognise the changing banking environment, and are focused at ensuring 
that all banks sustain regulatory capital adequacy sufficient to counteract the underlying 
risks they face, irrespective of the source (Moosa 2007a).
1.1.2 Framework for Risk Management
A survey conducted by the author revealed that Basel II incorporates the phrase 'risk 
management framework' on ninety eight occasions. The author would contend that such 
emphasis highlights the importance of the risk management framework in the banking 
industry. The undertaken literature review supports this view.
As early as the year 1919, in his 'Administration industrielle et generate' 1 ', Fayol (1919, p 
3) classified the various activities of a company in six groups:
1. Engineering, production, manufacturing and adaptation: Technical Group.
2. Buying, selling and exchanging: Commercial Group.
3. Searching for and optimising use of capital: Financial Group.
4. Protection of assets and personnel: Security Group.
5. Stocktaking, balance sheets, costing and statistics: Accounting Group.
6. Planning, organising, commanding, coordinating and controlling: Managerial 
Group.
The objective of the Security Group as he discussed it was to safeguard property and 
persons against theft, fire and flood, to ward off strikes and felonies and broadly all social
" An English translation appeared in 1929 with a revised edition some twenty years later (Fayol 1949).
disturbances liable to endanger the progress and even the life of the business (Fayol 1949, 
p. 4). Subsequent researches that placed Fayol's work within today's standards of 
management theory identified a component of security as being risk management, 
involving: risk exposure identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation and risk control and 
financing (Rodrigues 2001), summarising a framework for the management of risk within 
an organisation. Other authors 12 (White 1995, Parker 2005, Millo and MacKenzie 2007 and 
Jason 2009) identified a similar concept, which may be summarised in Figure 1.





EST1MATIONAT b RISK EVALUATION - RISK MITIGATION
Source: Parker (2005)
Parker (2005, p.61) explains these terms as:
Risk Identification: Perceiving hazards, identifying failures, recognising adverse
consequences;
Risk Estimation: Estimating risk probabilities, describing the risk, quantifying the risk; 
Risk Evaluation: Estimating the impact of the risk, judging acceptability of the risk,
comparing the risk against benefits;
12 The terminology may differ between the authors but as Millo and MacKenzie (2007) note, there is 
considerable agreement about the components of the model even if the labels are different.
Risk mitigation: The action taken once the identification, estimation and evaluation 
processes have taken place.
Andreas (2007) maintains that the principal objective of the risk management framework is 
to adjust the level of risk faced by a business until it is acceptable in terms of the risk 
reward criteria adopted by the organisation's Board 11 ; with the intention of maximising the 
positive impact and minimising the negative impact.
It can be argued that all aspects of risk within an organisation need to be encompassed by 
risk management. A review of the literature identifies a range of business risks 14 , and a 
growing interest is being demonstrated by the established consultancy firms' 5 in the generic 
area of risk management framework. The first issue faced by an organisation that wishes to 
manage its total business risk exposure is to decide what types of risks are included in its 
own business environment (Alexander 2005). A recent survey report indicates that firms 
are yearly losing considerable amounts of money due to risk management failures 
(Robertson and Austin 2008).
13 The Business Dictionary defines the Board of an organisation as a body of elected or appointed members 
who jointly oversee the activities of an organisation. Sometimes, it has different names, such as Board of 
Trustees, Board of Governors, Board of Managers, or Executive Board. It is often referred to as the 'Board.'
14 The term business risk includes all risks faced by an organisation such as market risk, credit risk. 
operational risk, strategic risk and reputational risk (Alexander 2005).
15 An example is the risk model produced by The Public Risk Management Association (2010)
1.1.3 What is Operational Risk?
Basel II produced a revised definition for operational risk which has found reasonable 
acceptance in financial institutes. A 'recent' definition seems to be somewhat inconsistent 
given that operational risks have existed in organisations for many years (Moosa 2007). 
Banks were in the practice of producing their own operational risk definitions. However, 
the majority of banks have recently adopted the Basel II definition as a workable definition 
(Moosa 2007, Dorfman et al. 2008, Hubbard and Douglas 2009). Basel II adapted the 
definition produced by the British Banking Association and Price Waterhouse Coopers 
(BBA 1999a),thus:
"Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition includes 
legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk" (Basel II, p. 140).
The author would contend that the use of the word risk in the Basel 11 definition of 
operational risk implies that the reader is supposed to have an understanding of the concept 
of risk in the first place, which is unhelpful when defining a term.
The definition of operational risk illustrates that it has a three dimensional focus, thus; a 
loss resulting from a breakdown (failure) in the internal controls (systems/processes) that 
should be designed to mitigate the risk in the first place. The breakdown may occur for 
different reasons, including, as quoted, processes, people and system failure. Equally, a 
breakdown can occur due to lack of controls in place to reduce the possibility of the risk 
occurrence. The definition also recognises the effect that external events can have in giving
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rise to operational risk. External events might include systemic risk 16 affecting multiple 
institutions simultaneously with broad consequences (BBA 1999a).
This definition also focuses exclusively on the negative aspects of risk. 'Positive' risk, 
whilst probably self-contradictory from a linguistic point of view, may not be considered 
an appropriate concept in the context of operational risk; although under certain 
circumstances the operational risk mitigation decision may be beneficial (positive risk- 
taking), for example, outsourcing and legal risks. This is a view shared by Holtgrave and 
Weber (2009).
1.1.4 Bank Selection Criteria
"Operational risk exposure is inevitable and can be acceptable as long as we 
understand the concepts behind it and we are confident that it's not always cost 
effective to the business to introduce additional controls."
The above quote by one of the Risk Managers interviewed in this research captures the 
essence of operational risk management (ORM). This study focuses on ORJvl in the UAE 
commercial banks, with particular emphasis on the mitigation phase. The UAE commercial 
banking industry has been chosen for the following reasons:
16 The Business Dictionary defines systemic risk as the risk of a potentially catastrophic financial system 
instability, caused by certain events or conditions in financial intermediaries (such as exposure to other 
industry participants, physical or natural disasters, or a change in regulations, laws, accounting or taxation 
beyond the organisation's control). It refers to the risks imposed by inter-linkages and inlerdependencies in a 
system or market, where the failure of a single entity or cluster of entities can cause a cascading failure, 
which could potentially bankrupt or bring down the entire system or market.
1. The Global Financial Crises emphasised the need to understand the operational 
risks that the UAE commercial banks are facing and how the recurrence of such 
crises can be predicted and mitigated in a timely manner;
2. There is growing pressure on the Regulators of the UAE banks, the Central Bank 
of the United Arab Emirates (CBUAE), to ensure that they inspect the adequacy 
of Banks' risk management frameworks and internal control mechanisms (Basel 
II) to counteract operational risk exposures;
3. The corollary of the latter point is the growing pressure on the Senior 
Management 17 of the UAE commercial banks to ensure that it establishes 
adequate risk management frameworks and internal control mechanisms to 
counteract operational risk exposures;
4. The UAE commercial banks are likely to have a wide range of operational risks 
since they have a wide range of products and systems within which operational 
risks may reside;
5. The multi-cultural population of the UAE is unique in its extremely diverse
origins. According to the World Fact Book (2009), the demographic structure of 
the UAE population is extremely diverse, consisting of: Emirati 19%, other Arab, 
Iranian, South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan) 50%, and other 
expatriates (including Westerners and East Asians) 31%. Hence, due to the large 
number of people and systems involved in the UAE commercial banking sector, 
the opportunity of operational risk occurrence is high. Nevertheless, the author
17 The Business Dictionary defines Senior Management as individuals at the highest level of the 
organisational management who have the day-to-day responsibilities of managing an organisation and hold 
specific executive powers conferred onto them by the authority of the Board.
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would contend that this multi-cultural diversity may instigate a wide spectrum of 
ORM skills.
6. The author's knowledge of the dynamics of the U AE commercial banking 
industry.
Despite the fact that the literature review did not identify any prior work on operational risk 
mitigation in the UAE commercial banks, operational risk was chosen since a number of 
authors have confirmed the view of Tschoegl (2005) that ORM is still in its infancy 
(Dorfman et al. 2008). Much of the academic literature concerning the management of 
banking risks has focused mainly on market risk and credit risk as main concerns with 
recent increasing attention to operational risk (Hubbard and Douglas 2009). Such 
increasing attention makes operational risk an interesting and fruitful area for research 
since it relates to practical and current problems facing the management of the commercial 
banking industry.
Risk mitigation in the UAE commercial banks was selected in order to focus the research 
into one area which could be seen as one of the most important daily challenges facing 
management, that is to say, how best to manage the operational risk exposures identified 
through the risk management processes. Risk identification, estimation and evaluation are 
all important phases of risk management, but unless conscious risk mitigation strategies are 
deployed, it may all be in vein. The fact of not having effective risk mitigation strategies 
can be catastrophic as was highlighted by the cases of BCCI, Barings and Societc General, 
to name a few. As pointed out by Agence France-Presse (2008), in financial terms, the
Societe General case was the result of the ultimate but ill-developed management
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processes, coupled to an IT genius, at the expense of ORM. Appendix A provides an 
example of a briefcase study on a well publicised operational risk incident which affected 
the UAE commercial banks (The credit card fraud case). The incident is useful to examine 
because it is in the public domain, has a significant impact and provides a good opportunity 
to examine the mitigating tactics used.
1.2 Research Framework
1.2.1 Lack of Prior Research
According to Blommestein and Peters (2009), ORM of financial institutions is a topical
subject from the perspectives of both academics and practitioners. Grody and Toms (2009) 
argue that academics encounter sever difficulties in ORM research due to the limitations of 
obtaining hard empirical data.
Operational risk can be viewed as the unwanted future event which, on small scale, can 
happen on a daily basis but which, when it hits the headlines, can lead to firms losing 
significant sums of money (Angelos 2005). As was witnessed by the events of BCCI and 
Barings, the consequences of inadequate ORM can even lead to the collapse of the whole 
bank. The fact that inadequate ORM, and in particular; inadequate operational risk 
mitigation can lead to an impact on the bottom-line further highlights the importance of 
research into the area of operational risk.
A review of the literature did not find any work dealing with operational risk mitigation in
the UAE commercial banks. However, notable work was found that deals with risk
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mitigation strategies in the banking industry in general, including work related to 
operational risk mitigation (Kaple and Gregory 2006, Moosa 2007)). In a paper by Currie 
(2004, p. 14), operational risk is defined as "the problems associated with accurately 
processing, settling, and taking or making delivery on trades in exchange for cash. It also 
arises in record keeping, computing correct payment amounts, processing system failures, 
and complying with various regulations." This bouquet of activities suggests that there is 
no one best way to mitigate operational risk and there is unlikely to be any consensus about 
the most appropriate way forward.
1.2.2 Focus of the Research
The origins of the term 'commercial bank' in the UAE can be traced back to 1980 when the
Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates created a new commercial bank group in 
accordance with the UAE Federal Low (10). The requirement to being in this group was 
the provisioning of commercial banking services. Further insight was given by the CBUAE 
when 'commercial banks' was a group which broadly comprised banks having extensive 
branch networks in the UAE and offering commercial services (CBUAE 1990). All such 
banks are supervised by the CBUAE, and any new comer entering into this category would 
have to be authorised by the CBUAE to conduct such business 18 .
Islamic banks have been excluded due to the special nature of their operation. This does 
not, of course, preclude expanding the research into such banks at a later stage.
18 This is a requirement of the UAE Federal Law No. (10) of 1980.
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The research examined four UAE commercial banks, and using well-established case study 
methodology, explored the operational risk mitigation processes employed. The research 
was concerned with how the UAE commercial banks mitigated their operational risk 
exposures and focused on modelling the processes involved.
1.2.3 The Research Questions
Finken and Silke (2004) note that once operational risks have been identified and assessed,
all techniques to mitigate the risk fall into certain categories, and when managers have to 
decide on how best to mitigate risks, they will normally have multiple risk mitigation 
strategies available to them. (Kaple and Gregory 2006, p. 38), for example, identified five 
ways of controlling (mitigating) risk situations:
1. Risk avoidance;
2. Risk assumption (by virtue of the nature of the activity);
3. Risk reduction;
4. Risk transfer;
5. Combination of the above.
On the other hand, Dorfman and Marks (2007, p.9) argue that once risks have been 
identified and assessed, all techniques to mitigate the risk fall into one or more of the 
following categories:
1. Risk avoidance (eliminate, withdraw from or not become involved);
2. Risk reduction (optimise and mitigate);




4. Risk retention (accept and budget).
In essence, these risk mitigation strategies are almost identical in purpose, and managers 
themselves, also have their own risk-taking behaviour patterns (Mok and Hagel 2004). 
Further, managers must also take due consideration of the nature of the risk being 
mitigated, the risk aptitude of the business in which they work, the time available to effect 
the mitigation action and the cost of the potential risk mitigation solution (Mok and Hagel 
2004). This provides an interesting bouquet of ingredients from which a risk mitigation 
decision must be taken, even if the decision is 'to do nothing' and thus accept the risk.
In an attempt to investigate and understand better the processes used, the main research 
question is:
How do the UAE commercial banks mitigate their operational risk exposures?
A number of secondary questions evolve from this main question. These questions involve
  Areas of mitigation responsibility;
  Establishment of mitigation tactics;
  Communication of risk management decisions;
  Barriers to mitigating operational risk.
It was hoped that answers to these questions would shed light on how seriously the UAE 
commercial banks are taking the proposals on operational risk emanating from the leading
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world banking supervisory body, the BCBS. It would also establish whether operational 
risk mitigation can be modelled as a basis for extending the risk management model to 
include the other risks faced by the commercial banking industry.
1.3 Research Design
1.3.1 Case Study Methodology
The use of qualitative research methods and the inherent strengths that they bring are
becoming more widely accepted (Thomas 2004), and the metaphysical polemics (principles 
of reality arguments) concerning epistemological (that of theory of knowledge/philosophy) 
techniques are growing in their intensity (Hunter and Erin 2008). Dul and Hak (2008) argue 
that case study methodologies are now well-developed, articulated in the literature and are 
highly appreciated when the research questions are 'how' and 'why'; where the focus is on 
contemporary events; the research is exploratory or descriptive. The data was collected 
using multiple exploratory case studies, which are favoured for answering such research 
questions (Baxter and Jack 2008, Dul and Hak 2008). Multiple case studies also enabled 
the author to compare management practices in the area of operational risk mitigation.
1.3.2 An Overview of the Research Design
The research methodology used in this study involved developing a preliminary model of
the risk mitigation process based on the literature review, and exploring adherence to the 
model. The preliminary model is an extension of the risk management model in the risk 
mitigation phase. The extension is based on an appropriate decision making model, driven
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from the literature (Simon 1997 and Lurie 2004), since the act of mitigation involves 
making a decision about how to reduce the probability or lessen the impact of the risk. The 
model is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Preliminary Operational Risk Mitigation Model
tudy Boundary
Source: Developed by the author
Data was collected using primarily semi-structured interviews, together with papers and 
documents concerning the bank and its approach to ORM. Data triangulation was 
employed, using Critical Incident Techniques (CIT's) to validate the results since CIT's 
provide data that can be used to either substantiate or reject the propositions concerning 
operational risk mitigation (Serenko 2006).
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The section dedicated to the research methodology examines in detail the qualitative 
analysis employed, justification for choosing particular techniques; as well as the research 
design.
The literature review carried out prior to the field work identified the main players who 
assist operational management to mitigate operational risk, hence; Risk Managers. Also, it 
identified a role for Internal Auditors in this regard. These two groups together with the 
Operational Managers were the units of analysis for the study. The research was carried out 
between January 2008 and December 2010.
1.4 Scope of the Research
The 'boundary' (Cash and William 2002) for this study was ORM, whilst the 'focus' (Cash 
and William 2002) was one phase of ORM, namely operational risk mitigation.
The author recognises that there are other risks within banks, for example market risk and 
credit risk, but they have not been the centre of attention in this study; although the critical 
reader may note that there are occasions when the boundaries between these risks are not a 
clear cut (Alexander 2005). The fact that the research questions are aimed at exploring the 
operational risk mitigation phase did not preclude the examination of other phases of ORM. 
They were included in the study but were not discussed in any greater detail, except for 
where there was some linkage to operational risk mitigation.
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An area of operational risk that has attracted a significant amount of attention over the last 
few years is ORM (Moosa 2007). This is concerned with the identification, estimation 
evaluation and mitigation phases, including the measurement and quantification of 
operational risk exposures. The author discussed ORM in very broad terms at the 
interviews to substantiate the link between quantification and mitigation. The generic area 
of operational risk quantification is, however; outside the scope of this study. The 
emphasis on the UAE commercial banks did not preclude the author from examining ORM 
in other operations, such as enterprise risk management. This was done to broaden the 
author's knowledge base and literature review as there is very little to be found in the 
current literature about ORM in the context of the UAE commercial banks.
1.5 Positioning of the Researcher: the Researcher's Objectives
From the outset, the researcher aimed at building a model for operational risk mitigation 
actions that would be of interest and use to policymakers, regulators and those in charge of 
the banking corporate governance, as discussed in the section 1.6 dedicated to the 
'Contribution to Knowledge.'
Models that are generated from academic research should have pragmatic validity, 
according to Collins and Joseph (2004). By this they mean they should be useful and user 
friendly. Thus, building a model of the risk mitigation process to encourage better ORM 
practices is considered an important output.
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Weik (1995) describes the process of model building as being iterative where one is 
continually speculating and abstracting using the data that has been collected. The model 
development will be discussed in more detail in section 2.1.4.
The researcher aimed to achieve other secondary objectives, thus; a high level review 
document for auditing the emerging Operational Risk Functions, a practical 'road map' of 
how to approach operational risk mitigation, and better understanding of management in 
major financial institutions. The objectives of the research will be discussed in more detail 
in the section dedicated to 'Contribution to Knowledge' (section 1.6)
ORM is, or at least should be, of interest to every manager, whether they work in the 
financial services or otherwise. The cost of ORM failures in all industry sectors can be 
measured not only in monetary terms, but also sadly in terms of people's lives (Gustafsson 
2007). As a result of this research project, the profile of ORM and therefore operational 
risk mitigation will be raised.
1.6 Contribution to Knowledge
Operational risk is an area that is not researched in the UAE, and is of growing importance 
to financial institutions because of regulatory requirements. The study examines an 
uncharted area in the UAE with a practical orientation towards managing operational risk 
on a day-to-day basis. Whilst the focus of the study has been in the UAL, it has 
international implications because BCBS is an international organisation responsible for 
bank regulation. The researcher aimed at building a research model that would be of
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interest and use to policymakers, regulators and those in charge of the banking corporate 
governance. In particular, this model is expected to contribute to the area of operational 
risk mitigation in the banking sector.
There is mounting pressure from BCBS, both on the regulators of the UAE banks and 
Senior Management within the banks, to mitigate operational risk exposures effectively 
(Saif and Choucair 2009). BCBS is also mandating banks to boost market discipline 
through enhanced disclosure (Basel II). This mandate requires disclosure of the bank's risk 
assessment methods, an area which the research has examined in relation to operational 
risk. The development of a model for operational risk mitigation actions will provide an 
important contribution to how the UAE commercial banks will tackle this problem and help 
to identify what shall be current practice. The development of a practical 'road map' of 
how to approach operational risk mitigation will provide an important contribution to those 
managers 19 who are seeking to improve their understanding of the process. Furthermore, 
the development of a high level review document for auditing the emerging Operational 
Risk Functions will help to provide comfort that such functions are doing their job 
effectively.
As recognised by Basel II, studying how banks mitigate operational risk will be an 
important contribution to helping banks reduce the exposure, frequency or severity of an 
operational risk incident. Reducing fraud, errors and inefficient operations through 
effective operational risk mitigation will have a positive effect on an organisation's cash
Manager means principally operational management but equally well applies to risk managers.
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flow and help to improve a risk awareness culture in the business, which should ultimately 
lead to an increase in shareholder value20 . Additionally, this research will provide a 
contribution to the understanding of management in major financial institutions, 
particularly from a Board perspective, where the pressure to demonstrate effective 
corporate governance continues unabated. This is particularly so in the UAE environment 
with the recent emphasis being placed by the CBUAE mandate on ORM.
Given the lack of research in the area of operational risk in the UAE, it is hoped that the 
research will contribute to the construction of a cumulative knowledge vis-a-vis ORM, 
operational risk mitigation and the processes and tactics used to mitigate operational risk. 
The research is very much at the exploratory stage. No prior work was found to have been 
undertaken in this area in the UAE. Methodologically, the study contributes to the growing 
repository of case study research programmes in another area of business that is ORM, and 
may be viewed as a building block on integrated or comprehensive risk management.
1.7 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis has been structured in the following way:
  Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the related literature and discusses 
why operational risk is important and why a 'preliminary model' of the risk 
mitigation process was chosen. Related theoretical propositions are summoned 
when necessary and as relevant, in this Chapter;
Shareholder value is an analysis valuation approach which considers in broad terms that the value of a 
business to a shareholder can be determined by discounting its future cash flows using an appropriate cost of 
capital (Eldomiaty 2005).
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• Chapter 3 argues for the methodological position adopted and provides the research 
design;
• Chapter 4 provides the study findings emerging from the detailed data analysis 
work and provides related explanations;
• Chapter 5 discusses the implications for management, focusing particularly on 
ORM;
• Chapter 6 summaries the research and identifies the limitations and suggested areas 
for further research.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS
This Chapter covers the literature review and aims to build a theoretical foundation upon 
which the research is based. Relevant literature is reviewed and issues related to the topic 
being studied are identified. It begins with introductory comments concerning the areas of 
knowledge being reviewed. Each area is then examined separately in more detail.
An extensive state of the art of literature review is discussed in chronological order from 
the earlier studies to the most recent literature on the subject; unless the context dictates 
otherwise.
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Disciplines Covered by the Literature Review
The research is based on the following academic disciplines:
1. Management and Organisations: The decision-making environment and the 
organisational arrangements for operational risk mitigation;
2. Risk Management: The discipline where the literature review has been focused and, 
in particular, the regulatory environment, the control framework and the role of 
Internal Audit in the internal control framework;
3. Banking: The current issues facing the UAE commercial banking sector and how 
they may impact upon ORM;
Figure 3 illustrates diagrammatically how the research questions link to the wider body of
knowledge. The outer layer represents the wider body of knowledge, and this and the other
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layers may be peeled back to arrive at the core of the research problem, i.e. the research 
questions.











Scope of the research: 
ORJVI in the UAE 
commercial banks
(See section 1.4)
Relevant academic discipline: 





Wider body of knowledge
Source: Developed by the author
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2.1.2 Focus on Risk Management: Contingency Theory
Considering that the core discipline underpinning this research is risk management, a few
introductory words that reflect on its history and identify its theoretical positioning, are 
considered appropriate to place the research into context.
Bernstein (1996) discusses how a mere 350 years separate today's risk management 
techniques from decisions guided by superstition, blind faith and instinct. The notion of 
risk management by instinct can be seen throughout the history of civilisation. For 
example, early man feared attack from animals so mitigated that risk by living in a cave, 
and the Romans feared insurgence so mitigated that risk by maintaining a big well-trained 
army. Risk management is, therefore, nothing new and more recent times have seen 
increasing sophistication in the development of risk management techniques.
Earlier, Lavington (1925) developed an approach to the theory of business risk based on the 
economic view point of satisfying material needs and the inherent problems, or business 
risks, in attempting to achieve these needs. His theory was built on two conditions which 
affected production within an organisation: the intractability (difficulty in manipulating) of 
the natural resources at the organisation's disposal, and the incalculability (difficulty in 
foreseeing) of the results of the operations by which these resources are adapted by the 
organisation to produce goods and services for the society. He concludes that business risks 
consist of the probability of occurrence of losses which arise from incalculability. He, 
therefore, places the emphasis of risk management within the operations of the organisation 
where the goods and services are produced.
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More recently, McConnell (1996) in his review of major risks of international banking 
notes how the risk management function performs a similar role to the traditional control 
functions in the techno-structure21 part of the organisation, and that one of their primary 
roles is that of problem identification and formulation.
Risk management is also concerned with influences outside the firm, in particular, the 
environmental conditions within which the firm must operate. Hatch (2002) notes how 
rapidly changing environments require organisational flexibility giving rise to organic 
organisations22 , because like other living things, they adapt flexibly to changing 
circumstances. At the opposite end of the spectrum are mechanistic organisations which 
Hatch (2002) points out existed in stable environment where the need is for specialisation 
of the tasks and jobs undertaken, thus creating a high-performance and disciplined or 
mechanistic system.
The decision as to when to use either the organic or mechanistic form of organisation is an 
example of contingency theory (Hatch 2002). Contingency Theory is a behavioural theory 
that claims that there is no ideal way to organise and lead a company, or to make decisions 
Instead, the optimal course of action is contingent (dependent) upon the internal and 
external business environments (William 2001). Cade (2002) argues that risk management 
and the framework within which risk management takes place are rooted in contingency
21 The functions of the techno-structure operate at all levels of the organisation by analysing activities of the 
workers in the operational core, planning and carrying out studies of managerial tasks and planning and 
developing control systems for Senior Management (Mintzberg 19X9).
22 A term created by Bums and Stalker in the late 1950's. Organic organisations, unlike mechanistic 
organisations, are flexible and value external knowledge (Bums and Stalker 1961).
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theory since the process of risk identification (the first phase in the risk management 
process) takes place within a two dimensional framework within the business environment 
in which the firm operates: the likelihood of the risk (risk estimation) against its possible 
impact (risk evaluation). Risk mitigation, the phase that follows, must take due 
consideration (is contingent upon) of the probability and impact as part of the information 
from which a risk mitigation decision will have to be made Cade (2002).
2.1.3 Sources of Literature
In order to provide a broad ranging view of the disciplines, the literature has been selected
from both academic and practitioner sources. The emphasis has been on academic material, 
but the reader should note that there is also a reasonable number of relevant practitioners' 
references.
2.1.4 Model Building
Weik (1995) describes the process of model building or development as being iterative
where one is continually speculating and abstracting through the process using the data that 
has been collected. The resulting model should be composed of assumptions, abstract 
reasoning, and speculation which describes or explains an observed or experienced 
phenomenon's constructs (terms which may be applied or even defined on the basis of the 
observables), their interrelationships, and their boundaries Wcik (1995). An analogy was 
also cited by Baert and Carreira (2005). The operational risk mitigation model developed in 
this study is based on this process.
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The building of a model is of extreme importance to researchers because it can serve as a 
basis for accumulating and refining knowledge in the domain of interest (Thomas and 
James 2006). Since one of the objectives of this research is to present a model of 
operational risk mitigation, a few words on what model building is, are presented in this 
section.
Bell (2008) describes the purpose of a building a model as to organise efficiently and to 
communicate clearly. Epistemologically (from knowledge perspective), a model enables 
the components of a complex phenomenon to be brought together in one understandable 
whole (Macionis and Ken 2008). The terms good, middle range, and substantive model 
(Macionis and Ken 2008) are used to describe the scale of what is being proposed, although 
exactly what constitutes a good model has been a subject of debate (Berberoglu 2005, Baert 
and Carreira 2005, Macionis and Ken 2008). According to Baert and Carreira (2005), such 
debate has arisen due to increasing interest in the area of model building.
2.2 Management and Organisations
2.2.1 Theories of Management and Organisations
According to Hatch (2002), some of the earliest research on organisational environments
was built upon the observation that organisations differ considerably depending on whether 
they operate in a stable or rapidly changing environment. In stable environments, 
organisations are characterised by strict and clear lines of responsibility whilst in rapidly 
changing environments, organisations require flexibility and employees are not subject to
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the same rigorous control. This notion tallies with contingency theory (Cade2002) 
discussed in section 2.1.2. Contingency theory is used by many organisational theorists23 
(see for example William 2001, Hatch 2002, Cade 2002, Scott 2007 and Baron and 
Greenberg 2008) to provide a framework for deciding the most appropriate strategy for the 
organisation, and the importance of adopting the correct posture is highlighted by Scott 
(2007) who notes that scientific studies show that organisations which are too set in their 
ways (having too many rules and too much central control) ultimately cease to exist; and 
organisations which are too loose in their ways (have few rules and everyone looks after 
himself with little interest in others) also do not survive for long.
Baron and Greenberg (2008) indicate that managements24 of unstable firms seem reluctant 
to attribute poor performance to uncontrollable environmental events and instead, 
demonstrate what is called illusions of control by manipulating the words they use to 
describe the outcome of events. This has important implications for the way managers 
behave when times are difficult and when the need for sound judgement and good 
management is paramount.
Drawing on the work of Petit (1967), Tompkins (2005) argues that there are different types 
of managers who may be differentiated according to task, viewpoint, techniques, time 
horizon and decision making strategy. He explains a behavioural theory of management as
23 Organisational theory is the study and application of knowledge to how people - as individuals and as 
groups - act within organisations (Hatch 2002).
Management in business areas and organisational activities is the act of getting people together to 
accomplish desired goals and objectives (Robbins 2004).
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the actions that management takes in dealing with the firm's primary needs for uncertainty 
avoidance based upon the organisation's environment (Tompkins 2005).
The UAE commercial banks operate in a multi-cultural fast moving and rapidly changing 
environment, and according to the above analysis will need to continuously adapt to 
survive. Fundamental to this, generally speaking, will be the role of management in 
deciding upon the most appropriate strategy. The importance of managers as a distinctive 
occupational category has long been recognised by a number of scholars (see for example 
Taylor 1911, Fayol 1949, Carter 2004, Tompkins 2005 and Gomez and Luis 2008).
Carter (2004) claims that management is a set of individuals distinguished by the activities 
they perform, and goes on to identify four management perspectives Carter (2004, p. 89):
1. Management functions: the essence of management can be distilled into a number 
of functions (production, administrative, innovative, and so on), which need to be 
carried out in all organisations although how they are carried out may differ;
2. Management task characteristics: the tasks that management have to do within the 
functions are characterised by a number of different features such as being highly 
interdependent and context dependent;
3. Management roles: managers' jobs can be analysed into a number of interrelated 
roles related to behaviours and attributed to relative hierarchical positions;
4. Management control: arising from the nature of the relations of productions, 
management is compelled to create structures of control over the labour force.
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Carter (2004) concludes his analysis by proposing that the four perspectives may be viewed 
as ontological or natural layers of management with different layers exhibiting different 
rates of change depending on how various contingencies influence a particular layer.
The development of appropriate performance measures is picked up by Woods (2009) who 
advocates a contingency theory approach to performance measurement since, as the 
environment becomes more unstable, then performance measures must be sufficiently 
flexible to reflect resulting discontinuities. He points out that the establishment of 
performance measurement systems that are wrongly focused or too rigid may precipitate 
the fall into organisational decline, and the risk performance measurement systems fall 
within this area (Woods 2009).
2.2.2 The Organisation and Its Environment
The author would contend that Porter's (1985) work on the five forces has been providing a
well-established framework from which an organisation can objectively view its 
environment and the threats and opportunities that may be ahead (see section 2.4.1 for 
details of the five forces). Preparing for an uncertain future is best done by identifying the 
major events that have already happened and that will have predictable effects in the next 
decade or two (Drucker 1997). External environmental factors that can play an important 
role in determining strategy, and questions such as 'what external forces are shaping 
competition?' are viewed by El-Dyasty (2004) as helping to stake out the future.
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Environmental uncertainty has been well researched over the last few years (see for 
example Dean and Shanley 2000, Mulcaster 2009) with the dominant focus being on 
internal uncertainty reduction strategies or a focus on acquiring knowledge about the 
operation of the organisation. External uncertainty reduction strategies are described by 
Dean and Shanley (2000) as a means of acquiring knowledge about the environment and, 
where possible and desirable, creating more uncertainty for others in order to try and gain 
competitive advantage' . Acquiring such knowledge is often done by units within the 
organisation, which perform staff functions such as market research, or it may be integrated 
into the responsibilities of those who operate in the external environment, such as salesmen 
(Mulcaster 2009).
The UAE commercial banks are currently subject to much environmental uncertainty in the 
area of risk. This is being driven by a number of factors including the regulatory situation 
(Basel II), the Financial Crisis, Dubai Crisis and the move for a Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) single currency. These factors will be thoroughly examined in this literature review 
(section2.4.1).
25 Competitive advantage theory suggests that states and businesses should pursue policies that create high- 
quality goods to sell at high prices in the market. Lmphasis is on productivity growth as the locus of national 
strategies. The other theory, comparative advantage can lead countries to specialise in exporting primary 
goods and raw materials that trap countries in low-wage economies due to terms of trade. Competitive 
advantage attempts to correct for this issue by stressing maximising scale economies in goods and services 
that garner premium prices (Porter 1985).
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2.2.3 Decision Making in the Organisation
Based on a study of Chief Executive Officers' career path and the processes and problems 
they encounter when making decisions, Tedlow and Purrington (2003) point out that it is 
imperative to realise that the perfect decision making environment exists only in the minds 
of theorists. They conclude that even successful companies have not yet solved some of the 
important problems of management.
The work of Simon (1997), cited by Brooks (2002, p. 175) provides a four phase decision- 
making model, covering:
1. Intelligence activity - searching the environment for conditions calling for 
decisions;
2. Design activity - inventing, developing and analysing possible courses of action;
3. Choice activity - selecting a particular course of action;
4. Review activity - assessing past choices.
Lurie (2004) expands upon the last activity and describes it as an implementation phase 
where the action plan from the choice activity is implemented. Lurie (2004, p. 473) goes on 
to explore the choice process in some detail and comes up with five types used by decision 
makers:
1. Historical: the solution would be drawn from the practice of others and would 
involve the decision maker selecting a procedure which is known to work;
2. Off-the-shelf: the solution is drawn from a selection of best ideas collected by the 
decision maker;
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3. Appraisal: the decision maker begins with an idea that has an unknown value and 
seeks to implement it rationally and top down;
4. Search: the decision maker seeks a new solution but needs help in knowing where 
to look;
5. Nova: the decision maker seeks to implement a solution which is innovative and 
aims to challenge the way things are being done in the organisation.
Simon's (1997) model, as pointed out by Brooks (2002) is, however, not without its critics. 
Sloan (2008) argues that the framework is a serious obstacle for the evolution of Decision 
Support Systems (DSS) and practice, arguing that different types of DSS could emerge 
from the adoption of alternative perspectives of human decision-making. DSS aims to 
extend methodologies and techniques developed in different research areas and to combine 
them into a new form of computer-based systems able to support and enhance managerial 
decision-making (Sloan 2008). Such systems may be developed to (Sloan 2008, p. 123):
• Facilitate the structuring of a decision so that the analytical tools, possibly several 
in combination, can be used in generating solutions;
• Facilitate the use of the analytical tools and bring them together through a 
structuring process;
• Facilitate the manipulation, retrieval and display of data.
Despite the growing interest in DSS, Palocsay (2008) notes that the subjectivity cannot be 
removed from the decision-making processes, and that there is no substitute for intuition, 
experience and judgement when it comes to making decisions. Palocsay (2008) goes on to
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point out that people do not work mechanically in their business nature; they work by 
experience, instinct and analysis.
Robbins and Timothy (2008) develop a decision making model starting with the process of 
realising a problem, establishing and evaluating planning criteria, creating alternatives, 
implementing alternatives, and monitoring progress of the alternatives. They claim that the 
model is central in the development of modem DSS being a process for making logically 
sound decisions by following an orderly path from problem identification through to 
solution. Figure 4 illustrates the model.
Figure 4: Decision Making Model
Source: Robbins and Timothy (2008)
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Robbins and Timothy (2008) argue that their model is suited for structuring a DSS because 
the generic aspect of the model allows decision makers to concentrate on actions specific 
for particular phases of the decision-making processes, and its analytical feature contributes 
to the decomposition of the decision problem between its components.
From operational risk mitigation perspective, a risk management support system is based 
on the DSS domain. As will be discussed in section 2.4.3, Aref (2009) in his review of 
information technology for risk management highlights that many financial institutes have 
risk management support systems already in place whereas many others have already 
started the deployment process.
Henri and Joumeault (2009) provide an analysis of some decision-making models and 
propose a contingency theory of decision-making which relates the situation facing the 
decision-maker to the model to be used. Their analysis looks at the models by functional 
area, by process and by level (in the organisation). They make a number of specific 
recommendations some of which are important in the context of operational risk:
• Theorists must carefully study the real world of decision-making: the focus should 
be on understanding the application of the model in the field where dynamic factors 
can be assessed in the context of the model;
• Decision models must encompass the whole decision-making process: the need to 
look at risk mitigation in the context of the wider management of risk and;
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• Models must deal particularly with dynamic factors and multiple goals: the need is 
for open-system models of decision-making which recognise conflicting goals, 
limited data, timing difficulties, possible interruptions, delays to implementation 
and of the factoring of larger decisions into smaller ones.
Mukherjee (2008) provides an analysis on decision-makers and their behavioural attitude to 
risk when making a decision. He notes that decision-makers have a strong tendency to 
consider problems as unique, and the natural way to think about a problem is to exploit all 
one knows about it (experience), whilst paying special attention to its unique features. He 
also finds that people also exaggerate their control over events and the importance of the 
skills and resources they possess in ensuring desirable outcomes from the decision; leading 
to more decisions being taken without fully appreciating the risks involved. In looking at 
whether organisations provide effective controls against the optimistic bias of individual 
executives, he observes that a rational organisation would want to base its decisions on 
unbiased odds but that arrogance or optimism can lead to mistakes in decision-making that 
can cost the organisation dearly. Evidence to support this view comes from Asif (2010) 
who suggests that managers can spend a substantial part of their time dealing with 
consequences of bad decisions.
Asif (2010) indicates that some interesting issues arise for banks in the context of 
operational risk mitigation. A consistent approach to operational risk mitigation (decision 
making) is arguably required if managements are to act rationally when faced with
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operational risk problems. The challenge facing managements is to articulate and spread 
their approach as an integral part of the ORM control strategy.
2.2.4 Barriers to Decision Making: the Theory of Bounded Rationality
The literature review reveals that decision-making is one of the toughest as well as one of
the riskiest jobs of any executive (see for example Hammond et al. 1998, Cash and William 
2002, Fioretti 2008, Henri and Joumeault 2009). Fioretti (2008) points to a number of 
psychological traps that are particularly likely to undermine business decisions: the 
anchoring trap, the status-quo trap, the confirming-evidence trap, the framing trap and the 
estimating and forecasting traps. Many of these traps can work in isolation or in concert. 
His argument supports the view of Martin et al. (2004) who discuss Simon's (1972) theory 
of bounded rationality which locates the constraints of decision-making mainly in the 
decision maker. The theory of bounded rationality postulates that in decision making, the 
rationality of individuals is mainly limited by the cognitive limitations of their minds. Also, 
the information they have and the finite amount of time they have to make decisions are 
limiting factors (Simon 1972).
The literature review found substantial work on the 'games' that decision-makers play (see 
for example Brindle 1999, Kelly 2003, Sanfey 2007). In his review of the cognitive 
decision processes Sanfey (2007) identifies some games that managers play, such as misuse 
of analogy, framing and rationality, and argues that whilst we cannot control human nature 
at the decision-making table, we can learn to be more adept at the games which are played 
every day.
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Citing Basi (1998), another aspect of decision-making that is noted in the literature by 
McKinnon (2003) is based on the position of the decision-maker in the organisation and the 
organisational culture. McKinnon (2003) provides an analysis of decision-making styles 
vis-a-vis organisation cultures and illustrates manager's freedom to act on a decision- 
making continuum, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Organisational Culture and Manager Decision-making Ability
Organisational Culture
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Source: Adapted from McKinnon (2003)
As can be seen from the diagram, the degrees of freedom available to the manager vary 
considerably depending upon the type of organisational culture that exists. Finally, Graham
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(2008) advocates that the risk maturity of the organisation is seen as a possible constraint 
against selecting a particular course of action.
The discussion in this section identifies some of the barriers or constraints that occur when 
decision-making has to take place in the organisation, and illustrates some of the 
complexities involved in the decision-making process, all of which have implications for 
the way an operational risk mitigation decision is taken.
2.2.5 Implications for Operational Risk Management
There is evidence to indicate that the UAE commercial banks are facing a changing
external environment and that management will need to keep abreast of the changes that 
are occurring and the operational risks that they may bring. Part of the management process 
entails looking ahead, planning for expected and unexpected outcomes, organising 
adequate resources, and controlling the work done. The operational risks associated with 
the future strategic intent of the bank in this turbulent environment, will require effective 
mitigation strategies. Management behaviour in dealing with these risks must take account 
of any delusions of control that may exist, and the development of appropriate performance 
measurement systems to monitor operational risks will assume increasing importance.
Operational risk mitigation involves making a decision and, as the analysis in this section 
has shown, this can involve a complicated set of processes contingent upon the nature of 
the risk. The complexity and subjectivity of the process provide illustrations of some of the 
constraints that put pressure on managers when the choice has to be made about what to do.
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The implication is that there should be a drive towards a more uniform and structured 
approach to the risk mitigation process, taking into account the organisational culture and 
the freedom of managers to act.
2.2.6 Summary
This section has provided some theoretical propositions relating to organisations, 
management within organisation, how the organisation copes with environmental factors 
and decision-making. The emphasis within this section has been to provide a theoretical 
underpinning for the research, and to place the research area, operational risk mitigation, in 
the wider body of knowledge concerning management and organisations. The review 
highlighted how contingency theory and bounded rationality theory can play an important 
part in both the organisational structure and the decision-making process. The behavioural 
aspects of management and the internal environment in which it has to operate also feature 
in the day-to-day decisions that managers have to make. The section concluded with a 
review of the implications for ORM.
2.3 Risk Management
2.3.1 The Concept of Risk and Risk Management
"...managers in the past did not want to deal with information of historical nature, 
but today, the emphasis is on identifying a potential problem and taking action 
before it happens."
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This quote from one of the Risk Managers interviewed appears to capture the essence of 
what proactive, as opposed to reactive risk management (Douglas 2009) is all about: 
identifying a potential problem (risk) and taking action (mitigation) before it happens. This 
is a view shared by Masli and Peters (2009) and Hopkin (2010) who describe the activity of 
risk management as being the embodiment of the old proverb: prevention is better than
cure.
It is likely that most people's understanding of the word risk would trigger the thought of 
something that could go wrong. A point emphasised by the Oxford English Dictionary 
definition of risk, that is; "the possibility of incurring misfortune or loss." This negative 
definition of risk, however, ignores the expected benefits of rewards that can accrue from 
taking risks and management has plenty of opportunities to take speculative risks in areas 
such as the investment function, where the decision to invest can subsequently yield losses 
as well as gains. Equally, a failed business acquisition, a missed opportunity to enhance 
performance, or the failure to move into a new business area are as much a risk as the 
possibility of a control failure (Branger and Schlag 2004).
The concept of risk was normally associated with insurance (Branger and Schlag 2004), a 
point emphasised in the past by describing the Risk Manager's role in the organisation as 
being involved with the technical aspects of insurance (Robert 1999). In current 
organisational terms, risk and how it is managed have taken a much broader dimension. 
Hence, the assessment of risk and the development of corporate strategy should now go 
hand in hand, as outlined by Alexander and Sheedy (2005). This change in risk
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management paradigm is illustrated by Alexander and Sheedy (2005), who describe it as 
reinventing risk management, as per Table 1.
Table 1: Reinventing Risk Management
Old Paradigm





Insurance jargon understood by a few
New Paradigm




Board and Senior Management support and 
involvement
Common risk language understood by the 
boardroom downwards
Source: Adapted from Alexander and Sheedy (2005)
The table identifies how risk management has broadened to cover all aspects of the 
business as well as illustrating how Senior Management understanding and involvement is 
essential in establishing the risk management culture.
Dionne (2005) notes that the general concept of risk is the chance, in quantitative terms, of 
a hazard occurring. It, therefore, combines a probabilistic measure of the occurrence of an 
event with the measure of the consequence of that event.
According to Caplan (2004) risk is a dominant feature of society. The business of 
estimating and addressing risk is complex and controversial and has become an industry 
with many competing specialists, a view confirmed by Ishmael and Stacy-Marie (2005).
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Lam (2006, p. 12) points out that the discipline of risk management is well advanced in 
sectors outside of the financial services, and identifies a number of different experiences of 
risk management:
• The fundamental risk assessment processes are subjective and risk cannot, 
therefore, be unambiguously measured in objective terms;
• The actions of people cannot be predicted with certainty, and individual action in 
particular, cannot be pre-specified and reduced to a simple numerical 
representation;
• In the case of extreme events, data is likely to be in short supply; making it
extremely difficult to obtain a realistic, quantitative appraisal given the high level of 
uncertainty;
• For a dynamic organisation operating in a dynamic global economy the past is not 
necessarily a good predictor of the future.
These experiences illustrate the complexity of risk management, and some of the 
difficulties associated with quantifying risk exposures.
The growing interest in risk and risk management is evidenced by the increasing attention 
being shown by the quality Journals about the subject such as: Risk Magazine, Journal of 
Operational Risk, Operational Risk and Regulation, Risk.net, OpRisk Compliance and 
Regulation. These Journals are monthly and quarterly periodicals specialising in all aspects 
of risk with particular emphasis on operational risk. They draw on the collective
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experience of practitioners and academics alike and provide a comprehensive overview of 
the important concepts of risk management. Given such increasing interest in risk 
management, it begs the question: Why should organisations manage risk? Hopkin (2010) 
argues that good management is risk management, because it is inevitable for all 
managements. The Public Risk Management Association (2010, p.45) furnishes five 
reasons why it believes firms should manage risk:
1. Risk management can be used to align interests of management with those of the 
owners of the company;
2. Risk management can be used to improve cash dividends;
3. Risk management can be used to encourage and protect from adverse events;
4. Risk management can be used to assist firms in developing financial plans and 
funding programmes;
5. Risk management can reduce the costs of financial distress and bankruptcy.
A number of these issues are to do with managing cash flows, for example, the stabilisation 
of cash dividend payments, and both managing cash and managing risk are seen as 
essential for survival (Gewei 2008). Sabato (2009) goes as far as saying that risk 
management programmes should have an overarching goal of enhancing cash flows, which 
in turn should lead to improved firm performance.
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2.3.2 Risk Management Framework
BCBS published its 272 page comprehensive revised framework: "International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards " in the year 2006. The 
framework primarily focused on recommendations on banking laws and regulations. Its 
purpose is to create an international standard that banking regulators can use when creating 
regulations about capital adequacy to guard against the types of financial and operational 
risks banks face (Basel II). The framework is currently used by the majority of countries in 
the world (Moosa 2007). The literature review revealed that besides BCBS, a multitude of 
authors addressed risk management as a contemporary topic and reiterated its extreme 
importance (see for example Sadgrove 1996, Scandizo 2005, Hull 2006, Gewei 2008 and 
Sabato 2009).
In considering how to manage risk, Andersen and Torben (2005) provide a framework 
based on three components and focused on negative connotation of risk: the exposure to 
loss, the chance of loss and the magnitude of loss. The components of loss are described by 
Venkataraman (2006) as being a threat (a disaster that can lead to a loss of resources), 
which leads to an event (a loss of resource for a definite time period). Venkataraman 
(2006) argues that to manage risk, you need to reduce one or more components. This 
description could involve building complex models based on previous risk exposures 
within the organisation, assuming one is able to capture the data. (Gustafsson 2007).
A number of authors (see for example White 1995, Parker 2005, Millo and MacKenzie 
2007, Jason 2009) summarise the principal approach to risk management as outlined in
section 1.1.2. This approach can then be applied equally to all types of risk exposure within
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a company (Parker 2005) and is summarised in the model shown earlier in Figure I. The 
model involves a systematic approach to risk identification, estimation, evaluation and 
mitigation. Figure 6 draws on the work of Millo and MacKenzie (2007) and illustrates how 
risks can be categorised into one of four quadrants, depending on how the probability (risk 
estimation) and impact (risk evaluation) of the risk are assessed.




















Low Impact High Impact 
Risk Evaluation
Source: Millo and MacKenzie (2007)
In addition, a whole body of literature has been developed on frameworks for managing 
project and enterprise risks (Lam 2005). COSO (2004) develops an enterprise risk 
management integrated framework; Bena (2006) examines risk classification 
methodologies for the information technology (IT) projects; Virine and Trumpcr (2007)
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look at the tools used in managing project risks; Kenneth (2009) illustrates a system for 
prioritising project risks, and tracking the progress of risk mitigation.
The reader will note that these frameworks are built around proactive risk management, i.e. 
trying to prevent something from happening rather than dealing with something that has 
happened (reactive management). Other methods for proactively managing risks are 
discussed by Alexander and Gordon (2008) who discuss techniques for benchmarking risk 
management in the organisation with suggestions on how it can be improved. James and 
Roberts (2009) maintain that organisations should predict and handle risk crises promptly 
since they do not improve with time.
2.3.3 Risk Perceptions and Decision Making: Prospects Theory
Dake (1990) argues that our attitudes towards risk vary according to what has happened to
us, what we expect, what we feel and what we care about. In other words, our perceptions 
of risk are selective and change as our social and business lives change. He explains five 
theories of risk perception as follows Dake (1990, p. 41):
1. Knowledge theory: people perceive technologies to be dangerous because they are 
not familiar with them;
2. Personality theory: some individuals love risk-taking so they may take many risks, 
while others are risk averse and seek to avoid as many risks as they can;
3. Economic theory: the rich are more willing to take risks stemming from technology 
because they benefit more and are somehow shielded from adverse consequences;
4. Political theory: people view the controversies over risk as struggles over interests;
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5. Cultural theory: adherents of hierarchy perceive acts of social deviance (risk) to be 
dangerous because such behaviour may disturb their preferred subordinate form of 
social relations.
Dake (1990) goes on to conclude that people perceive a variety of risks in a manner that 
supports their way of life and suggest that risk communication programmes might 
profitably be used to focus on the underlying causes of risk perception rather than only on 
the possible harms. This point on risk communication is picked up by a number of authors 
(Recchia 1999, Ragnar 2004, Nielson et al. 2005). Nielson et al. (2005) discuss why risk 
communication, or the science of understanding scientific and technological risk and how it 
is communicated, have become so important, and why risk communication programmes 
will only be successful if they raise the level of understanding of relevant issues or actions, 
and satisfy those involved that they are adequately informed within the limits of available 
knowledge.
Biais (2006) notes that one of the reasons why a risk analysis may not be carried out in a 
project is because there is a perception that the risks are not sufficiently great or are too 
poorly understood to justify analysis, and a perception that the risks will in any case be 
borne by the parties.
The interplay of the variables that influence how people formulate their perceptions of risk 
has been studied by Otway and Thomas (2006) and their model is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Risk Perception Formulation Model
Resulting perceptions and 
opinions
Source: Otway and Thomas (2006)
Risk perceptions are important in a business decision-making context; because a substantial 
part of the literature dealing with risky choice behaviour assumed that decision makers are 
risk averse (Bigoni and Frid 2008). Prospect theory, however, developed by Kahenman and 
Tversky (1979) indicates that when managers anticipate negative changes in wealth, they 
display risk seeking behaviour, but when anticipating positive changes in wealth, they 
exhibit risk averse behaviour. Prospect theory is a theory that describes decisions between 
alternatives that involve risk, with uncertain outcomes. The model is descriptive and tries to 
model real-life choices, rather than optimal decisions (Kahenman and Tversky 1979). 
Adams (1998) describes such behaviour as being the balancing act between risk and 
reward.
Recent advances in behavioural decision theory have also confirmed that most individuals 
exhibit a mixture of risk seeking and risk averse behaviour (Bigoni and Krid 2008), a view 
supported by McDermott et al. (2008) who develop a behavioural agency model of risk-
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taking which suggests that managers' risk-taking behaviours vary according to the type of 
monitoring they are subjected to by the principals of the business (shareholders).
Other research into risk-taking behaviour (Taylor 2008) highlights how the factors 
perceived control and the nature of the risk information available have an important role to 
play in influencing the risk-taking decision managers make. Information can play an 
important part in the decision-making process about a risk, and Agarwal (2008) notes that 
insufficient attention has been given to the information requirement of risk management 
decisions. Michael and Ebert (2009) suggest that risk management decisions can be 
significantly improved when managers are aware of the full range of controls at their 
disposal.
The practical realities of decision making in an operational environment are investigated by 
Sloan (2008) who supports the use of DSS for interactive real-time risk management where 
the decision maker is able to analyse risks and make decisions in real time during 
unexpected disruptions in the operations (see section 2.2.3 for a discussion on DSS 
systems).
It should be apparent from the previous discussions that the aspect of risk perception is 
important in determining the decision made by the manager. There does not appear to be a 
'one size fits all' model because the number of different variables at play is large and 
diverse. Woods (2009), in investigating a contingency model of strategic risk-taking, 
identifies a number of key variables that he considers affect the risk decision. For example.
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self-confidence, knowledge, biases, and performance of the decision maker are important, 
whilst in the environmental area, the economy, government regulations, technological 
change and cultural values need to be addressed, too.
2.3.4 Focus on Operational Risk
2.3.4.1 Reviewing the Definition of Operational Risk
As discussed in section 1.1.1, BCBS published its second Capital Accord to address
operational risk: "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards " in 2004 (BCBS 2004), and a revised edition in 2006 (Basel II). A survey made 
by the author revealed that Basel 11 incorporated the phrase 'operational risk' on 145 
occasions. The author would contend that such emphasis could be interpreted as an 
indication of the importance of operational risk in the banking sector.
Basel (2001, p. 32) defines operational risk as "The risk of direct or indirect loss resulting 
from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or external events. " Basel 
II upgrades the definition to include legal risk but exclude strategic and reputational risks 
(section 1.1.3), thus;
"Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition includes 
legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk" ( Basel 11, p. 140).
The origins of this definition of operational risk arc derived from the major operational risk 
survey undertaken by the British Banking Association and Price Watcrhousc Coopers 
(BBA 1999a). Whilst it may be that the latter definition became universally accepted, the
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literature evidences a large number of definitions were formulated to describe the term 
'operational risk.' The following is a cross-section of some of the definitions:
"Operational Risk is the risk that improper operation of trade processing or 
management system will result in financial loss. Operational risk encompasses the 
risk of loss due to the breakdown in controls within the firm including, hut not 
limited to, unidentified limit excesses, unauthorised trading, fraud in trading or in 
back office functions including inadequate books and records and a lack of basic 
internal accounting controls, inexperienced personnel, and unstable and easily 
accessed systems" Oldfield and Santamero (1997, p. 33).
"Operational Risk is the risk of loss resulting from breakdown in administrative 
procedures and controls or any aspect of operating procedures" Treasury 
Management Association of Canada (1998, p. 11).
"Operational Risk is the difference between the inherent risk of an activity and the 
hedges used to mitigate the risk" Senior (1999, p. 24).
"Operational Risk is the risk that deficiencies in information systems or internal 
controls will result in unexpected loss. The risk is associated with human error, 
systems failure and inadequate procedures and controls. " This was a sample 
definition from one bank.
"Operational Risk is the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or external events " BBA (1999a, p. 
17). This definition was adapted by Basel II to produce its definition version of 
operational risk.
"Operational risk is the problems associated with accurately processing, settling, 
and taking or making delivery on trades in exchange for cash. It also arises in 
record keeping, computing correct payment amounts, processing system failures, 
and complying with various regulations. " Currie (2004, p. 14)
"Operational Risk is the risk arising from execution of a company's business 
functions due to people, systems and processes through which a company operates. 
It includes fraud, legal, physical and environmental risks " OCC (2005, p. 18).
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The field interviews in the selected UAE commercial banks revealed that Basel II 
definition is the one accepted amongst most of the UAE commercial banks as the workable 
definition; with minor variations in some cases to accommodate specific bank 
requirements. This phenomenon will be discussed during the analysis of the study findings 
(Chapter 4).
Apart from the second definition which appears to be very specific and that of Senior 
(1999) which appears to leave open many questions such as 'what is an activity?' the others 
appear to have a theme: a loss resulting from breakdown (failure/deficiency) in the internal 
controls (systems/procedures). This breakdown can occur for a variety of reasons some of 
which are quoted above: inexperienced employees, unauthorised trading and fraud. 
Equally, a breakdown can occur because there is no control (or controls) in place to reduce 
the possibility of the risk occurring. Only one of the definitions (Treasury Management 
Association of Canada) places a boundary around the definition by linking the breakdowns 
to operating (as opposed to strategic) procedures which give rise to operational risk. 
It is probably safe to assume that this boundary is implied in all the others, although some 
definitions appear to have a narrower focus than the others.
The common theme referred above in the definitions indicates that a loss will occur when 
an operational risk event manifests itself. This happens, for example, when there is a 
breakdown in the control systems, which are designed to mitigate the risk. This establishes
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a link between a risk and a control 26, i.e. a risk is mitigated by a control (or a series of 
controls), and a control acts to reduce the probability of a risk occurring. A further common 
feature of the definitions is that risk resides within the business/process/procedures/systems 
or, putting it more concisely, the internal control environment that exists within a company. 
This is pointed out in Basel II which notes that operational risk is principally addressed 
through a firm's internal control framework. Continuing with this logic, it can be seen that 
the internal control framework (or the processes within it) gives rise to (operational) risks 
which are in turn mitigated by controls. Diagrammatically this can be represented as shown 
in Figure 8:














Source: Developed by the author
Whilst this simple diagram may draw together the common components of operational risk 
and be intuitively easy to understand, it does not necessarily illustrate the potential for loss 
arising from external as opposed to internal events. The author, however; offers it as a 
pictorial way of describing what is meant by operational risk from an internal perspective.
26 The term control is used to describe any action which serves to mitigate a risk. This could include but is not 
limited to internal accounting controls, risk management policies and any other form of management control 
(Merchant 2002 and Spira and Page (2003).
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2.3.4.2 Operational Risk Sources
According to the BBA (1999a, p. 22), banks acategorise operational risk sources into a 
number of different areas to help managers understand what the definition encompasses. 
Such areas include:
1. System failure and error.
2. Transaction processing error.
3. Business interruptions.
4. Internal and external criminal act.
5. Personnel errors.
However, different banks use different categories and sub-categories, suggesting that 
operating procedures and hence operational risk sources are interpreted differently by 
different banks. On the other hand, Basel (2006, p.257) classifies operational risk sources, 
and hence operational risk event types in more detail, as follows:
1. Internal Fraud - misappropriation of assets, tax evasion, intentional mismarking of 
positions and bribery.
2. External Fraud- theft of information, hacking damage, third-party theft and 
forgery.
3. Employment Practices and Workplace Safety - discrimination, worker 
compensation and employee health and safety.
4. Clients, Products and Business Practice- market manipulation, antitrust, improper 
trade, product defects, fiduciary breaches and account churning.
5. Damage to Physical Assets - natural disasters, terrorism and vandalism.
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6. Business Disruption and Systems Failures - utility disruptions, software failures 
and hardware failures.
7. Execution, Delivery and Process Management - data entry errors, accounting 
errors, failed mandatory reporting and negligent loss of client assets.
In its June 2010 operational risk report, which contains a high-level overview of the global 
operational risk loss database and the high level trends in operational risk losses, ORX 
Association (2010, p. 32) classifies operational risk sources slightly differently, thus:
1. Internal fraud.
2. External fraud.
3. Employment practices and workplace safety.
4. Clients, products and business practices.
5. Disasters and public safety.
6. Technology and infrastructure failures.
7. Execution, delivery and process management.
8. Malicious damage.
Further, the report reflects operational risk event severity and frequency on the various 
business lines for a time horizon of one year (2009): corporate finance, trading and sales, 
commercial banking, clearing, agency services, asset management, retail brokerage, private 
banking, corporate items and multiple lines.
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Analysis of the report (ORX Association 2010) data reveals that the top three event types 
that account for more than 85% of the number of total operational risk events - in 
descending order; with the maximum severity and frequency are:
1. Fraud - internal and external;
2. Execution, delivery and process management;
3. Clients, products and business practices.
The author would contend that banks need to prioritise the management of these types of 
operational risk, with special emphasis on fraud that will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section. Another finding in the report is that commercial banking is incurring the 
maximum number of operational risk events, with the maximum severity and frequency, 
totaling losses amounting to billions of dollars per year (ORX Association 2010). This 
gives more impetus to the research, and demonstrates that the selection of operational risk 
mitigation as an area of research in the UAE commercial banking industry is extremely 
important and intuitively appealing and challenging to the author.
2.3.4.2.1 Fraud: General Deterrence Theory
Internal and external fraud are two major sources of operational risk out of seven, as
classified by Basel II, that every organisation faces. ORX Association (2010) points out 
that banks are vulnerable to the impact of fraud. The large scale losses that banks have 
suffered bear witness to this; perhaps the most famous being BCCI which resulted in the 
complete collapse of the bank. Other recent examples of severe losses incurred due to fraud
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are the Madoff27 (Clauss and Roncalli 2009) and the Societe Generale cases. Carpenter 
(2007) discusses certain types of fraud to which banks are particularly vulnerable, 
including card28 fraud, phantom cash withdrawals, internet fraud and money laundering. 
Money laundering, or the attempt by criminals to legitimise the proceeds of crime by 
placing it into legitimate accounts is one area of concern for all banks where they work 
together to combat this type of fraud (Carpenter 2007).
Computer Crime Research Centre (2005) discusses another type of fraud that hits banks, 
that is of crime in cyberspace, and illustrates, in particular the jurisdictional issues that can 
arise due to the complexities of establishing where the event took place, and having 
governments with harmonised computer crime laws (Computer Crime Research Centre 
2005). Wikimedia Foundation (2010) lists more than twenty banking fraud scenarios. Fraud 
against banks and the methods used to bring the perpetrators to justice are discussed by 
Green and Reinstein (2004). They point out the complexities that can be involved with 
bank fraud and the administrative steps that need to be taken. All of these points illustrate 
the need to ensure that adequate control procedures are in place to guard against the threat 
of fraud risk and the impact that it may have on the bank both in financial and reputational 
terms.
Theoretical propositions concerning the effectiveness of counter measures taken to prevent 
fraud acts include the General Deterrence theory (Straub and Welke 1998). This theory
For detailed analysis of operational risks in the Madoff case see Clauss & Roncalli (200')). 
The term card embraces credit and debit cards, charge cards, and all similar instruments.
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points that individuals with an instrumental intent to commit antisocial acts can be 
dissuaded by the administration of strong disincentives and sanctions relevant to these acts 
(Straub and Welke 1998).
2.3.4.3 The Increasing Emphasis on Operational Risk Management
"It is difficult for banks to understand the extent of the risks they are assuming at 
any moment. Their ability to understand risk often lags seriously behind their urgent 
need to do so."
The above quote by one of the Risk Managers interviewed in this research illustrates a 
growing problem for banks, how to ensure that the risks they manage today are the ones 
that could affect their performance tomorrow. How well do banks understand operational 
risks and the impact that they have on the business? Netter and Poulsen (2003) consider 
that the re-engineering of the business in recent years has forced bank management to look 
afresh at the challenges of operational risk.
BCBS (2003) issued its revised fifty-one article document "Sound Practices for the 
Management and Supervision of Operational Risk." Special emphasis was placed on four 
areas of operational risk (BCBS 2003, p.21):
1. Role of Supervisors: Banking supervisors should require that all banks, regardless 
of size, have an effective framework in place to identify, assess, monitor and 
mitigate material operational risks as part of an overall approach to risk 
management.
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2. Developing an Appropriate Operational Risk Management Environment: The Board 
should be aware of the major aspects of the bank's operational risks as a distinct 
risk category that should be managed, and it should approve and periodically review 
the bank's ORM framework.
3. Risk Management: Banks should identify, monitor, assess and mitigate the
operational risks inherent in all material products, activities, processes and systems. 
Banks should also ensure that before new products, activities, processes and 
systems are introduced or undertaken, the operational risks inherent in them are 
subject to adequate assessment procedures.
4. Role of Disclosure: Banks should make sufficient public disclosure to allow market 
participants to assess their approach to ORM.
Moosa (2007b) points out that a new impetus driven by a number of factors has taken 
shape in ORM. He identifies information technology, business climate, outsourcing, 
globalisation and regulation. The following discussion demonstrates these factors in more 
detail:
• Information Technology: Stonebumer and Feringa (2004) illustrate how the rapid 
development in IT provides the platform from which financial services companies 
can provide new rapid and enhanced services, the so called online banking" , to 
their customers. The reduction in time and transaction costs brought about by these 
developments has seen new entrants in the UAK banking market. This is a dual-
Online banking (or Internet banking) allows customers to conduct financial transactions on a secure 
website operated by their commercial or virtual bank.
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edged sword in ORM since it requires new processes to deal with the new 
technologies and new strategies to deal with the instigated operational risks.
• Business Climate: Sandra and Strahan (2004) argue that informed customers, new 
entrants and financial innovations are the main driving forces that are leading to 
increased competitive pressures and a greater need to manage operational risk. They 
also discuss the current climate of rapid change and how it is, for example, reducing 
decision-making timeframes and making people less aware of unusual events, hi 
such an environment ORM should be an ongoing, rather than a static process.
• Outsourcing: the trend towards outsourcing is noted by Shailey (2005) as being 
important since this type of service implies that operational risk implications need 
to be considered and understood as part of contractual negotiations. The author 
would contend that in reverting to outsourcing, banks should not lose their 
identities; otherwise, outsourcing can instigate additional operational risks that will 
overload banks with additional burdens.
• Globalisation: there is an increase in risk exposure when a company leaves its home 
market and ventures into uncharted waters. Whilst companies can reduce the risk 
through joint ventures and strategic alliances, the balance will be between the cost 
of the risk (we are going to do this on our own) and the cost of the control (we are 
going to play safe and share the risk with somebody else) (Franzoni 2008). hi his 
analysis of various risks, Franzoni (2008) notes the increasing trend towards 
globalisation with its attractiveness to customers. A point re-iterated by Basu and 
Hung (2009) who emphasise the marketing economics that can be made, but warn 
about the resulting operational risks. Such studies illustrate how managing
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operational risk exposures, requires a global rather than a national mindset (Basel 
II). The author would contend that banks should think globally and act locally.
• Regulation: Basel II has placed tremendous emphasis on risk management,
disclosure and reporting of risk management activities (Avgouleas 2009). Basel II 
will be discussed in detail in section 2.4.2
On the other hand, banks should expect some benefits to accrue from more proactive ORM 
Andreas (2010, p. 31) identifies some of the expected gains:
• A measure against financial crises vis-a-vis the current Financial Crisis;
• A quantifiable reduction in losses;
• Better risk mitigation;
• More efficient allocation of capital;
• Risk 'comfort' for Senior Managers;
• Risk 'comfort' for regulators;
• unproved project investment analysis.
This last point is particularly important in large-scale projects where significant risks (high 
impact) can occur and where there is a greater need for more comprehensive risk 
frameworks able to capture where and how risks arise (Bamberger 2010).
Gustafsson (2007) points out that as ORM efforts mature, and gain both the support and the 
confidence of the Board, they will become increasingly valuable to the business. Perceived 
initially to support regulatory requirements, these efforts can be leveraged and aligned with
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the business performance management. To be successful, however, such alignment must be 
based on a clear vision of the potential benefits.
Gustafsson (2007) goes on to explain that a bank needs to be focused on the regular 
monitoring of its operational risk profiles and material exposures to operational risk losses 
with the Board supporting the proactive management of operational risks. Successfully 
navigating the road from compliance to value creation can be daunting without a roadmap 
and a clear vision by the Board. By taking a holistic (integrated) approach to ORM an 
organisation can significantly lower its risk profile and improve responsiveness to risk 
scenarios leading to strategic and operational benefits (Gustafsson 2007). Bonson and 
Flores (2008) argue that the bank's ORM should carry out assessments of operational risks, 
prepare recommendations for operational risk mitigation, analyse new products, and 
implement a number of tools recommended by BCBS, including: internal and external data 
loss collection and reporting, key risk indicators (KR1), and control and risk self- 
assessments. Further, a bank needs to maintain records for all risk management related 
data: a reusable library of operational risks and their corresponding controls and 
assessments, results from individual assessments, KRl's, incidents and mitigation plans 
(Bonson and Flores 2008).
As a result of increasing emphasis that has been placed on ORM, academic research began 
to develop. Examples of research into theoretical propositions for operational risk in the 
financial services arena are numerous. Two examples arc given below:
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• Wahler (2006) examines the relative contributions of prospect theory (see section 
2.3.3) and agency theory30 explanations for specific operational risks and 
subsequent firm performance in both regulated and non-regulated environments;
• Moosa (2007) critiques the techniques used for operational risk measurement, 
concluding that they are all flawed, and proposes that financial institutions should 
focus their attention on using an agency theory framework for managing operational 
risk.
2.3.4.4 Internal Control
2.3.4.4.1 Internal Control in Organisations: Control and Complexity Theories
Fayol (1949) identifies control as one of five functions of management, the others being
planning, organising, commanding and coordinating. By control he means verifying 
whether everything occurs in conformity with the plans adopted, instructions issued and 
principles established. An internal control system has been described by Spira and Page 
(2003, p. 251) as the policies, processes, tasks, behaviours and other aspects of a company 
that, taken together:
• Facilitate its effective and efficient operation by enabling it to respond appropriately 
to significant business, operational, financial compliance and other risks to 
achieving the company's objectives;
• Help ensure the quality of internal and external reporting;
30 Agency Theory postulates that the firm consists of a group of contracts between the principals, the owners 
of the economic resources of the firm, the agents, and the managers who use the economic resources (see 
Sheedy 1999).
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• Help ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations and also with internal 
policies with respect to the conduct of business.
This description introduces the concept of risk and how the internal control system 
responds to or manages the risks that the business faces. As such it provides a link between 
the maintenance of an internal control system and the management of risk.
The development of control theory is traced by Glasser (1990). Control theory is the theory 
of motivation which contends that behaviour is never caused by a response to an outside 
stimulus; instead, control theory states that behaviour is guided by what a person wants 
most at any given time (Glasser 1990). He contends that the executives in an organisation 
have plenty of guidance to turn to in performing their functions. Specifically, executives 
can revert to (Glasser 1990, p. 83):
• Knowledge of the control concepts;
• Knowledge of the processes required to control;
• Knowledge of the characteristics of the control system;
• Knowledge of the problems likely to occur when controlling and, therefore, a 
knowledge of what to guard against;
• A number of control models;
• A framework of principles for effective control.
On the other hand, complexity theory advocates that ordered and chaotic systems differ by 
the relationship that exists between the system and the agents who act within it. In an
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ordered system the level of constraint means that all agent behaviour is limited to the rules 
of the system. In a chaotic system the agents are unconstrained and susceptible to statistical 
and other analysis. In a complex adaptive system, the system and the agents co-evolve such 
that the agents modify the system by their interaction with it (Bailey et al. 1981).
Drawing on the work of Bailey et al. (1981), the design and analysis of internal control 
systems to help managers is discussed by Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) who use 
complexity theory to illustrate how certain regulatory control requirements can impose 
theoretically unacceptable costs of analysis with respect to internal control requirements. 
They argue that that a good framework for developing internal control mechanisms would 
be useful to guide managers on how to design an appropriate system.
A framework at the organisational level can be attributed to Smith (2006) who addresses 
the organisational control problem from a different perspective by questioning how to 
achieve good control. According to Smith (2006), good control should mean that an 
informed person should reasonably be confident that no major unpleasant surprises will 
occur. His analysis concludes that good control can be achieved by avoiding some 
behavioural problems (to do with personnel), and by implementing few types of control to 
protect against the remaining problems. The options available to protect against these 
remaining problems are (Smith 2006, p. 130):
1. Problem avoidance controls attempt to disallow opportunities for improper
behaviour, for example, automation of a procedure avoids human intervention and
provides enhanced reliability;
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2. Specific action controls attempt to ensure that individuals perform (or do not 
perform) certain actions that are known to be desirable (or undesirable), for 
example, segregation of duties helps to ensure that one person cannot perform an 
improper act;
3. Control of results attempts to ensure that employees are responsible for certain 
prescribed results, for example, performance measurement systems which provide 
rewards that help to ensure that objectives are achieved;
4. Control of personnel attempts to place reliance on staff to do what is best for the 
organisation, for example, sound communication systems help to ensure a 
consistent message is given and shared beliefs in organisational goals are created.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) has 
been notably active in developing an internal control framework that could be used in 
practice. Their initial framework (COSO 1992) was used as a benchmark to assess and 
improve internal control systems. It consists of five interrelated components derived from 
the way management runs a business. According to COSO (1992), these components 
provide an effective framework for describing and analysing the internal control system 
implemented in an organisation. The five components are: control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communication and monitoring. Following 
the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act31 , the COSO (2004) enterprise risk management 
integrated framework emerged. The COSO (2004) framework expands on internal control.
This law (enacted in 2002) extends the long-standing requirement for public companies to maintain 
systems of internal control, requiring management to certify, and the independent auditor to attest to the 
effectiveness of those systems (Bumiller 2002).
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providing a more robust and extensive focus on the broader subject of enterprise risk 
management (Dey and Thomas 2005), and is still geared to achieving an entity's 
objectives.
COSO (2004) points out that at the micro level, an organisation needs to establish its own 
internal control structure, which reflects the emphasis which the entity's owners, Board and 
Senior Management place on controls. The main issues that need to be addressed are 
discussed by Mikes (2008, p. 25) and are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2: Broad Elements of the Internal Control Structure
Area











Examples of elements of internal control
• Delegation of authority 
• Assignment of responsibility 
• Documentation of authorisation 
• Policies on conflict of interest and acceptable business practices
• Planning and reporting systems 
• Investigation and communication of variances from planned performance policies 
to develop and modify systems and control procedures 
• Investigation and communication of violation of laws and regulations
• Laws, rules, regulations of regulatory bodies review and follow-up by external 
parties
• Management functions 
• Reporting relationships 
• Data processing organisations
• Management attitudes and actions towards reporting 
• Management's approach to taking and monitonng business risks 
• Management's emphasis on compliance with laws and regulations 
• Management's emphasis on meeting financial and operating goals
• Policies regarding hiring, training, evaluating, promoting and compensating 
employees
• Risk detection 
• Risk estimation 
• Risk evaluation 
• Risk Mitigation 
• Risk reporting 
• Risk communication
• Role in communication between the Board and mlem.ll/cxlem:il auditors 
• Role in overseeing accounting and financial reporting
• Authority of Internal Auditors 
• Reporting relationship 
• Role in overseeing the internal control
Source: Adapted from Mikes (2008)
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I1A (2009) explains the internal control as any action taken by management to enhance the 
likelihood that established objectives and goals will be achieved. IIA (2009, p. 29) points 
out that internal control is the result of proper planning, organising and directing by 
management, and that there are three types of controls:
1. Preventive - to deter undesirable events from occurring;
2. Detective - to detect and correct undesirable events which have occurred;
3. Directive - to cause or encourage a desirable event to occur.
2.3.4.4.2 Internal Control in Banking
Basel (1998b, p. 54) points to the significant losses incurred by several banking
organisations and how they could probably have been avoided if the banks have maintained 
effective internal control systems. Five types of control breakdowns typically seen in 
problematic bank cases are identified:
1. Lack of adequate management oversight and accountability, and failure to develop 
a strong control culture within the bank;
2. Inadequate recognition and assessment of the risk of banking activities;
3. The absence or failure of key control structures and activities, such as segregation 
of duties, approvals, verifications, reconcilliations, and review of operating 
performance;
4. Inadequate communication of information between levels of management within 
the bank, especially in the upward communication of the problems;
5. Inadequate or ineffective audit programmes and monitoring activities.
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Basel II discusses thoroughly the framework for internal control systems in banking 
organisations. It emphasises the fact that the bank's internal control structure is essential to 
the capital assessment process and indicates that effective control of the capital assessment 
process includes an independent review and, where appropriate, the involvement of internal 
or external audits. It goes on to point out that the bank's Board has the responsibility to 
ensure that management establishes a system for assessing the various risks, develops a 
system to relate risk to the bank's capital level, and establishes a method for monitoring 
compliance with internal policies. Further, the Board should regularly verify whether its 
system of internal controls is adequate to ensure well-ordered and prudent conduct of 
business (Basel II). An implication, as pointed out by Basel 11, is that the periodic review of 
the internal control system is essential in order to ensure its integrity, accuracy, and 
reasonableness. Areas that should be reviewed include (Basel II, p. 167):
• Appropriateness of the bank's capital assessment process given the nature, 
scope and complexity of its activities;
• Identification of large exposures and risk concentrations;
• Accuracy and completeness of data inputs into the bank's assessment process;
• Reasonableness and validity of scenarios used in the risk assessment process;
• Stress testing and analysis of assumptions and inputs.
According to Basel II, the internal control framework consists of five interrelated elements 
(Basel II, p. 163):
• Management oversight and the control culture;
• Risk recognition and assessment;
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• Control activities and segregation of duties;
• Information and communication; and
• Monitoring activities and correcting deficiencies.
This framework provides a response to risk breakdowns and identifies the principles, which 
should be followed for assessing the robustness of the internal control system including a 
specific requirement to recognise and address all risks facing the bank (Basel II).
The press has been frequently firing at the banking internal control deficiencies. Agence 
France-Presse (2008) reviews a particular area of interest in the internal controls related to 
Societe Generale failure case caused by the misuse of the IT system in the bank and urges 
banks to be very cautious about the IT competitive advantage at the expense of the internal 
control standards. Palfi (2007) sees three main issues that banks need to address when 
looking at internal control. The first relates to capital adequacy and internal controls, which 
are in many ways a front line defence for shareholder's equity and depositor's funds. The 
second is the behavioural dimension of controls, which have increased tension in them in 
areas such as derivative trading where the line between trading and gambling is a narrow 
one. The third issue is whether the present overall system impairs operational efficiency 
due to the onerous and costly body of compliance requirements that have been established 
in a bank. Palfi (2007) argues that the latter point is particularly interesting because it 
highlights the potential for too much control in relation to the possible risk involved.
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From a cultural perspective, internal control within the UAE commercial banking has been 
addressed by the CBUAE (2009), emphasising the need to understand the cultural 
differences within the UAE banking industry, and urging UAE banks to invest in 
developing innovative risk management methodologies, procedures and controls.
2.3.4.4.3 Operational Risk and Internal Control
Basel II places a bank's internal control system firmly at the centre of ORM. The term
'internal control' was incorporated on twenty five occasions in Basel II; which the author 
would contend could be interpreted as an indication of the importance of banking internal 
control systems in ORM.
Basel II proposes a framework consisting of fourteen principles that banking supervisors 
should use when evaluating a bank's internal control system, with paragraphs 20 to 23 
examining risk assessment in the context of internal control systems. A risk assessment 
should regularly be carried out to evaluate the internal and external factors that could 
adversely affect the achievement of the banking organisation's operational, information and 
compliance objectives (Basel II). These are the main objectives of the internal control 
processes that should be in place, according to Basel II. The author would argue that the 
linkage of processes, operational risks and controls discussed previously in section 2.3.4.1, 
forms the basis by which Senior Management should ensure that the operational risks 
affecting the achievement of the bank's strategies and objectives are continually being 
evaluated.
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Article 744 in Basel II provides guidance on how to maintain a sound internal control 
system: the bank's internal control structure is essential to the capital assessment process. 
Effective control of the capital assessment process includes an independent review and, 
where appropriate, the involvement of internal or external audits (Basel II). The article goes 
on to demonstrate that the bank's Board has the responsibility to ensure that management 
establishes a system for assessing the various operational risks, develops a system to relate 
operational risk to the bank's capital level, and establishes a method for monitoring 
compliance with internal policies. The Board should regularly verify whether its system of 
internal controls is adequate to ensure well-ordered and prudent conduct of business (Basel 
II). hi short, Basel II emphasises the necessity for continuous monitoring, continuous 
review, capital adequacy verification, involvement of internal and external audits, and 
assuming clear responsibilities by the Board; in order to realise a sound internal control 
system. The author is of the view that this bouquet of activities should be affected in unison 
in order to achieve the desired objective.
Spira and Page (2003) analyse why sound internal control systems are fundamental to 
ORM. They review a number of well-known operational risk incidents involving fraudulent 
conduct and reckless management and find that the general consensus as to why they 
occurred is due to the critical absence of or failure to enforce proper internal control 
systems, internal audit of the control systems, and corrective actions to prevent 
opportunities for fraud, reckless management, or conflicts of interest.
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Andreas (2010) points out that the greater emphasis on management and internal control 
requires bank supervisors to explore enhanced measures that strike a balance between 
prescriptive and principle-based control guidelines, which better reflects the economic 
reality of operational risk in light of the market failures during the Financial Crisis
The above discussion demonstrates that the implementation and monitoring of a 
comprehensive system of internal control within a defined framework is the key to ensuring 
that risk in general, and operational risk in particular, can be managed down to acceptable 
levels. An ongoing evaluation of internal control is, therefore, an important element in 
identifying operational risk exposures.
2.3.4.5 Corporate Governance
Corporate governance in the banking industry has become more prevalent over the last few
years (Ciancanelli and Reyes 2001). BCBS published its initial guidance on corporate 
governance in 1999 (Basel 1999), with revised principles in 2006 (BCBS 2006) and 2010 
(BCBS 2010). The guidance is intended to help ensure the adoption and implementation of 
sound corporate governance practices by banking organisations worldwide, but is not 
intended to establish a new regulatory framework. The guidance highlights the importance 
of the following (BCBS 2006, p. 47):
• *The roles of the Boards, with a focus on the role of independent directors * and 
Senior Management;
" An independent director is member of the Board of directors of a company who does not form part of the 
executive management team. He or she is not an employee of the company or affiliated with it in any other
76
• Effective management of conflicts of interest;
• The roles of internal and external auditors, as well as internal control functions;
• Governing in a transparent manner, especially where a bank operates in 
jurisdictions, or through structures, that may impede transparency;
• The role of supervisors in promoting and assessing sound corporate governance 
practices.
Subsequent to the publication of the BCBS (2006) guidance, there have been a number of 
corporate governance failures and lapses, many of which came to light during the Financial 
Crisis. Drawing on the lessons learned during the Financial Crisis, BCBS published 
Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, 2010, which sets out sound practices for 
banking organisations in this regard. The key areas where the principles have been 
strengthened include: (1) the role of the Board; (2) the importance of an independent risk 
management function, including a chief risk officer (CRO) or equivalent; (3) the 
importance of monitoring risks on an ongoing firm-wide and individual entity basis; and 
(4) the Board and Senior Management's understanding of the bank's operational structure 
and operational risks BCBS (2010, p. 2 - 31). The principles also emphasise the importance 
of supervisors regularly evaluating the bank's corporate governance policies and practices 
as well as its implementation of the BCBS principles (BCBS 2010).
As pointed out by some of the interviewees in this research, the CBUAE is continually 
urging the UAE commercial banks to adopt the guidance set by BCBS (2010). The author
way. They are differentiated from inside directors, who are members of the Board who also serve or 
previously served as executive managers of the company (Higgs 2003).
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considers this as a good move in the right direction. On the other hand, the author would 
contend that Boards which operate with heavy emphasis on monitoring management 
corporate governance practices may end up with less efficient performance. The 
implication of this proposition, if it were to be true, would suggest that the balance between 
operational risk and the level of management control needed is a fine one.
2.3.4.6 Operational Risk Mitigation
Deventer and Donald (2004) capture the essence of operational risk mitigation by
maintaining that the challenge of ORM is to minimise the probability and magnitude of 
adverse events without incurring excessive cost.
Basel II discusses a number of techniques used to mitigate operational risk. The most 
important two mentioned are internal controls (which act to reduce the impact/probability) 
and insurance. This issue is taken up by Tsanakas and Desli (2007) who review the ways in 
which insurance can be used to mitigate operational risk.
Risk in banking is also mitigated when key decision-makers in organisations see the big 
picture Scandizo (2005). He goes on to point out that the organisation should be designed 
so that information about risk is communicated to those decision-makers who can put 
together warning signals from various areas in the organisation, thus forming a picture of a 
risky or hazardous situation in its early stages of development. The warning signals or 
KRl's are discussed in a banking context by Coleman (2007), who provides a number of 
examples of the indicators that may be used. He discusses, for example, data security risks
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being controlled by backup files, password control, finger-printing and voice recognition. 
Computer viruses can be controlled by firewalls, monitoring computer usage, scanning 
software, stringent audit procedures and employee education.
According to Grody et al. (2007, p 44), selecting one or a combination of the following 
strategies is essential to the risk mitigation process:
• Avoiding the risk by suggesting alternative course of action;
• Eliminating the cause of the risk;
• Reducing the likelihood of the risk occurring;
• Reducing the direct consequences of the risk;
• Minimising the risk impact in business terms;
• Instigating further investigation to gather further information before a final decision 
is made;
• Accepting the risk as unavoidable.
• Transferring the risk.
The author would argue that whilst these are generic risk mitigation strategies, they can 
equally be applied to operational risk exposures.
2.3.4.7 The Measurement and Quantification of Operational Risk
Market risk exposures are typically quantified in terms of 'Value at Risk' (VaR) estimate 
(Dorfinan 1997). The history of VaR is traced by Reed (1997) to Dennis Weatherstone, the 
Chairman of JP Morgan bank, who asked for a one page report to be delivered to him
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summarising the company's exposure to moves in the market and estimating the potential 
losses over the next twenty four hours. Titus and Lewis (1997, p. 9) provide a definition of 
VaR, thus:
"Value at Risk is the largest loss from market risk (expressed in currency units) that 
an asset or portfolio will suffer over a time interval and with a degree of certainty 
selected by the decision-maker."
VaR essentially defines the maximum a firm could lose given a certain level of confidence 
over a given time horizon, should exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices 
move against it (Kevin 2005). The calculation of VaR in this context is well covered by a 
number of authors (see for example Titus and Lewis 1997, Kevin 2005, Vanita and 
Aggarwal 2008 and Abad-Romero 2009), and can involve a number of methods normally 
based on historical, empirical, simulated information or a combination.
The application of VaR approach in the area of operational risk (OpVaR) is, however; less 
developed, and Basel II guidelines offer three alternative approaches to 'valuing' 
operational risk with related qualifying criteria (Basel II, p. 140-150):
1. Basic Indicator Approach (BIA): calculates a value for operational risk capital using 
a single indicator as proxy for an institution's overall operational risk exposure;
2. The Standardised Approach (TSA): calculates a value for operational risk capital 
based on standard business units using a broad financial indicator (e.g. income) 
multiplied by a beta factor (i.e. proxy for the operational loss experience);
3. Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA): uses the bank's own internal current 
and historical loss data as well as external loss data, and a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods to calculate a value for operational risk capital.
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The literature has a number of articles which deal with operational risk valuation (see for 
example Abernethy et al. 2004, Andreas 2007 and Dutta and David 2010).
Basel II postulates that banks still have work to do in adequately measuring operational risk 
exposures and need to move on a continuum from the BIA to the AMA, emphasising 
certain requirements for banks to qualify for using either of the TSA or AMA approaches 
(Basel II, p. 144):
• The bank Board and Senior Management, as appropriate, are actively involved in 
the oversight of the ORJM framework;
• The bank has an ORM system that is conceptually sound and is implemented with 
integrity;
• The Bank has sufficient resources for the use of the approach in the major business 
lines as well as the control and audit areas.
According to Basel II, the AMA is meant to enable the bank to reduce the capital adequacy 
requirement since it is more sensitive to risk and more advanced and sophisticated than the 
other two approaches. Accordingly, Basel 11 imposes further requirement in order to ensure 
proper utilisation of this approach (Basel II p. 144-150):
• The banks must track internal loss data based on a minimum of five-year 
observation period;
• The bank's operational risk measurement system must use relevant external data 
(either public data and/or pooled industry data), especially when there is reason to
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believe that the bank is exposed to infrequent, yet potentially severe, losses. The 
external data should include data on actual loss amounts, information on the scale 
of business operations where the event occurred, information on the causes and 
circumstances of the loss events;
• The bank must use scenario analysis of expert opinion in conjunction with external 
data to evaluate its exposure to high-severity events. This approach draws on the 
knowledge of experienced business managers and risk management experts to 
derive reasoned assessments of possible severe losses.
Figure 9 illustrates the risk sensitivity versus the capital adequacy requirement for the three 
Basel II approaches.













Chaudhury (2009) argues that the application of the BIA approach to measuring 
operational risk would be sufficient for most organisations to start with, however; banks 
need to look forward to the application of the AMA in order to reduce the capital adequacy 
requirement and to better safeguard themselves against operational risks (increase the 
bank's sensitivity to operational risk). According to a Manager interviewed in one of the 
banks:
"The UAE commercial banks usually set aside capital for the unexpected and not 
the extreme since some operational risks may be easily quantified, while others are 
clearly impossible to quantify. Still, we make sure that we are in line with Basel II 
stipulations."
Another phenomenon of ORM and measurement is that various leading IT firms have 
embarked on research and analysis of the global market to produce risk management and 
measurement technology, with special emphasis on operational risk. The goal is to support 
financial institutes, as they drive business performance, through better risk management, 
corporate governance and compliance by providing in-depth analysis and actionable advice 
on the main aspects of operational risk (Gorrod 2004 and ACM 2005).
This brief analysis of operational risk measurement and quantification illustrates that there 
is still some work to do. Whilst operational risk measurement will remain an important goal 
in the long term, ORM will continue to remain the focus of attention for bank management.
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2.3.4.8 Operational Risk Management Roles
A survey conducted by the researcher reveals that Basel II incorporates the bank's Board 
and Senior Management on thirty nine different occasions with emphasis on the important 
roles they carry out in ORM.
Basel 11 pins tremendous responsibilities on the Bank's Board and Senior Management for 
ORM. According to Basel 11, the Board and Senior Management should ensure the 
development of a framework for assessing the various operational risks, a system to relate 
operational risk to the bank's capital level, and a method for monitoring compliance with 
internal policies. It is likewise important that the Board adopts and supports strong internal 
controls and written policies and procedures (Basel 11).
Considering the above, Hubbard and Douglas (2009) emphasise that the key to ORM is 
management, a point taken up by Pagach and Richard (2010) who say that such 
management, if it is to act in the best interest of the owners of the business, should have 
character33 . According to Aabo and Fraser (2007), effective risk management is the result 
of a sound risk management strategy that is grounded in the realities and the organisational 
culture, and has top management support.
A brief overview of the management structure required to manage operational risk in a 
trading environment is presented by Coleman (2007) who notes how financial institutions
33 A person of character does what is right not because of a set of rules, or a reward structure, or because 
his/her actions will be noted by superiors, but because of the intrinsic merit or worth of these actions (Sheedy. 
1999).
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have been creating specialist Operational Risk Manager roles at a senior level. Their role is 
described as the creation of a group-wide culture of operational risk awareness. Coleman 
(2007) also points out that many institutions make use of their Internal Audit function to 
monitor the implementation of group risk policies, while deliberately excluding them from 
the actual formulation of rules about risk (a point which enhances their independence). 
Following the requirements of Basel II, the CBUAE (2008) has advised the UAE 
commercial banks to use either of the following organisational models for ORM:
• Head office driven: a centralised function that assumes the entire ORM 
responsibility, often supported by local Operational Risk Managers;
• Non-head Office driven: dedicated decentralised ORM units are in place in the 
business units.
The choice, whether to adopt the centralised or decentralised model, is left to the individual 
bank to decide based on the organisational requirements of the bank (CBUAE 2008). The 
data analysis results indicate that the UAE banks in this study opted for the second model.
2.3.5 Summary
This section has provided an analysis of risk management with a particular focus on 
operational risk. The concept of risk was discussed with the distinction between proactive 
and reactive risk management being noted. Risk pervades all aspects of society and 
business, and there have been a number of developments over recent years to produce a 
generic risk management model which can be applied to operational risk. However, the 
process is subjective and relies on people making judgements. Risk perceptions of
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managers and individuals are, therefore, important in formulating these judgements. Risk 
perceptions were found to be linked closely to risk communication and the use of common 
risk language. Relevant theories were presented illustrating the complex nature of the 
subject.
The decision-making that takes place in the risk management process can be enhanced if 
the right information is made available to the manager. This was seen to be an important 
factor because there can be so many variables at play in making a risk management 
decision.
The literature review then focused on operational risk. It was noted that there had been a 
move towards more explicit (as opposed to implicit) ORM. There is a universally accepted 
definition of operational risk although there are a number of common themes around the 
definition that were reviewed and, generally speaking, the focus of operational risk is in the 
internal control environment. Operational risks were seen to be embedded in the processes 
(of the internal control systems), and were mitigated by the controls that management put 
in place. The reasons why operational risk has become important in the banking industry 
were identified and the scarcity of academic research about the UAE commercial banking 
was noted.
A distinction between ORM and operational risk measurement was noted, with the former 
being concerned with creating an adequately controlled internal environment and the latter 
being concerned with quantifying the total operational risk exposure. The two activities
86
appear to be mutually exclusive but both are recognised by the regulators as being highly 
important. A discussion on the Value at Risk (particularly in the market risk area) concept 
was presented, although it was noted that there was still some way to go in the operational 
risk measurement area. Fraud, the regulatory environment and corporate governance, three 
areas of interest to ORM, were examined. The section concluded with a review of the ORM 
roles.
2.4 Banking
2.4.1 The UAE Commercial Banking Industry Structure
The literature review found little literature on the UAE commercial banking environment.
Hence, this section will discuss the commercial banking in general, and focus on the UAE 
commercial banking as much as possible.
The number of different players in the UAE financial industry as on Dec. 31, 2010 is 
depicted in Table 3 34 below.
34 Table 3 represents the list of banks and other financial institutions licensed by the CBUAE to conduct 
banking financial, investment brokerage and money-changing activities as on Dec. 31. 2010 (CBUAE 2010).
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Source: Adapted from CBUAE (2010)
Table 3 indicates that there are a total of forty six commercial non-Islamic banks in the 
UAE. This number has substantially increased over the last few years as a result of the 
excessive liquidity of such an oil-rich tax-free country (Saif and Choucair 2009).
During the last few years, the UAE commercial banking industry has been witnessing 
structural changes resulting from:
• The GCC single currency programme that has set in motion a rationalisation
process which would have a dampening effect on commercial banking traditional
approach to business (Al-Suwaidi 2010).
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• The Financial Crisis: Saif and Choucair (2009) argue that as a consequence of the 
Financial Crisis, the banking sectors in the UAE generally suffered despite the 
continued improvements and strengthening of banking supervision. They go on to 
point out that the UAE economy and its banking sector got the ultimate confidence 
boost as it received assurance from the UAE Government which approved a set of 
preventive steps and measures to serve the national interest and protect the national 
economy (Saif and Choucair 2009, p. 9):
S Pumping United Arab Emirate Dirham (AED) 120 billion into the banking
sector to deplete fears of a financial meltdown; 
S Guaranteeing depositors' money in national banks; 
•S Guaranteeing inter-bank lending between national banks.
The author would contend that the measures set by the UAE Government reduced the 
impact of the Financial Crisis on the UAE commercial banks by providing liquidity to 
banks and comfort to depositors:
• Dubai Crisis: As a result of the worldwide economic downturn following the 
Financial Crisis, Dubai suffered a major economical deterioration (Simon 2009). 
Many property construction projects came to a sudden halt resulting from the 
sudden decline in demand due to negative economic expectations (Hazelton 2009). 
Hazelton (2009), points out that depositors became uncomfortable with keeping 
their savings in banks due to the contagion effect of the USA bank failures. As a 
result, the UAE banks suffered from lack of liquidity; which added salt to injury.
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The UAE Government intervened in a timely manner to restore confidence in the 
UAE commercial banks as indicated above.
• Stock Exchange crisis: During 2004 - 2006, there were significant increases in the 
volume of shares traded and the share prices of many companies. However, towards 
the end of 2006 and through the first few months of 2007 the bubble burst and share 
values dropped by more than 70% (Huberman 2007), along with similar and 
parallel decreases in UAE. As a direct result, credit defaulting in commercial banks 
became a common trend with the consequence of reducing liquidity and 
profitability (Gulfnews 2007).
• UAE currency pegging change rumors: Since the year 2005, there were frequent 
rumors that, due to the declining US$ rate, the UAE was planning to change its 
currency pegging from the US$ to another currency IMF (2005). As a consequence, 
many worldwide depositors used the UAE commercial banks as a potential means 
for profit generation had the pegging change been affected, expecting the UAE 
currency would appreciate. CBUAE (2009) declared in a press conference that there 
would be no currency pegging change. Driven by the Financial Crises, the majority 
of foreign depositors withdrew their cash in droves, leaving the UAE commercial 
banks to suffer from lack of liquidity (Gulfnews 2009).
Bearing these factors in mind, a report by the Business Review Weekly (2008) identifies 
four additional forces that are driving the UAE commercial banking industry' 5 to change 
the way it operates:
This study was undertaken in the Emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi.
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1. Consumer demand: consumers are demanding fast, convenient, glitch-free service 
from the branches and non-premise distribution channels;
2. Technology development: many UAE commercial banks have built sophisticated 
information management capabilities that will help them to enhance their consumer 
management capabilities;
3. Competition: new customer acquisition strategies are intensifying whilst revenue 
generation is growing more complex, more difficult and costly;
4. eCommerce36 (Internet banking or on-line banking) and mBanking37 38 (mobile 
banking): eCommerce and mBanking are set to dominate the way business to 
customer (B2C) and business to business (B2B) transactions are undertaken.
Underlying these forces, Gulfhews (2008) looks at the drivers behind the change in the 
UAE commercial banking industry at the macro level, i.e. development in the wider 
business environment commonly known as a PEST (political, economic, social and 
technological) analysis, and the micro level, i.e. based on the five forces model of 
Porter (1985). The analysis is represented diagrammatically in Figure 10.
36 eCommerce (also known as Internet banking or on-line banking) consists of the buying and selling of 
products or services over electronic systems such as the internet and other computer networks (Graham 
2008).
37 mBanking (also known as Mobile banking) is a term used for performing balance checks, account 
transactions, payments etc. via a mobile device such as a mobile phone (Tiwari and Herstatl 2007).
38 The author of this thesis is heavily involved in mobile banking and financial services network deployment 
via mobile telephony networks in many countries in the world (to name a few: UAE, Cote D'lvoire, Benin, 
Gabon, Togo, Niger, Nigeria).
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Figure 10: Forces Driving Change in the UAE Commercial Banking
Political
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Source: Adapted from Gulfnews (2008)
There are examples to support the development of these forces and some writers have 
illustrated some of the themes in the diagram. For example, Mustapha (2008) looking at the 
most efficient methods for regulating the UAE banks (political analysis) argues for even 
greater regulation by CBUAE because bank regulation, especially capital requirements,
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induces bank stability. Mansur (2008) suggests that the UAE banks, in facing these 
challenges should not lose site of one of their most valuable intangible assets, namely, their 
institutional stature (social analysis). He argues that whilst customers are not quite happy 
with the services that banks deliver, they still trust their banks as a safe and secure place to 
keep their money.
2.4.2 The Regulatory Environment
2.4.2.1 Banking Regulation Historical Review
The history of banking regulation in the UAE can be traced back to 1980 when it became
possible for banks to shed their constitutions and acquire the benefits of incorporation as 
either limited or unlimited companies CBUAE (1980). According to the World Fact Book 
(2010), the CBUAE took several measures in the early 1980's to strengthen the banking 
structure. It expanded audits and inspections, increased bank reporting requirements, 
established a computerised loan risk department, and set minimum capital requirements. 
On Dec. 2,2008, the CBUAE (2008) issued its mandate to the UAE commercial banks via 
Notice 4170/2008 that they ensure that they fully adhere to Basel II operational risk 
recommendations by Jan. 1, 2011. With this mandate, the author argues, the 'disconnect' in 
the UAE commercial bank regulation has been addressed.
Worldwide, the degree of governmental monitoring became more crucial to improving the 
stability of the banking sector, and continuing bank failures in the I920's and 1930's are 
generally accepted as the cause for further extensive bank regulations being introduced 
across many countries (Hickson and Turner 1996). By that time, minimum capital
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requirements were being imposed on banks (Hickson and Turner 1996). The momentum 
continued around the globe with a range of different regulatory requirements being used. 
Nevertheless, banks continued to have problems and it was not until the 1980's, when 
concern about international banks financial health mounted and complaints of unfair 
competition increased, that the BCBS started considering proposals to set capital standards 
for the banks (Freixas and Santomero 2003). In 1988, when Basel Accord I came into 
being, it was seen as a breakthrough in regulation. For the first time, regulators from a 
number of countries had set a truly global standard for capital adequacy in relation to 
banking operations.
Basel I explicitly covered credit risk. It required banks from the G10 countries to hold a 
minimum capital adequacy equal to 8% of risk-adjusted39 assets. In 1996 an amendment to 
the accord introduced market risk exposures and, as noted by Santos (2000), the main 
novelty of the amendment was that it allowed banks to use their own internal models to 
determine the required capital charge for market risk. VaR, the Value-at-Risk (see section 
2.3.4.7) concept had now entered into the regulatory regime.
The reader will note the focus on the risk that the Basel I introduced was geared towards 
credit risk followed by market risk. Operational risk was not specifically mentioned but 
interest in this area probably grew as a result of the banking collapses, which derived from 
operational risk failures (e.g. Barings). Accordingly, Basel I had a serious drawback in that
The calculation of risk adjusted assets involves taking both on- and off-balance sheet items and assigning 
them to risk category which would weigh them (by factors of 0%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 100%) according to 
the perceived riskiness of the assets (Basel I).
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it adopted a 'one size fits all' approach and did not address operational risk (Santos 2000). 
To address these issues, BCBS published its second accord (Basel II) which is meant to 
take into account the shortcomings of the previous one. According to Moosa (2007a), Basel 
H was designed to be more flexible and risk sensitive as highlighted in Table 4.
Table 4: High Level Comparison between Basel I and Basel II
Basel Accord 1
Addressed credit rand market risks.
Focused on a single measure.
One size fits all.
Broad brush structure.
Basel Accord II
Addressed credit risk, market risk and placed 
special emphasis on operational risk.
More emphasis on banks own internal 
methodologies, supervisory review, and market 
discipline.
Flexibility, menu of approaches, incentives for 
better risk management.
More risk sensitive.
Source: Adapted from Moosa (2007a)
The structure of Basel II is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars. Together these are 
seen as contributing to the safety and soundness in the financial system. The pillars cover 
(Basel II, p. 182-184):
• Pillar 1: minimum capital requirement - this is still set at 8% of risk-weighted 
assets; a measure for operational risk is included whilst market risk remains 
unchanged.
• Pillar 2: supervisory review process - requires supervisors to ensure that each bank 
has sound internal processes in place to assess the adequacy of its capital based on a 
thorough evaluation of its risks.
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• Pillar 3: market discipline - aims to bolster market discipline through enhanced 
disclosure by banks including the way a bank calculates its capital adequacy and its 
risk assessment methods.
Aabo and Fraser (2007) note that the scene has, therefore been set for banks to focus their 
risk management and measurement techniques in the early years of the 21 sl century and for 
the first time operational risk features directly in the assessment of capital adequacy. Basel 
11 points out that whilst measuring capital is one thing, it is important not to lose sight of 
the function of capital itself. Capital is only one important tool in the overall supervisory 
arsenal. Supervisors are likely to be playing a more active role in monitoring a bank's 
capital adequacy and risk management arrangements (Basel II).
As discussed in section 1.1.1, BCBS published its third Capital Accord in December 2010: 
"International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement. Standards and Monitoring " in 
response to the deficiencies in the financial regulation revealed by the Global Financial 
Crisis from liquidity risk perspective, hereafter; referred to as Basel III. Nevertheless, in 
this study, there will be more focus on Basel 11 for two reasons:
1. Basel II is more concerned with operational risk management, measurement, 
sources and other operational risk areas (Basel II, p. 140 - 152); whereas, Basel III 
is concerned mainly with liquidity risk management (Basel 111, p. I).
2. Basel III is not due for final implementation, yet. It will officially be introduced in 
two stages: January 2015 and January 2018. Until then, Basel III will undergo 
analysis of financial institution feedback, monitoring and updating (Basel 111, p. 41)
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The author considers the enforcement of Basel 111 and the consequent implications 
for ORM an interesting area for further future research.
The discussion in this section reveals that the regulations and competitive pressures on the 
UAE commercial banks are, therefore, set to increase on a number of fronts. This provides 
further impetus and support for this research project with its emphasis on understanding 
how the UAE commercial banks are mitigating the operational risks that confront them.
2.4.2.2 Bank Stress Testing
Nelson (2004) explains stress testing as a form of testing that is used to determine the
stability of a given system or entity. It involves testing beyond normal operational capacity, 
often to a breaking point, in order to observe the results. In the case of banks, testing is 
conducted under assumptions of deteriorating economic conditions, such as low gross 
domestic product (GDP)40, higher unemployment rate and lower real estate prices. The 
purpose of the test is to ensure that banks have enough capital to survive (Nelson 2004).
BCBS (2008) emphasises the importance of stress testing. It advocates that it is important 
to note that stress testing is especially favourable after long periods of good economic and 
financial conditions, when fading memory of negative conditions can lead to the under 
evaluation and estimation of risk. It is also a key risk management tool during periods of
40 Gross domestic product (GDP) refers to the market value of all final goods and services produced within a 
country in a given period. It is often considered an indicator of a country's standard of living (I.equiller et al. 
2006).
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expansion, when innovation leads to new products that grow rapidly and for which limited 
or no loss data is available (BCBS 2008). Jokivuolle et al. (2008) conclude that BCBS
(2008) requires banks to conduct stress tests on their potential future minimum capital 
requirements and consider the effect of the Financial Crisis scenarios.
BCBS published its "Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision" BCBS
(2009). The committee points out that stress testing is an important risk management tool 
that is used by banks as part of their internal risk management, and is promoted by 
regulators through Basel II. BCBS (2009) further points out that stress testing alerts bank 
managements to adverse unexpected outcomes related to a variety of risks and provides an 
indication of how much capital might be needed to absorb losses should large shocks occur.
Chopra (2009) argues that drawing on the lessons for banks and supervisors emerging from 
the Financial Crisis, BCBS (2009) work presents sound principles for the governance, 
design and implementation of stress testing programme at banks. It addresses weaknesses 
in stress testing exposed by the Financial Crisis, including the specific areas of risk 
mitigation (Chopra 2009).
According to BCBS (2009, p. 1), stress testing is a tool that supplements other risk 
management approaches and measures, and plays a particularly important role in:
• Providing forward-looking assessments of risk;
• Overcoming limitations of models and historical data;
• Supporting internal and external communication;
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• Informing the setting of a banks' risk tolerance;
• Facilitating the development of risk mitigation or contingency plans across a range 
of stressed conditions.
The author shares the view of Chopra (2009) that this is an interesting bouquet of benefits 
that banks can accrue from conducting stress testing to help shield themselves against 
operational risks.
Recently, two bank stress testing exercises were conducted:
1. The Supervisory Capital Assessment Programme (SCAP) was an assessment of 
capital conducted in February 2009 by the Federal Reserve System and Supervisors 
to determine if the largest USA financial organisations had sufficient capital buffers 
to withstand the recession and the financial market turmoil (SCAP 2009). The 
capital levels at nineteen institutions were tested. The test revealed that only nine 
banks had sufficient capital to withstand the recession and the financial market 
turmoil. Failed banks were given a grace period of six months to close the capital 
deficit gap (Wall Street Journal-WSJ 2009).
2. European Union-wide banking stress test exercise was conducted by the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) in July 2010. The Council of the 
European Union mandated the CEBS to do so, in the aftermath of the global 
Financial Crisis (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devclopment- 
OECD 2010). The exercise assesses the financial strength of European banks under 
different adverse scenarios. The exercise was conducted in cooperation with the
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European Central Bank, the European Commission and the national supervisory 
authorities of the member states. The test revealed that eighty four banks had 
sufficient capital to withstand the recession and the financial market turmoil. Failed 
banks were given a grace period of six months to close the capital deficit gap 
(OECD2010).
The results of these two test support the view of Chopra (2009) cited above. However, an 
issue faced by banks undergoing stress testing is whether the tests would decrease 
confidence in any bank that performs badly under the test (Chopra 2009). The author 
would argue that the latter point can be very critical to certain banks since it may reflect on 
the reputation of the bank.
The literature review reveals that no stress testing exercises were conducted on the UAE 
commercial banks; a fact which the author also argues may be due to the reputational issue 
mentioned above. Having said that, and given the importance of bank stress testing, it begs 
the questions: When will the CBUAE mandate the UAE commercial banks to conduct 
stress testing? Are the UAE commercial banks prepared for undergoing stress testing? The 
author considers this to be an area worthy of further research.
2.4.3 Information Technology and mBanking
The rapid advancements in technology have a major impact on the competitive structure of 
banking systems Annamalah (2008). Banks use IT extensively in carrying out their day-to­ 
day operations, most notably in the areas of electronic cash dispenser networks and more
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recently in the areas of telephony and internet banking systems, or the so called 
eCommerce (Arnaboldi and Claeys 2008). The development of the internet has removed 
one of the main barriers in commercial banking, i.e. the cost of setting up a branch network 
(Graham 2008). Internet only banks in the UAE such as 'Bank4me' attest to the extent to 
which information technology may be put in developing a banking operation.
IT is also becoming important in the generic area of risk management for banking 
operations. Aref (2009) in his review of information technology for risk management 
highlights that many financial institutes have risk management support systems already in 
place (the so called DSS) whereas many others have already started the deployment 
process. The interviews conducted in this research reveal that the majority of the UAE 
commercial banks are in the process of deployment of risk support systems; however, no 
literature was found in this regard. A number of worldwide information technology firms 
have developed software to support ORM, and an examination of operational risk journals 
(such as Journal of Operational Risk, Operational Risk and Regulation, OpRisk 
Compliance) reveals that these journals frequently carry advertisements for such products.
Another trend of advanced technology that is growing rapidly in the banking sector is the 
mobile financial services/mobile-banking, or so called, mBanking. This type of services 
necessitates the technical and operational partnership of the mobile network operator and a 
bank that has a large foot-print in a specific region (Tiwari and Hcrstatt 2007). The 
literature review reveals that mBanking has been well researched (see for example Tiwari
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and Herstatt 2007, Cheney and Julia 2008), giving an indication of the importance of this 
thriving technology in commercial banking.
Cheney and Julia (2008) demonstrate that financial institutions are considering how and to 
what extent to incorporate mBanking into their business models. The evolutionary path 
taken by mBanking is substantial and depends on a variety of factors besides available 
technologies and experience with related products (Cheney and Julia 2008, p. 13). Such 
factors include:
1. Consumer adoption of mobile cellular phones and associated non-voice 
communication technologies;
2. Consumer adoption of contactless payments;
3. Data security considerations.
Cheney and Julia (2008) argue that the emerging adoption patterns also raise risk, policy 
and business model considerations, data security considerations, and coordination issues. 
They go on to point out that ultimately, greater adoption will rest on the ability of market 
participants and regulators to work together in order to market and regulate products and 
services that combine a telecommunications device and a payment process into an 
innovative way to connect consumers with banks. With the anticipated success, the mobile 
channel may become the primary way through which consumers conduct their banking 
business, particularly in developing economies without comparable alternatives (Cheney 
and Julia 2008).
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Vince (2008, p. 29) is more specific in reviewing a range of mobile banking products that 
are already in use in many countries:
1. mWallet (Cashln/CashOut): the mobile telephony network subscriber can deposit 
funds in a virtual wallet associated with his subscription to the mobile network, 
created by the mobile telephony network operator.
2. mBill Payment: the mobile telephony network subscriber can pay his bills and 
merchandise value using his mWallet.
3. Money Transfer via mWallet: the mobile telephony network subscriber can transfer 
funds to another mWallet belonging to another subscriber on the network. This is 
called Peer to Peer transfer (P2P), and has two forms: national and international 
transfer.
The author would contend that eCommerce and mBanking are becoming two major trends 
in banking evolution for years to come. The drawback is that with technology comes risk 
and in particular operational risk that needs to be addressed as early as possible. The 
literature review reveals that operational risk in mBanking has not been researched, and 
hence, can be an interesting area for future research.
2.4.4 Implications for Operational Risk Management
There are a number of implications for ORM emerging from the review of the issues facing
commercial banks in general and specifically, in the UAH. The industry structure is 
changing and with change comes risk. Regulation, in particular, is a key driver behind 
changes at the macro and micro levels, and the UAE commercial banks will have to ensure
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that they are ready to face the challenges being imposed by the regulatory regime, with its 
increased emphasis on ORM. The drivers of ORM are also coming from competition and 
new technologies. New entrants into the market already have their customer bases through 
which they can offer products. The UAE commercial banks will have to respond to these 
threats by taking more risks to secure their business and avoid customers leaving them in 
droves. New technologies, particularly eCommerce and mBanking, bring new opportunities 
as well as new risks and commercial banks will need to ensure that their developments in 
this area are managed with the potential risks in mind. The literature review reveals that 
operational risk has not been adequately addressed in eCommerce and particularly, in 
mBanking (Malphrus 2009).
Customers are becoming more demanding and the marketing mix is changing with a much 
broader range of products being offered and supported by banks. All these have 
implications for operational risk as the banks react and change the way they do business. 
One specific example which has been previously cited is the movement of commercial 
banks into the mBanking market. This has brought increased operational risk with new 
processes and internal control requirements, but, it may also increase the cooperation 
between banks and mobile network operators, and their understanding of each other's 
business.
2.4.5 Summary
This section provided an overview of the current challenges being faced by the UAE 
commercial banks and illustrated how these challenges will impact upon their operational
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risk profile. A review of the macro level commercial banking industry structure was 
followed by an examination of several key areas, with a specific focus on the regulatory 
regime, which is one of the main drivers of this study. A discussion on risk management in 
the current banking environment confirms a number of complexities and issues that will 
need to be proficiently managed. The section concluded with a review of the implications 
forORM.
2.5 Summary of the Literature Review
The UAE commercial banks are currently subject to much environmental uncertainty in the 
area of operational risk. This is being driven by a number of factors including the 
regulatory situation, the Financial Crisis, Dubai Crisis and the move for a GCC single 
currency.
Bearing this in mind, this Chapter has reviewed the literature in the areas of management 
and organisations, risk management; with specific emphasis on ORJV1, regulatory 
environment, and finally banking. The focus has been to describe relevant theories in the 
context of ORM and also to provide an overview of some of the current issues in each of 
the areas. The author has not attempted to describe each area in detail, as this would be 
beyond the scope of this research. A relevant thorough discussion is, however, warranted in 
order to place the research into an appropriate theoretical framework and illustrate to the 
reader the importance of the research in the context of the current business environment.
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Section 2.2 provided some theoretical propositions relating to organisations, management 
within organisations, how the organisations cope with environmental factors and decision- 
making. It was noted how contingency theory can play a part in both the organisational 
structure and the decision-making process. The behavioural aspects of management and the 
internal environment in which they have to operate also feature in the day-to-day decisions 
that managers have to make. The theory of bounded rationality as it is described, identifies 
one of the barriers to decision making and is seen as important in the context of operational 
risk mitigation, which involves making a decision about the most appropriate action to 
take.
Risk management with particular focus on operational risk was discussed in section 2.3. 
The concept of risk was discussed with the distinction between proactive and reactive risk 
management being noted. Proactive risk management uses a generic risk management 
process model to manage risk whereas reactive risk management is, in effect resolving a 
problem that has occurred. The overall context in which risk management takes place is 
rooted in the contingency theory and underpinning this are a number of other theoretical 
propositions relating to risk perceptions, or how the managers who have to manage risk 
view the risk they have to manage. The risk perception can be enhanced if the right 
information is made available to the manger before the decision is made.
In the operational risk area, it was noted that there had been a move towards more explicit 
(as opposed to implicit) ORJV1. There is a universally accepted definition of operational risk 
and there is agreement that operational risks are mainly embedded in the bank's internal
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control systems. A distinction was also made between ORM and operational risk 
measurement. This point is important when viewed in the regulatory context because whilst 
Basel II discuss the two activities, it is not clear whether they are viewed as mutually 
exclusive. To date little work appears to have been done on integrating the two.
Section 2.4 was focused on the current challenges being faced by the UAE commercial 
banks and illustrated how many of these challenges will impact upon their operational risk 
profile. The competitive climate in the UAE is intensifying and the range of products and 
services offered by banks, financial investment firms, money changers, real estate 
financing companies are almost identical. In this type of climate, differentiation and brand 
strength can add a lot of value to the customer proposition, and he or she in turn may then 
be influenced to buy the name first followed by the product.
Several key areas in the regulatory environment illustrate the importance and timeliness of 
this study. Basel II has introduced a major shift towards even more explicit ORM as well as 
forcing the pace of change on how operational risk should be measured. Banks have always 
been in the business of taking risks and the discussion on risk management confirms the 
need for banks to establish clear risk policies that were understood by all as a first step to 
preventing some of the disasters that have beset the banking industry over the last few 
years. Bank stress testing and the Basel 111 which is geared at improving liquidity risk 
management have also been discussed. Basel III will be introduced in two future stages: 
January 2015 and January 2018.
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Following this review of some of the theoretical perspectives of ORM, the remainder of the 
thesis examines ORM (and mitigation) in practice. Chapters 3 describes the overall 
research design and the methodology that have been employed to collect and analyse the 
data. Chapter 4 provides analysis of the results of the data collected from the case studies; 
Chapter 5 considers the implications and conclusions of the findings for the groups 
arguably most interested in ORM: Risk Managers, the Operational Managers in the 
Business Units and Internal Auditors; and Chapter 6 provides a summary for the research 
and suggestions for further future research.
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3. METHODOLOGY
A description of the research methodology and the logic for using the particular research 
approach is described in this Chapter. Following an overview of the proposed methodology 
(section 3.1), the structure of the main items of the remainder of this Chapter is shown in 
Figure 11. This Chapter is broadly divided into two main parts:
1. Research options: linking back to the research question, section 3.2 examines 
research paradigms, the two main research approaches and then focuses on case 
study methodologies as the most appropriate option for answering the research 
question;
2. Research design: section 3.3 focuses on the research design for the study and argues 
for the methodology used. It includes the following subsections:
3.3.1 Research Design
3.3.2 Preliminary research Model
3.3.3 Triangulation
3.3.4 Data Analysis
3.3.5 Quality of the Research Design
3.3.6 Selection for the Cases Studied: The Way Forward
3.3.7 Case Study Protocol
3.3.8 Limitations of the Research Design and Mitigation Strategy
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3.1 Methodology - In Outline
According to Patton (2002) all research strategies are seriously flawed, as the very 
strengths in regard to one desideratum function as weaknesses in regard to other equally 
important goals. He goes on to advise researchers that they should be aware of the 
dilemmas facing them and be fully armed with possibilities on how to handle them. 
Creswell (2003) describes the research process as a taboo, arguing that the traditional 
model of research is presented as an idealised model but when confronted with reality, 
researchers, and particularly student researchers, realise that the process is characterised by 
complexity and intractability (difficulty in manipulating). Such truisms reinforce the need 
for the researcher to describe objectively his research methodology, the methodological 
position adopted and the appropriateness of the methods used to the research questions 
posed.
The theoretical foundation upon which the research is based has been described in Chapter 
2, where the research problem was placed in the wider body of knowledge. The research is 
described as largely exploratory because no prior work was found to have been undertaken 
in this area in the UAE and the research output may be viewed as building blocks for 
operational risk mitigation. The focus of the study was to collect data that would answer 
the research questions and enable a risk mitigation model to be developed. From the 
beginning the author was keen to model the practices in the field of operational risk 
mitigation in the UAE commercial banks.
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The data was collected using multiple exploratory case studies. An initial pilot case study 
was undertaken to test the appropriateness of the key issues and revise the case study 
protocol which was based on that suggested by Straits and Singleton (2006). Four UAE 
commercial banks were selected and four or five managers within each of the banks were 
interviewed (see section 3.3.7.4). From the beginning it was hoped that the opportunity to 
discuss the day-to-day issues concerning ORM would provide a rich insight into the 
emerging practices. The author was equally concerned to ensure that the research 
deliverables would help managers in mitigating operational risk. Managers treat models as 
tools (George and Bennett 2005). Their primary goal is to use models, and the knowledge 
that they bring, to achieve organisational goals'". The scientific validity of this knowledge 
is of lesser importance to managers than its practical usefulness (George and Bennett 
2005). The managers were the unit of analysis within the study and each case was treated 
as a separate entity before cross-case analysis and comparison was undertaken.
For reasons of confidentiality, the banks in question cannot be named and each has been 
referred to by a Greek letter; however, the bank names were made available to the research 
supervisor. The author was keen to study banks that were appropriate for the type of 
exploratory research envisaged. Gerring (2005, p. 37) notes the following in this context:
"Work should take place in fast-moving companies operating in rapidly changing 
environments so as to provide illustrations of developing good practice at the 
leading edge of adaptive activity."
The author is aware from some of the interviews that some of these goals arc linked to the management ot 
risk within the organisation.
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The author is vigilant about using the term 'good practices' when discussing operational 
risk in the financial services sector of the UAE. Whilst operational risks have existed 
within the UAE commercial banks for many years, the literature review shows that explicit 
ORM has started only recently. A few years ago, the term operational risk did not even 
exist in the financial services in the UAE and the management of such risks was done 
implicitly as part of the day-to-day responsibilities. It is for this reason that the term 'good 
practices' has been used. Notwithstanding this position, all the selected banks operate in the 
rapidly changing UAE commercial banking sector and each has been subject to significant 
change, over the course of the last few years.
The epistemology (knowledge) behind the research is rooted in post-positivism42 . Whilst 
post-positivism accepts that empirical observations are important, it rejects the idea that 
such observations are an immutable or absolute foundation for knowledge claims (Philips 
and Nicholas 2000 and Zammito 2004). This is not to say that a positivist43 approach 
cannot be used within a case research methodology. The author has focused his work on 
providing a theoretical grounding, multiple sources of evidence (including the use of 
Critical Incident Techniques) and on persuasiveness of logical argument (Flyvbjerg 2006).
42 Post-positivism is a meta-theoretical stance that critiques and amends positivism. Post-posilivists believe 
that human knowledge is based not on unchallengeable, but rather upon human conjectures (propositions that 
are unproven but appear correct and have not been disproven). As human knowledge is thus unavoidably 
conjectural, the assertion of these conjectures is justified by a set of warrants, which can be modified or 
withdrawn in light of further investigation (Zammito 2004).
"3 Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives of science which hold that the scientific method is 
the best approach to uncovering the processes by which events occur (Cohen and Maldonado 2007).
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A research process was developed at the start of the study as a means of guiding the work. 
Data was collected using, primarily, semi-structured interviews, and from a variety of 
sources including press articles, annual reports, internet material and relevant internal 
documents (reports/ memoranda/manuals/presentations). Most interviews averaged three 
hours each and all interviews were taped and transcripts sent to the interviewees for 
correction. For each case study a detailed report was produced and sent to the lead contact 
in the bank for corroboration. A follow-up discussion about the findings was then arranged. 
The interviews were held during the year 2010.
To summarise, the research methodology involved developing a set of research questions 
and a preliminary model based on the literature review. The model was used to focus the 
work in the principal area of interest, that is, operational risk mitigation. Multiple 
exploratory case studies were used to collect data. Data triangulation was employed using 
Critical Incident Techniques. According to O'Donoghue and Punch (2003), triangulation is 
a method of cross-checking data from multiple sources to search for regularities and 
irregularities in the research data. Altrichter et al. (2008) contend that triangulation gives a 
more detailed and balanced picture of the situation. A pilot case study was used as a basis 
for refining the case study protocol and the research model itself was revised and updated 
in the light of the research findings.
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3.2 Research Methods in Perspective
3.2.1 Research Paradigms
The author started this research recognising that positivist beliefs appear to have dominated 
the research in the physical and social sciences over the last fifty years but equally noticing 
the trend towards using post-positivist methodologies.
Researchers have an obligation to fully describe their theoretical posture44 (Kincheloe 
2005) in order that the critical reader can understand how he or she construes the shape of 
the social world in which he or she operates, particularly in the context of the research 
project itself.
To identify where the post-positivist paradigm fits in the qualitative research approach, it is 
necessary to examine the research process itself and then consider how the different 
paradigms fit within this process. Guba and Lincoln (2005, p. 93) summarise the qualitative 
research process into phases, which are reproduced in Table 5.
** Posture may be defined as the relationship that the researcher wants to have with the subject being 
researched (Pereira et al. 2003).
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Table 5: The Research Process
Phase 1
The Researcher as a Multicultural Subject
• History and research traditions.
• Conceptions of self and the other.














Methods of Collection and Analysis
Interviewing.
Observing.




The Art of Interpretation and Presentation
Phase 5 • Writing as interpretation.
• Evaluation.
Source: Adapted from Guba and Lincoln (2005)
The author's thinking is very much constructivist^ within the post-positivist paradigm.
Posture may be defined as the relationship that the researcher wants to have with the subject (Pereira et al. 
2003).
Constructivist epistemology is an epistemological perspective in philosophy about the nature of scientific 
knowledge. Constructivists maintain that scientific knowledge is constructed by scientists and not discovered 
from the world. Constructivists claim that the concepts of science arc mental constructs proposed in order to 
explain our sensory experience. Constructivism believes that there is no single valid methodology which 
means there are multiple methodologies for social science (Taylor and Derrick 2007).
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Phase two provides the interpretive paradigms that guide the research and Cuba and 
Lincoln (2005, p. 105) go on to provide a summary for each paradigm, reproduced in Table 
6 below.









Lived experience, dialogue, 
caring , race, class, gender, 
emotion.
Cultural practices, social texts
Type of Narration
Scientific report, case studies
Interpretive case studies
Essays, stories, experimental writing
Cultural theory
Source: Cuba and Lincoln (2005)
Other texts provide the researcher with a guide to establishing a suitable posture before 
embarking on the detailed work ahead. For example, Chenail (2003, p. 14) attempts to 
simplify these into the four C's:
• Curiosity and qualitative methods
• Confirmation and quantitative methods
• Comparison and comparative methods
• Critiquing and critical methods
The author recognises his research posture as one of curiosity in the context of knowing 
more about the subject, thus further aligning the research strategy to a qualitative approach
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3.2.2 Qualitative Methods
According to Patton (2002), qualitative research is multi-method in focus, involving a 
naturalistic approach to its subject matter. Creswell (2003, p. 51) notes the following 
features of qualitative studies:
1. Field focused.
2. Rely on 'self as research instrument.
3. Interpretive in character.
4. Rely on the use of expressive language and the presence of voice in the text.
5. Attend to particulars.
6. Believable and instructive because of their coherence and insight.
Mahoney and Goertz (2006) claim that qualitative methods are the best strategy for 
exploring a new area; a point which is particularly pertinent to the area of operational risk 
mitigation in the UAE.
Qualitative research is not without its problems. Denzin (2006) describes how critics see 
qualitative research as being unscientific, only exploratory or entirely personal and full of 
bias. Citing Patton (2002), Flyvbjerg (2006) identifies a few weaknesses of qualitative 
research; such as, the inability to manipulate independent variables, and the risk of 
improper interpretations. A number of authors (Jancsick 1998, Gummesson 2000, Yin 
2002, Holliday 2007) provide guidance on how such disadvantages may be minimised, if 
not eliminated. Holliday (2007) points towards using multi-methods or methodological 
triangulation as one way of overcoming these problems.
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Mahoney and Goertz (2006) adopt a pragmatic attitude towards qualitative research, 
describing it as the precursor to the quantitative study. The qualitative work develops the 
model and provides a definition of the concept. The quantitative work can then 
operationalise the variables46 and measure adherence to the model. In this scenario, both 
methodologies have an equally important role to play in the development of knowledge. In 
reflecting on the research that the author undertook, one of the major strengths with a 
qualitative approach is its openness to opportunistic possibilities that emerge during the 
period of study. For example, the author was able to witness a change to the risk 
management structure in one of the banks studied and discuss how this could impact upon 
operational risk mitigation. In fact, only structural, reporting and responsibility 
arrangements within the Corporate Risk Management Function were affected.
3.2.3 Quantitative Methods
The quantitative approach focuses on measurement, and is of significant help in validating
relationships that may exist (Mahoney and Goertz 2006) and, more importantly indicate 
direction and strength of causality. Quantitative research uses large sample surveys, or 
other instruments such as experiments, to gather data and then submits the data to 
appropriate analysis to prove that the relationship either exits or does not exist, or the 
hypothesis is confirmed or otherwise.
The author does not believe that using quantitative methods for this research study would 
have necessarily enhanced the reliability and validity of the research findings. Quantitative
To 'operationalise' a variable means to decide how to measure it (Shields and Hassan 2006).
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methods could have been used if operational risk was much better addressed and the study 
population was large enough to warrant the use of questionnaires. According to CBUAE 
(2010), the number of UAE commercial banks is quoted as forty six. However, due to the 
sensitivity of the subject, access to data is difficult; which limits the number of banks 
willing to be part of the research.
3.2.4 Case Study Methods
Yin (2002) explains a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context. Case study research investigates pre-defined 
phenomena but does not involve explicit control or manipulation of variables. The focus is 
on in-depth understanding of the phenomenon or its context (Flyvbjerg 2001).
Case studies have been described in a number of different ways: exploratory, explanatory 
and descriptive (Yin 2002 and Rarick 2003); descriptive, illustrative, experimental, 
exploratory and explanatory (Gerring 2005); intrinsic, instrumental and collective (George 
and Bennett 2005). Such descriptions, whilst helpful in illustrating the type of case study 
being undertaken, must be preceded by an understanding of the researcher's epistemology 
(see section 3.2.1). Soy (2006) reminds researchers that case study research can be used in 
the positivist and post-positivist traditions, with a single or multiple case study design, 
using qualitative or mixed methods. Other authors point out that case studies are favoured 
for answering the 'how' and 'why' research questions (Flyvbjerg 2001, Yin 2002, Dul and 
Hak 2008).
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Citing Yin (2002), Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 219) argues that using case studies as a research 
strategy is suggested when the following conditions exist:
1. When the form of research question is 'how' or 'why';
2. Where there is no control over the behavioural events;
3. Where the focus of the study is on contemporary events.
Robert (2009, p.63): adds the following 'key characteristics' of case studies:
1. Phenomena are examined in their natural settings;
2. Data is collected by multiple means;
3. One or few entities (person, group or organisation) are examined;
4. The complexity of the unit is studied intensively;
5. Case studies are more suitable for the exploration, classification and model 
development stages of the knowledge building process - the investigator should 
have a receptive attitude towards exploration;
6. No experimental controls or manipulations are involved;
7. The investigator may not specify the set of independent and dependent variables;
8. The results derived depend heavily on the integrative powers of the investigator;
9. Changes in site selection and data collection methods can take place during the 
work progress.
The author believes that the area of study, operational risk, and the research questions 
within the study satisfy most of the criteria referred to above.
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Case studies may be single or multiple in nature. Multiple-case studies can be used for two 
purposes - model building and replication (Yin 2002). Stake (2005) describes the evidence 
arising from multiple cases as more compelling and the design is more robust, although he 
warns that the decision to undertake multiple case studies cannot be taken lightly because 
of the time commitment and resource required. Echtelt et al. (2006) argue that multiple 
cases offer the researcher an even deeper understanding of the processes and good picture 
of reality. Additionally they consider that the multiple case studies add confidence to 
findings and can strengthen the perception, the validity, and the stability of the findings.
On the other hand, Flyvbjerg (2006) points out that the advantage of large samples is 
breadth, whereas their problem is one of depth. For the case study, the situation is the 
reverse; nevertheless, both approaches are relevant for a sound development of social 
science (Flyvbjerg 2006).
3.2.5 Case Study Methods in Business Research
Case study research has also previously addressed related fields of study. The study of
operations management by Gumport (2002) is probably a close fit to the area of operational 
risk. Put simply, Operational Managers have to manage operations risk, which in turn falls 
under the umbrella of operational risk. According to Gumport (2002), operations 
management involves complex interplays of people, technological systems, and 
organisational and physical processes, most of which change in their nature over time. 
Operational risk mitigation has been described as involving a complex series of interactions
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between people, processes and technology (Andreas 2007). Therefore, there appears to be a 
strong similarity.
Back to Gumport (2002) who goes on to analyse what he considers to be true Operations 
Management case studies which have been published in some mainstream operations 
management journals47 . The results of the analysis are reproduced in Table 7.























The 'Research Intent' is similar to Yin's (2002) terminology as the basis of analysis, thus:
• Descriptive - describes a hitherto unstudied situation.
• Exploratory - focuses on model building.
• Explanatory - involves hypothesis generation.
Journal of Operations Management, International Journal of Operations and Production Management, IEEE 
Transaction on Engineering Management and International Journal of Production Research.
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As can be seen from Table 7, the basis for most of the case studies was exploratory with an 
emphasis on using a pure case methodology rather than multiple methods to triangulate the 
results.
3.2.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of Case Studies
Many of the writers on case study methodology have documented the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the approach. The reader is reminded that all forms of research have 
limitations (Yin 2002) and that some of the strengths and weaknesses quoted reflect an 
argument for or against qualitative research rather than the case study methodology. Table 
8 represents a selection of the comments made in the literature reviewed.
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Table 8: Strengths and Weaknesses of Case Studies
Analysis of Case Studies
Strengths Weaknesses
1. Case studies are strong in reality - they are 
down to earth in details and attention as they 
report actual behaviour (Gummesson 2000).
2. Case studies are non-disruptive research
method - they are in harmony with the reader's 
own experience (Yin 2002).
3. Case studies recognise the complexity of social 
truth (Rarick 2003).
4. Case studies allow for a large number of 
variables and different aspects of the 
phenomenon (George and Bennett 2005).
5. Case studies are of high value in the applied 
social sciences where research often aims to 
provide practitioners with tools (Stake 2005).
6. Multiple case studies add confidence to 
findings (Echtelt et al. 2006).
7. Case studies are valuable in developing and 
refining concepts for further studies (Echtelt et 
al. 2006).
8. Case studies offer the opportunity for a holistic 
view of a process (Primus 2008).
9. Case studies enable phenomena analysis in 
their natural settings (Robert 2009).
1. Case studies rely on analytical generalisations 
(Flyvbjerg200l).
2. Case studies can take a long time to complete 
and result in drowning in the data (Rarick 
2003).
3. Case studies lack statistical reliability (there is 
element of bias) (Zainal 2005).
4. Case study analysis may establish relationships 
between variables but not necessarily the 
direction of the causation (Straits and Singleton 
2006).
5. Some case studies, for reasons of
confidentiality, have to disguise the identity of 
the organisation(s) being studied (Zahid and 
Riaz 2008).
6. Case studies represent interpretations of social 
reality and as such cannot be too objective 
<Muhamat2009).
Source: Developed by the author
Many of the texts quoted provide counter arguments to the weaknesses. Robert (2009) in 
particular, provides a robust and detailed defence against the criticisms made. Stake (2005) 
also discusses mitigating factors and counter arguments, and in particular points to the use 
of multiple case studies to strengthen or broaden the analytic generalisations as well as the 
precision, validity, and stability of the findings. It behooves all researchers to recognise the
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inherent weaknesses in their approach and then to develop an appropriate research design, 
which overcomes as fully as possible the shortcomings using a range of tactics, such as, 
paying attention to details, adhering to the research timeline framework, addressing data 
bias, using multiple case studies to enhance confidence in the results, and most important 
of all, validating the results using methodological triangulation (Stake 2005).
3.3 Research Design for This Study
3.3.1 Research Design
Yin (2002) explains the research design as the logic that links the data to be collected and
the conclusions to be drawn to the initial questions of the study. He points out that there are 
elements to consider when determining a research strategy:
1. The type of research question posed;
2. The extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events;
3. The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events.
The answers to these three questions furnish an indication to the type of strategy to be 
adopted in undertaking the research, as depicted in Table 9.
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Form of research 
question
How, Why
Who, what, where, how 
many, how much



















Using this analysis, the strategies suggested for completing this research were case studies.
Methodological triangulation (section 3.3.3) should enhance the reliability of the results 
but, as Holliday (2007) notes, a factor that must be considered is the perceived magnitude 
of the benefits that integrating case study work and survey methods would bring, 
particularly in relation to assessing the quality of the research design. His view suggests 
that methodological triangulation could be a judgemental issue, which researchers must be 
aware of throughout the course of the research project, and should be taken into account 
during the development of the research proposal. As detailed in section 3.3.3, Critical 
Incident Techniques were used to triangulate the results. Surveys across all the UAE 
commercial banks to triangulate the results for this study were not used due to access 
barriers, and since identifying all the individuals within all the UAE commercial banks who 
could participate in the survey would have been a difficult exercise due to the diverse 
nature of operational risk and the large number of potential actors involved. On the other
hand, a survey of one set of actors, for example, Risk Managers could have been done, but
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this would have produced biased results. Further, the four banks selected are major and 
influential players in the industry. Given this, it is believed that the results from the four 
case studies are sufficient to answer the research questions.
Bailey (2008) notes that the practical issues of access, availability of secondary data4 *1 , 
budgets, time pressures and experience of the potential users must also be considered in the 
research design. Robert (2009) points out that the design and scoping of the research 
project requires a comprehensive literature analysis to be undertaken in order to understand 
the existing body of research literature within the research area and to position the research 
questions within the context of the literature. He also points to other factors that could 
impact upon the design, including the purpose for which the research was undertaken, the 
resources available to the researcher and the deliverables required.
The overall design for this study showing the research phases, processes involved and 
documentation produced is shown in Table 10.
Secondary data is data collected by someone other than the user. Primary data, by contrast, is data 
collected by the investigator conducting the research (Corti and Bishop 2005).
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3. Pilot Case Study
4. Pilot Case Study 
Review






Define strategy/context/ preliminary 
model 
Define semi-structured interviews ;md 
case study protocol 
Identify potential cases
Conduct pilot case study 
Analyse pilot case study
Refine questionnaire 
Refine case study protocol
Conduct case studies 









Literature review write up (Chapter 2)
Cases for study
Research questions (Version 1) 
C'ase study protocol (Version 2)
Pilot case documentation 
Pilot case results
Research questions (Version 2) 
Case study protocol (Version 2)





Study implications (chap 5) 
Implications for further research (chap 6)
Source: Developed by the author
3.3.2 Preliminary Research Model
Thomas and James (2006) argue that a research focus is necessary in order to avoid being 
overwhelmed in data. They also point out that it is incumbent upon researches using case- 
based methods to be clear about their initial theoretical propositions, a point supported by 
Flyvbjerg (2006) who also warns of the dangers of completely disregarding any existing 
maps of the ground being explored.
It has been argued that risk mitigation involves making decision. Decision-making theories 
have been explored in the literature in Chapter 2 of this study and it was decided that an
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appropriate starting point for this research would be an extension of the risk management 
model, as applied to operational risk, using the decision making model driven from the 
literature (see section 2.2.3). This provided the author with the preliminary model for the 
risk mitigation process in Figure 2, depicted below as Figure 12 for easy reference.








Source: Developed by the author
Based on the work of Simon (1997) and Lurie (2004) discussed in section 2.2.3, the four 
risk mitigation phases are described below:
1. Responsibility - who has responsibility for operational risk mitigation (not included 
in the decision making process)?
2. Design - what tactics are employed to mitigate operational risk exposures?
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3. Choice - what is the process for selecting and implementing risk mitigation actions 
or tactics?
4. Implementation - what follow-up (e.g. reporting) is carried out to ensure that the 
risk has been effectively mitigated?
The researcher needs also to identify the categories or groups of people that, in 
combination, can provide both a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon under 
examination, and a variety of perspectives on that phenomenon (Atkinson et al. 2007). The 
literature review (Basel II) identified those areas with a primary concern for effective 
operational risk mitigation as being the Risk Management Unit, Internal Audit and 
Operational Management themselves. The view points of these three groups were 
considered important because:
1. The Risk Manager's viewpoint - the Risk Manager plays an integral part in the 
overall management of risk within the business;
2. The Internal Auditor's viewpoint - the Internal Auditor has an indirect role in 
mitigating risks through his examination of the internal control systems;
3. The Operational Manager's viewpoint - the Operational Manager acts as the owner 
of the process within which the risks have to be identified and mitigated.
The reason for selecting these groups is that the preliminary model included all of these 
groups in the 'responsibility' phase of risk mitigation. There are, however, other groups 
who - it could be argued that - have secondary concern for operational risk mitigation, such
131
as external auditors, consultants, outsourcing companies and regulators. By selecting the 
primary groups, the research data was kept more manageable, and enabled identification of 
commonalities of approach. Additionally, maintaining an internal bank focus ensured that 
stronger controls were achieved over the data since external parties would have approached 
the problem of mitigation from their own agenda.
The reporting of risk mitigation actions in the UAE commercial banks is not present in the 
literature and the model assumed that there would be some form of reporting so that follow 
up or tracking could be undertaken to ensure that the risk mitigation action is being or, has 
been carried out and is working effectively. Such an assumption was justified on the basis 
of regulatory pressures (Basel II) that would require documentary evidence of risk 
mitigation actions to be available for inspection, for example, audit reports on control 
improvements are mandatory actions. The absence of such reporting could be seen as a 
weakness in the ORM system.
Another important part of the model is shown as selection barriers. It was assumed there 
would be constraints placed on the organisation/functional units/individuals on what 
choices can be taken forward to implementation. The author approached the identification 
of these barriers by probing the interviewees about their views on the selection barriers.
3.3.3 Triangulation
Yin (2002) maintains that triangulation is the application and combination of several 
research approaches in the same research to validate the results. It can be employed in both
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qualitative research modes, including case studies, and quantitative research modes for the 
purpose of validation.
Creswell (2003) claims that by combining multiple observers, methods, and empirical 
materials, researchers can overcome the data bias and other problems that may arise from a 
single methodology strategy. This claim is also supported by other writers (O'Donoghue 
and Punch 2003, Altrichter et al. 2008).
Stake (2005) identifies four basic types of triangulation:
1. Data triangulation: involves time, space, and persons.
2. Investigator triangulation: involves multiple researchers in an investigation.
3. Theory triangulation: involves using more than one theoretical scheme in the 
interpretation of the phenomenon.
4. Methodological triangulation: involves using more than one method to gather data.
Triangulation has been employed in this study using Critical Incident Techniques (CITs) 
to validate the results (Serenko 2006), since CITs provide data that can be used to either 
substantiate or reject the data analysis findings concerning operational risk mitigation (see 
next section). The approach is consistent with the fourth type of triangulation as identified 
by Stake (2005).
In order to validate the results, and ensure that the findings make sense, the following 
strategy path has been followed:
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1. Triangulation of data sources to validate convergence of findings using CIT's;
2. Multiple-case study strategy has been employed;
3. The findings have been related back to the literature whenever possible (see 
Chapter 4).
3.3.3.1 Critical Incident Techniques (CIT)
Gremler (2004) explains the Critical Incident Technique as a procedure used for collecting 
direct observations of human behaviour that have critical significance and meet certain 
criteria. The observations are then analysed and compared to the research findings. Critical 
incidents can be gathered in various ways, but typically respondents are asked to tell a story 
about an experience they have had (Gremler 2004).
Gremler (2004, p. 29) goes on to point out that a CIT is a flexible method that usually relies 
on five major steps: The first is determining and reviewing the incident, then fact-finding, 
which involves collecting the details of the incident from the participants. When all of the 
facts are collected, the next step is to identify the issues, followed by determining how the 
issues were resolved based on various possible solutions. The final step is the evaluation, 
which will determine if the solution that was selected would solve the root cause of the 
incident.
Zach (2004) describes the use of Critical Incident Techniques (CIT's) as a way of 
validating the data analysis results. The idea behind CIT's is to encourage the manager
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(unit of analysis, see section 3.3.6.4) to explain an incident (operational risk incident) in 
some detail and then to illustrate how the incident was eventually overcome (how it was 
mitigated) and whether it is in line with the data analysis results.
Support for using CITs is also found in Serenko (2006) who notes that collecting data 
about such events can portray the organisational processes and enable patterns in the 
overall data to be identified and compared.
The author is also confident that the use of Critical Incident Techniques within the case 
study approach also helps to overcome some of the problems concerned with comparability 
of data from the basic units of analysis. This comparability may arise since Risk Managers 
and Internal Auditors are generally governed by external regulations and professional 
standards, whereas Operational Managers in different disciplines can have a wide variety of 
functional responsibility, vested interests, experience and skills.
Hughes (2007, p. 51) defines a critical interview technique as:
"A qualitative interview procedure which facilitates the investigation of significant 
occurrences (events, incidents, processes or issues) identified by the respondent, the 
way they are managed, and the outcomes. The objective is to gain an understanding 
of the incident from the perspective of the individual."
He sees a critical incident as having the following characteristics:
1. It should contain only one event or chief description;
2. It should identify persons, locations and times as specifically as possible;
3. It should either be observed by the writer or be verifiable by more than one source;
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Serenko (2006, p 33) sees a critical incident as having the following advantages:
1. Can be applied using questionnaires or interviews.
2. Identifies events that might be missed by other methods which only focus on 
common and everyday events.
3. Data is collected from the respondent's perspective and in his or her own words.
4. Does not force the respondents into any given framework.
5. Useful when problems occur but the cause and severity are not known.
6. Provides rich information.
He also places emphasis on making sure that critical incidents are not written in 
judgemental terms, and do not attempt to summarise too much nor be too general.
Based on the above illustration, CIT's were used during the course of the interviews as data 
triangulation strategy for the study. This process was accomplished by collecting additional 
set of data, analysing it, and comparing it to the data analysis results of the main interviews. 
Sorenko (2006) demonstrates that CIT's provide data that can be used to either substantiate 
or reject (i.e. validate) the findings (concerning operational risk mitigation).
The questions used to discuss the critical incidents in this study were part of the case study 
protocol and can be found in Appendix Bl.
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33A Data Analysis
3.3.4.1 Qualitative Data Analysis
The common qualitative data analysis approaches are examined in this section, and the 
logic of choosing one approach over another is given.
Yin (2002, Ch. 5) explains data analysis as a process of inspecting, categorising, tabulating 
and modelling data with the goal of highlighting useful information, suggesting 
conclusions, supporting decision making and addressing the initial proposition. Creswell 
(2003) points out that data analysis has multiple approaches, encompassing diverse 
techniques under a variety of names, in different business and sciences, and it is incumbent 
upon the researcher to develop a general data analysis strategy as part of the case study data 
design.
The interpretation of data is recognised as a critical and difficult phase in qualitative 
research (Lindlof and Taylor 2002) and there are some excellent sources of reference 
available to the researcher to guide him through the process (see for example Yin 2002, 
Glaser 2005, Echtelt et al. 2006, Baxter and Jack 2008). There is no one approach of 
qualitative data analysis, but rather a variety of approaches, related to the different 
perspectives of the researcher (Glaser 2005). Researchers are also advised that successful 
qualitative research is entirely dependent upon a constant interaction among the research 
design, data collection, and data analysis (Bchtclt ct al. 2006).
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Holliday (2007) advocates that the most common analysis approach of qualitative data is 
observer impression. That is, an expert observer examines the data, interprets and reports 
the findings in a structured form. He goes on to point out that one of the most important 
parts of this qualitative data analysis approach is the data de-muddling or careful 
deliberation that takes place and how the de-muddle of information clears into patterns.
The author recognises Holliday's (2007) approach as allowing the data to speak for itself, 
and organising the emerging thoughts into a coherent pattern. In order to broaden the 
reader's knowledge, the following is a cross section of the common qualitative data 
analysis approaches:
3.3.4.1.1 Content Analysis
Stemler (2001) explains the Content Analysis (CA) approach as compressing many words
of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding. It often involves 
building a fixed vocabulary of terms and word frequencies. He points out that words and 
phrases mentioned most often are those reflecting important concerns. Therefore, CA starts 
with word frequencies.
Klaus (2004) points out that with the rise of computing facilities, computer-based methods 
of CA are growing in popularity. The input is analysed for frequencies and coded into 
categories for building up inferences.
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Roger (2005) claims that a frequent criticism of CA is that it can only be applied to identify 
the words, sentences, or texts themselves, rather than their inter-relations. As pointed out 
earlier, ORM is a complex area where actions are inter-related and inter-dependent. 
Accordingly, the author would argue that CA is not an optimal choice for data analysis for 
this study.
3.3.4.1.2 Discourse Analysis
Harris (1991) explains Discourse Analysis (DA) as an approach to analysing written, 
spoken or signed language use. He points out that DA has been taken up in a variety of 
social science disciplines, each of which is subject to its own assumptions, dimensions of 
analysis, and methodologies.
Schiffrin et al. (2001) point out that the objects of DA (writing, talking, conversation, 
communicative event) are variously defined in terms of coherent sequences of sentences, 
propositions or speech acts. According to Johnstone (2002) DA does not only study 
language use beyond the sentence boundary, but also prefers to analyse naturally occurring 
language use.
In DA, formal equivalence relations among the sentences of a coherent discourse are made 
explicit by using sentence transformations to convert the text into a basic form. Words and 
sentences with equivalent information are then grouped together. The work is then 
progressed into a fully articulated informational content and invoked into a system for 
computer-aided analysis (Blommaert 2005).
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An inherent limitation in DA is to decide when a particular piece of information (data) is 
relevant to the topic being researched (Gee 2005). Considering the complexity of ORM, all 
parts of interview data is considered relevant and needs to be conceptualised. Accordingly, 
the author would contend that DA is not an optimal choice for data analysis for this study.
3.3.4.1.3 Recursive Abstraction
Stebbins (2001) explains Recursive Abstraction (RA) as an approach to analysing
qualitative data without coding, where data is summarised; the summaries are then further 
summarised, and so on. The end result is a more compact summary that would have been 
difficult to formulate without the preceding steps of distillation.
Fischer (2005) points out that a frequent criticism of RA is that the final conclusions are 
several times removed from the underlying data. He counters this criticism by claiming that 
analysts need to document the reasoning behind each summary step, citing examples from 
the data where statements were included and where statements were excluded from the 
intermediate summary. Considering the complexity of ORM, all conclusions from the data 
are considered important and need to be maintained. Accordingly, the author would argue 
that RA is not an optimal choice for data analysis for this study.
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3.3.4.1.4 Grounded Theory
According to Allan (2003), Grounded Theory (GT) is a qualitative research methodology 
that emphasises generation of theory from data in the process of conducting research. He 
goes on to point out that it is a research method that operates almost in a reverse fashion 
from traditional research and at first may appear to be in contradiction with the scientific 
method. This point is picked up by Glaser (2005) who advocates that rather than beginning 
by researching and developing a hypothesis, the first step is data collection. From the data 
collected, the key points are marked with a series of codes, which are extracted from the 
text. The codes are grouped into similar concepts in order to make them more workable. 
From these concepts, categories are formed, which are the basis for the creation of a theory, 
or a reverse engineered hypothesis Glaser (2005).
Since generating a new hypothesis is not part of the study objectives, the author would 
contend that the GT qualitative data approach is not the optimal choice for data analysis for 
this study.
3.3.4.2 Coding
According to Marshall and Rossman (1998), Coding is an interpretive technique that both
organises the data and provides a means to introduce its interpretations. They go on to 
explain that most coding requires the analyst to read the data and demarcate segments 
within it. Each segment is labelled with a word or short phrase 'code.' When coding is 
complete, the analyst prepares reports via a mix of summarising the prevalence of codes.
141
discussing similarities and differences in related codes across distinct original contexts, or 
comparing the relationship between codes.
Contemporary qualitative data analyses are sometimes supported by computer 
programmes. These programmes do not limit the interpretive nature of coding but rather 
are aimed at enhancing the analyst's efficiency at data analysis, storage and retrieval and at 
applying the codes to the data (Ration 2002).
Lindlof and Taylor (2002) point out that a frequent criticism of coding method is that it 
seeks to transform qualitative data into quantitative data, thereby draining the data of its 
variety, richness, and individual character. They counter this criticism by advising analysts 
to thoroughly expose their definitions of codes and link those codes soundly to the 
underlying data, therein bringing back the richness that might be absent from a mere list of 
codes.
Citing Lindlof and Taylor (2002), Holliday (2007, p. 53) points out that irrespective of the 
data analysis approach, the data analysis process boils down to three main flows of activity:
1. Data reduction: The process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and 
transforming the data that is collected during field work;
2. Data display: Organising, compressing, and assembling the information to permit 
conclusion drawing and action;
3. Conclusion drawing and verification: Noting regularities, patterns, explanations,
possible configurations, casual flows and propositions.
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Holliday (2007) indicates that these three themes are interwoven and provide a well- 
established framework to undertake a thorough qualitative analysis of the captured data. 
(Holliday 2007) supports the view of Weik (1995) by emphasising that data analysis under 
this framework becomes an iterative process which means that the process is repeated again 
and again, using the results from the previous stage
The author followed the advice of Holliday (2007) in his qualitative data analysis approach. 
Written data from transcripts were conceptualised line by line. A process of going back and 
forth while comparing data, constantly modifying, and sharpening the growing conclusions 
was employed (see also section 3.3.4.1).
In order to facilitate the process, the data was coded based upon the best practices 
suggested by a number of authors (see Patton 2002, Denzin and Lincoln 2005, Charmaz 
2006) in order to find out relevant patterns.
The coding system was based upon the preliminary research model and enabled a 
structured approach to be taken from the beginning of the data analysis. The coding was 
revised after the pilot case study had been completed. The final version is presented in 
Appendix B2 as part of the case study protocol.
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Computer software, ATLAS.ti, was used to facilitate data analysis and provide a repository 
of the data that could be collected and stored electronically, thus forming part of the case 
study database.
Thomas and James (2006) warn about drowning in data and being unable to distinguish the 
most significant parts from those peculiar to a particular case, something which is easy to 
do when a big variety of data sources exists. How much data to collect and analyse is a 
judgemental matter which must consider how much additional data would help to validate 
the research approach and results. They reiterate that the experience and skills of the 
researcher play an important part in this process. Serenko (2006) captures an important 
innate or natural ability relating to the human psyche; thus, human beings are born with the 
ability to absorb a vast amount of information and make sense and order of that 
information. A view that was in fact supported by Mey and Mruck (2007) who claim that 
people are meaning-finders; they can very quickly make sense of most chaotic events.
3.3.4.3 Drawing Conclusions
The ability to draw valid conclusions rests in the hands of the researcher; and his skills and 
experience are tested to the extreme at this stage of the process. Several texts describe the 
qualities of a good researcher (Clarke 2005, Thomas and James 2006, Mey and Mruck 
2007). The researcher is in fact the research pillar, as it is he or she who is at the centre of 
the research process and who drives the whole effort forward. Based on their many years of 
experience in the field, Mey and Mruck (2007) believe that a knowledgeable researcher 
with conceptual interests and more than one disciplinary perspective is often a better
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research instrument for qualitative research, as he is more refined, more bias resistant, more 
economical, quicker to 'home in' on the core processes that hold the case together, and 
more persistent in the search for conceptual meaning.
Whatever the researcher's skill base is, there are still a number of issues that must be 
considered in assessing the quality of the conclusions drawn from the research study. Such 
issues are described by Mey and Mruck (2007) and are related to this study in Table 11.
Table 11: Issues in Assessing the Quality of the Research Conclusions
Issue Method used in the study
Obiectivitv/Confirmabilitv
Relates to the extent of relative neutrality and freedom
form researcher bias.
1. The general methods and procedures have been 
fully descnbed and critiqued;
2. The data collection and analysis is fully auditable 
enabling repetition of the study.__________
Reliability/dependability
Relates to the issue of quality control over the study.
1. The research design is congruent with the research 
questions;
2. The basic paradigms and beliefs are articulated and 
related to theory;
3. A monthly supervisory reporting mechanism was 
established at the outset of the study.
Authenticity
Do the findings of the study make sense?
1. Triangulation of data sources produced convergent 
Findings;
2. A multiple-case study strategy used;
3. Findings were related back to the literature
whenever possible. ____ ________
External Validitv//Fittingness
Relates to the generalisability of the results.
1. The study focused on major commercial banks in 
the UAE market;
2. Critical incidents and other published operational 
risk incidents support the findings.
Utilisation/ADDlication/Action Orientation
Relates to the pragmatic validity of the results in the
research/practitioner's community.
I. The study results are important to a number of 
stakeholders, for example, regulators, shareholders. 
Board and Senior Managers;
2 An operational risk mitigation checklist has been 
developed,
3. A high level audit overview document for 
reviewing the work of the Operational Risk 
Function has been produced. ____
Source: Developed by the author (based on Mey and Mruck (2007))
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3.3.5 Quality of the Research Design
Yin (2002, p. 33) identifies four common tests for judging the quality of research design:
1. Construct validity: establishing correct research procedural measures.
2. Internal validity (for explanatory studies only, and not for descriptive or exploratory 
studies): establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to 
lead to other conditions.
3. External validity: establishing the domain to which a study's findings can be 
generalised.
4. Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study, such as the data collection 
procedures can be repeated, with the same results.
It has been stated that this research is exploratory and the author was, therefore, concerned 
with ensuring the research design had construct validity, external validity and reliability.
Yin (2002) provides guidance on tactics that may be used (and the phase within the 
research process) to ensure such conditions are met. Table 12 provides further details.
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Table 12: Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests
Tests
Construct validity





- use multiple sources of evidence/triangulate 
- establish chain of evidence 
have key information review 
- draft case study report
- do explanation building 
- do time-series analysis
- use replication in multiple case studies
- use case study protocol 
- develop case study data base












In the context of this research study, the author followed Yin (2002) and has employed all 
suggested tactics. The use of critical incidents was seen as an effective way of providing 
evidence about the theoretical territory within which the study was bounded, thus 
enhancing construct validity. Further, multiple sources of evidence (see section 3.3.6.6), 
key information review and drafting case study reports were employed for this purpose. 
External validity which indicates that the findings can be generalised from companies in 
the sample to other companies or industries (Mitchell and Jolley 2001) is, of course, a 
matter of degree since no empirical study can offer certainty that its findings are valid for 
other populations (Shadish 2002). In this study, however, it is anticipated that the results 
will be generalisable to other sectors of the UAE financial services industry, such as 
insurance companies, since their operations are similar and many UAE commercial banks 
are known to have insurance subsidiaries. The issue of reliability and, in particular the 
reliability of interview data, is of concern in any case research. The goal of reliability is to 
minimise the errors and biases in a study (Yin 2002). Yin goes on to suggest that a good 
guideline is to conduct the research so that an auditor could repeat the procedures and
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arrive at the same results. The author considers his background, and the need to develop 
properly documented files, create sufficient evidence to support the findings and present 
them in such a way that a verifiable audit trial can be created, is of considerable help in 
satisfying this particular element. The development of a case study protocol (section 3.3.7) 
further helps to satisfy this requirement.
3.3.6 Selection for the Cases Studied: The Way Forward
3.3.6.1 Pilot Case Study
Yin (2002) advocates that a pilot case study helps investigators to refine their data
collection plans with respect to both content of data and the procedures to be followed. 
Straits and Singleton (2006) describe a pilot case study as being exploratory, enabling 
problems and issues to be identified which may point to further investigation. The author 
believes that the objective of a pilot case study is, therefore, to provide the researcher with 
a solid foundation such that the research process is in tune with the reality of the situation 
in the field. The research began with a detailed pilot case study, which aimed to confirm 
this position and provide the author with feedback concerning the development of the final 
case study protocol. The bank selected for the pilot was chosen on the basis of the author's 
personal knowledge of the concerned employees and ease of access.
3.3.6.2 Sampling
Lawrence (2006) refers to sampling as the process of collecting information from a 
population. He classifies sampling methods as: 'random/probability' (random sampling.
148
systematic sampling, stratified sampling, cluster sampling) or non-random/non-probability 
(convenience sampling, purposive sampling, snowball sampling). The most common 
reason for sampling is to obtain information about a population, since sampling is quicker 
and cheaper than a complete census of a population (Firebaugh 2008).
The number of cases used in the research was determined using the following criteria:
• The inherent difficulties in gaining access and discussing in detail a new area where 
sensitive information could, and indeed was, disclosed during the interviews and 
probing of critical incidents;
• The fact that any further case studies would have only marginally contributed to a 
better response to the research questions since the four selected banks are major 
players in the UAE commercial banking industry. If the results from the four 
selected banks had been divergent, the 'reserve' banks identified in the case study 
protocol would have been contacted and further work done.
Scholz and Tietje (2002) discuss the issue of how many cases are needed. They discuss the 
emphasis placed on numbers as being important but not a paramount issue; because 
although the number of studies conducted is important, no investigation can be defined on 
the basis of that issue alone. Rarick (2003) points out that there is no ideal number, whilst 
Straits and Singleton (2006) suggest that between two and ten cases are desirable. This 
study has used four for the reasons noted above.
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Practicalities played an important part in selecting the number of cases studied. There was a 
need at the outset to identify commercial banks that were known to have an ORM function. 
This type of approach is referred to as purposive sampling where the objective is to choose 
sources that will help to answer the basic research questions and fit the basic purpose of the 
study (George and Bennett 2005, Lawrence 2006). Random or representative sampling is 
not preferred in this type of environment due to difficulties in gaining access to sensitive 
information, as pointed out above.
3.3.6.3 Study Population
Chapter 1, section 1.1.4 has already described the logic behind selecting the UAE
commercial banks as the study population.
The UAE commercial banks represent a homogeneous and discrete group although they 
may differ in terms of size and business focus. They are all, however, regulated by the 
same body (CBUAE) and will, therefore, be required to maintain sound standards of 
operation in their business activities, including risk management. Additionally, it was 
anticipated that they would have a range of operational risk problems to manage.
Yin (2002) advises that when multiple-case studies are used, each case must be carefully 
selected so that it either predicts similar results (literal replication) or produces contrasting 
results but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication). Theoretical replication involves 
selecting cases due to suspected intrinsic differences between them Yin (2002), and it is 
required to make general statements about the differences and similarities (see section 4.6).
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(Creswell 2003) points out that when only a few cases (two to five) are selected, then literal 
replication, or selecting cases so that they are likely to predict similar results is appropriate. 
The author therefore selected the cases bearing this in mind.
Another element to consider is the bounding of the case study (Cash and William 2002) or 
deciding what is included and what is excluded. The author of this thesis argues that 
exercising control over the boundaries can be difficult with large organisations, which may 
themselves contain a number of business units that could, on their own, be bounded as a 
case study, In the case of the UAE commercial banks, they are known to operate in other 
market sectors such as insurance. This study was bounded at the organisational level and 
not confined to any particular business unit.
To summarise, the selection criteria for the sample chosen was based on what has been 
discussed and on a number of factors including how well established the bank was, how 
successful (in terms of profit, reputation, and so on) the bank had been, the information in 
the public domain about the bank's risk management policies and the information in the 
public domain concerning operational risk problems in the bank. It was hoped that by 
adopting these criteria the selected banks would recognise the relevance of the research to 
their own organisation thus facilitating access. Researchers would work with organisations 
and identify what is in it for them, according to Robert (2009). The author hoped from the 
outset that the research study would be of interest to the UAl: commercial banks since 
operational risk and the development of appropriate methodologies to manage operational 
risk are of topical interest in this sector of business.
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3.3.6.4 Unit of Analysis
Yin (2002) provides guidance on selecting the unit of analysis. He explains the unit of 
analysis as being related to the way the initial research questions have been defined. 
Typical units of analysis include the individual, the organisation or even the society itself. 
The unit of analysis in this study is the manager, i.e. person interviewed, within the bank 
since it is his interaction with the operational risk mitigation process that is the focus of the 
study. Whilst this study is concerned with how the organisation mitigates operational risk, 
it is at the level of the individual that the mitigation action is formulated.
Selecting a function within the banks as the unit of analysis was not possible because the 
managers selected came from a variety of departments and business units, and to restate, 
the focus of the study was on how the organisation, and not how a certain function, 
mitigates operational risk.
3.3.6.5 The Research Instrument
The research instrument is the tool that enables the researcher to obtain responses to his
questions from the respondents (Yin 2002). Lindlof and Taylor (2002) explain the semi- 
structured interview as a qualitative research tool commonly employed in qualitative 
research. They point out that a semi-structured interview is flexible and allows new 
questions to be brought up during the interview as a result of what the interviewee says, 
and allows face-to-face interaction to take place enabling the author, for example, to see
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how long respondents took to answer a particular question when some thinking time was 
required (barriers to mitigating operational risk). This ensures that answers can be reliably 
aggregated and that comparisons can be made with confidence between sample subgroups 
or between different survey periods (Lindlof and Taylor 2002).
The interviewer in a semi-structured interview generally has a framework of themes to be 
explored (Kvale and Brinkman 2008). However, this does not preclude prompting the 
interviewees with additional questions when the context dictates (Kvale and Brinkman
2008).
Considering the fact that, for this research, the purpose of the interview questions was to 
direct the interview and allow the interviewee to elaborate on his views (Joubish 2009) on 
operational risk, the semi-structured interview approach was selected as the appropriate 
research instrument.
3.3.6.6 Data Collection
Hentschel (1998) points out that for qualitative methods, researchers can revert to in-depth
interviews, direct observation and written documents for data collection. Furthermore, Shah 
and Corley (2006) maintain that qualitative methods for data collection and analysis can be 
powerful, especially in an area that is not well researched. Their view supports the author's 
approach to research operational risk mitigation in the UAE commercial banking industry 
using qualitative methods for data collection and analysis
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Yin (2002, p.80) lists six sources of evidence without reference to their relative strengths 
and weaknesses:
1. Documentation - such as letters, memoranda, internal reports, annual reports, press 
reports, minutes of meetings or emails.
2. Archival records - such as organisational charts, personnel records, internal magazines 
or internal material.
3. Interviews - structured or semi-structured.
4. Direct observation - via field visits to the sites.
5. Participant observation - where the researcher takes an active role in the case.
6. Physical artefacts - such as technological devices, a work of art, trophies or 
photographs.
Flyvbjerg (2006) considers that no single source has a complete advantage over the others; 
rather, they might be complementary and could be used in tandem, and most case studies 
have one or two sources of data as the primary collection vehicle. The goal is to obtain a 
rich set of data surrounding the research issues, as well as capturing the contextual 
complexity (Kvale and Brinkman 2008), but collecting case study data from case 
participants alone can be difficult and time-consuming (Robert 2009).
The main data collection source used in this study was a semi-structured interview 
designed to elicit information from the selected managers about ORM and, in particular, 
the mitigation process. The author noted the comments of Serenko (2006) concerning the
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disadvantages of taped interviews; such as, the respondent being sometimes self-conscious 
or overly aware of the recorder, and the equipment may malfunction. In response, each 
interviewee was given the option of having the interview taped, and the author had a spare 
machine available at all the interviews. Each interview was transcribed and the transcript 
sent to the interviewee for verification, correction and reflection vis-a-vis the responses 
given. The author concluded each interview with a statement ensuring that lines of 
communication remained open. In some cases follow-up questions were raised by the 
author to clarify issues that had been discussed during the interviews.
The questionnaire was developed by the author as part of the case study protocol. It was 
subject to revision after the pilot case study had been undertaken. The final document is 
part of the case study protocol (Appendix Bl). The use of a preliminary model for the 
operational risk mitigation process enabled the author to specify the potential factors and 
discuss them at the interviews. Data could thus be organised in a systematic way which 
aided subsequent analysis. Secondary data pertinent to the banks was collected by the 
author during the field work and from the internet. Such data includes annual reports, 
internal reports, power-point presentations, organisational charts and press reports.
The interviews were also the most appropriate method for collecting data about the critical 
incidents cited by the managers. Gremler (2004) notes that the Critical Incident Technique 
is a method for coming close to direct observation, but avoids some of the hardships. 
Serenko (2006) goes on to point out that the method allows more incidents and mini-cases, 
to be collected than would be possible through direct observation.
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The overall data collection method enabled a good level of data triangulation using CIT's 
to be achieved in the study, one of the important criteria for construct validity.
3.3.6.7 Organisational Confidentiality
Robert (2009) points out that there are two key points to be addressed in order to gain the 
cooperation of interviewees: confidentiality and benefits to organisations. The author was 
aware of the need for confidentiality given the sensitive nature of the subject matter and 
provided assurance both to the banks involved and the interviewees that their confidence 
and trust would be respected. The managers interviewed needed to be assured that the 
information given, particularly when discussing critical incidents, would not affect, for 
example, the researcher's views of the banks.
Data collected from the critical incidents was in some cases extremely sensitive. Obtaining 
approval from the companies took a considerable effort according to Zaugg (2006) in his 
case study research into 'On-line complaint Management.' The author knew from the 
outset that gaining access was one of the major risks of the study. Operational risk 
incidents within the UAE commercial banking sector have occurred regularly throughout 
the course of this study as press reports attest to (see for example Gulfnews, Sept. 16, 2008 
issue). Access was gained through a variety of channels following which an initial meeting 
was set up to discuss the aims and objectives of the research project, whom needed to be 
interviewed and the likely duration of the interviews. The author had made contingency
156
plans if access was not granted (see section 3.3.7.4), and in the event only one bank in the 
original list of four declined49 the invitation to participate.
None of the banks or the managers interviewed has been named (see tables 13 and 14) and 
no interview quotes have been attributed. Each bank is referred to using a Greek letter; 
however, the bank names and reports were made available to the researcher's supervisors.
3.3.7 Case Study Protocol
Yin (2002) suggests that a detailed case study protocol is desirable under all circumstances,
but is essential if a multiple case study design is used. He further advocates that a protocol 
helps to focus the research and provide a framework within which the case study may be 
carried out. The author followed the case study protocol developed by Straits and Singleton 
(2006), which they believe enhances the reliability and validity of the investigation. The 
following is an overview of the case study protocol developed for this study.
3.3.7.1 Project Objectives
The overall objective of the project was to examine one aspect of the ORM, namely risk 
mitigation, in the context of one type of business risk, namely operational risk, within the 
UAE commercial banking industry. This led to the development of the research main and 
secondary questions (section 1.2.3).
The invitation was declined because the bank was going through some significant organisational changes 
including a review of the operational risk management function.
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3.3.7.2 Background Information
A literature review of the operational risk area had been produced highlighting the scarcity 
or lack of previous academic research in the area of operational risk in the UAE 
commercial banking industry. Other areas of risk management have been examined in 
some detail, for example, market risk and the application of VaR methodologies to 
calculating market risk exposures. However, ORM (in the context of commercial banking 
industry in the UAE) has only recently attracted attention following the CBUAE mandate 
that the UAE commercial banks ensure that they fully adhere to Basel II operational risk 
recommendations by l $l Jan. 2011, and the Financial Crises. The result is that there are 
some challenging opportunities to further build a model in the operational risk area. The 
preliminary risk mitigation model was drawn from the decision-making theory which has 
been well researched and developed from an academic standpoint.
3.3.7.3 Summary of the Substantive Issues
The rational for selecting the UAE commercial banking was based on the literature review
undertaken as a prelude to completing the research proposal (section 1.1.4). This 
highlighted the growth in operational risk exposures being experienced by the UAE 
commercial banks generally resulting from factors such as globalisation, business climate, 
regulatory pressures and the Financial Crises. Whilst operational risk is a feature of many 
businesses, there is increasing pressure on the banking sector to ensure that adequate ORM 
procedures are in place. It was expected that the UAE commercial banks, in particular,
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would have a range of operational risk problems and, as such, represent a suitable group 
upon which to examine the research question. One of the expected outcomes of the 
research was the establishment of the practices within the selected population of the UAE 
commercial banks. The risk mitigation phase of ORM was chosen as the focus of the 
research (although it was recognised that the other phases would need to be addressed) 
since it could be seen as representing one of the most important daily challenges facing 
management, i.e. how best to reduce the operational risk exposures identified. The research 
questions were examined by using a series of probing interviews with key players in ORM 
in the selected banks. These interviews were semi-structured and a template of the 
questions was developed to guide the process (Appendix Bl).
3.3.7.4 Structure of the Field Procedures
• Banks chosen for the study - The list of banks chosen for this study is shown in 
Table 13.





















Contact for gaining access
Head of Operational Risk
Head of Operational Risk
Head of Operational Risk
Head of Operational Risk
Head of Operational Risk
Head of Operational Risk
Head of Operational Risk
Head of Operational Risk
Head ol Operational Risk
Source: Developed by the author
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The initial list of banks was selected because they were known to represent main 
players in the UAE commercial banking. They were, therefore, likely to have an 
Operational Risk Unit and an Internal Audit department. The selected banks were 
approached directly (by telephone) by the author as the first step to gaining access. 
This was followed up by a letter enclosing a copy of the condensed research 
proposal. A follow up visit was made to arrange an interview when face-to-face 
discussions could begin.
• Determining the people interviewed - Serenko (2006) discusses the selection of 
respondents when interviews are to be used to collect data, and suggests that they 
should be chosen on the basis of what the researcher desires to know and from 
whose perspective that information is desired (see section 3.3.6.4 for a discussion 
on selecting the manager as the unit of analysis).
Further, the author was aware from the literature review (Basel II) that, in 
particular, the key actors in ORM were the Risk Management Function, Operations 
Management in the various business units and Internal Audit. For each of the banks 
involved, initial contact was made with the Head of Operational Risk50 . The final 
interviewee choice was left to the Head of Operational Risk. Table 14 shows the 
positions of the people interviewed (generic titles have been used, however, the real 
titles were made available to the supervisors) for each of the banks involved in the 
study and where in the organisational structure they were positioned. Factors taken
This is a generic title and represents the most senior person responsible for the Corporate Operational Risk 
Function.
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into account in the selection criteria included managers from separate businesses, 
managers who have experienced recent operational risk problems (in order that 
Critical Incident Techniques could be employed at the interviews), managers with 
long auditing experience and Operational Risk Managers working in the business 
units.
Table 14: Managers Interviewed
Bank Person Interviewed Functional Area
Alpha
Director of Risk Management 
Head of Operational Risk 
Director of Internal Audit 
Operations Manager 
Security Manager
Corporate Risk Function 
Corporate Risk Function 
Corporate Internal Audit Function 
Treasury Business Unit 
IT Business Unit
Beta
Head of Operational Risk 
Operational Risk Manager 
Director of Internal Audit 
Operations Manager
Corporate Risk Function 
Treasury Business Unit 
Corporate Internal Audit Function 
Retail Banking Business Unit
Gamma
Head of Operational Risk 
Head of Business Risk 
Director of Internal Audit 
Operational Risk Manager 
Operational Risk Manager
Corporate Risk Function 
Corporate Risk Function 
Corporate Internal Audit Function 
Corporate Banking Business Unit 
IT Business Unit
Delta
Head of Operational Risk 
Head of Risk Finance 
Director of Internal Audit 
Internal Audit Manager 
Operational Risk Manager
Corporate Risk Function 
Corporate Risk Function 
Corporate Internal Audit Function 
Treasury Business Unit 
Finance Business unit
Source: Developed by the author
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The pilot and main interviews were held during the year 2010, most averaged three 
hours each and were conducted according to the interviewees' schedules and 
availability as suggested by Kvale and Brinkman (2008).
• Access issues - The author's personal contacts within the banking sector helped to 
gain access to data and only one of the original banks would not participate (due to 
impeding organisational changes). The sensitivity of the information gathered 
during the study is recognised and all material has been personally controlled by the 
author. All the information collected during the project has been maintained in a 
series of protected project files, which included data collected from the case studies.
• Contingency plans - In case of difficulties in gaining access, the author made a 
number of contingency arrangements to move the study forward (see Table 13).
• Resources used - the author personally carried out all the interview work in order 
to maintain a consistent approach throughout. Transcribing of the taped interviews 
and all the subsequent data analysis was carried out by the author. Case study work 
was reviewed on an ongoing basis by the supervisor in order to ensure that the work 
carried out met the high academic standards of professionalism demanded at 
doctoral level.
3.3.7.5 Case Study Questions
• The nature of the questions - case study questions can be classified into three 
groupings as detailed below (see Appendix Bl). It is important to structure the 
interview questions according to the sequence of risk mitigation events and the 
author utilised the risk management model to help structure the interview. In order
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to avoid the issue of bias, the questions were not shown to the interviewees. The 
principal reason for developing case study questions was to provide a tool for data 
collection and subsequent data analysis.
Group 1 questions - relate to bank's ORM details. Those in large type represented 
primary questions, whilst those in smaller type were likely to be answered during 
the discussion of the primary question and are, therefore, secondary questions. 
Group 2 questions - relate to the critical incidents across the cases. 
Group 3 questions - relate to the Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis.
3.3.7.6 The Analysis Plan
Outline of the case study report - for each of the case studies undertaken a case study
report was prepared. Preparing an initial outline of the report before the field work began 
helped to focus the author on the main topics to be covered and also provided an aid to 
structuring the work. The reports are presented in Appendix B3 as part of the case study 
protocol. A draft of the report was sent to the bank for commenting and corroboration of 
the validity of the findings.
• Database of evidence - an important element of any case study work is the 
evidence that is accumulated during the field work. Such evidence was maintained 
in a database for subsequent use and analysis where appropriate. The transcripts of 
the interviews form a key part of this database as they arc the main source of data. 
Other data collected before, during and after the field work (for example relevant
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information from the Annual Report and the website) has been included in the data 
base.
• Transcription and coding of data - following the transcription of the interviews, a 
coding system was used to provide a first cut analysis of the data. The coding 
system used was based on the research questions and the theoretical framework and 
was focused on the area of operational risk mitigation. A preliminary code list was 
prepared before detailed work had begun and amended in light of the experience 
gained during the pilot case study. Appendix B2 illustrates the high level coding 
used.
• Statistical analysis of data - the software package, ATLAS.ti was used to help 
analyse the data. This is a well-developed qualitative data analysis tool which was 
used to draw meaningful conclusions and develop emerging themes from the 
fieldwork results (section 3.3.4.2).
• Interpretation of results - following the data analysis, the results were examined 
for consistency across case studies in order that valid overall conclusions could be 
drawn (section 3.3.4.3).
3.3.8 Limitations of the Research Design and Mitigation Strategies
3.3.8.1 Limitations and Mitigation Strategies
By concentrating on the UAE commercial banks, there arc a number of limitations built 
into the research. Table 15 documents the possible limitations and illustrates the strategies 
adopted to mitigate the effect of these limitations.
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Table 15: Limitations of the Research Design
^^^^ Possible Limitation
h The results of a single industry study may not be 
1 generalisable to other business sectors within the 







the selected managers may themselves be biased in 
their approach to operational risk mitigation and may 
not necessarily be representative of the bank as a 
whole; giving rise to data bias.
There may be an element of 'group-speak in the 
way the managers responded to the interview 
questions.
There is uncertainty about the 'adoption of clear 
definition of operational risk and the categories 
within it. ——
There is a possibility that the banks chosen for the 
case study purposes may not provide a good 
representation of the industry as a whole.
The design of the interview questions may reflect the 
author's personal bias.
Interview questions can be interpreted in different 
ways and the responses may be prone to 
exaggeration. _________ ___ ̂ _^_^^_ _
Mitigation Strategy
financial services and have overseas operations.
aspects of the operational nsk mitigation process and not 
just a focus on one area.
This rests to a certain extent on the skill of the 
interviewer and the need to be vigilant when conducting 
the interview. The probing of a cntical incident avoided, 
in particular, any possibilities of 'group-speak.'
focused on establishing whether Basel II definition was 
adopted and whether the respondent understood it.
The selected banks were chosen because they are key 
players in the UAE commercial banking industry.
generic ORM framework established from the literature 
review and was subject to revision after the pilot study.
responses and data analysis has concentrated on 
identifying key themes. _ ____________
Source: Developed by the author
3.3.8.2 Data Bias and Mitigation Strategies
Bias is a personal and sometimes unreasoned judgement which takes place in human
communication. It needs to be avoided in order to have accurate research results and to 
uphold research standards and professional ethics (Shah and Corley 2006).
The researcher anticipated moderate bias scenarios such as biased interviewees and group- 
speech, and projected suitable mitigation tactics. Such bias scenarios were mitigated by 
ensuring that the semi-structured interview was designed to cover all aspects of the 
operational risk mitigation process and not just a focus on one area, and the vigilance to
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remain neutral and consistent exercised by the researcher when conducting the interview 
(Calvet 2007). 
Calvet (2007) points to the availability of a wide spectrum of tactics to counteract data bias, 
such as avoiding suggesting answers, avoiding steering the survey in a way that pleases the 
researcher, avoiding body language or expressions that indicate the researcher's feelings 
about the respondent or the answers, and extending neutral reinforcement when necessary. 
The researcher endeavoured to use these tactics when and as needed throughout the 
research. 
This section has focused on the research options available to the researcher and the actual 
research design used in this study. Case study methods have been selected as they offer the 
best opportunity to answer the research questions. The use of case studies was reviewed 
and appraised and the research design highlights the focus on critical incidents as a means 
of data triangulation. The research design was assessed and critiqued and strategies for 




This Chapter provides analysis of the results of the data collected from the case studies. 
The Chapter is split into seven parts:
1. Operational risk management (section 4.2) - discusses the findings related to 
the operational risk environment and the pre-mitigation phases;
2. Operational risk mitigation (section 4.3) - discusses the findings related to the 
principal research area and provides answers to the related research questions;
3. Operational risk quantification and training (section 4.4) - discusses the
findings related to two areas of operational risk that are important elements of 
an overall operational risk management strategy;
4. Operational risk and the Financial Crises (section 4.5) - discusses the findings 
related to the operational risks contributing to the Financial Crises, their impact 
and how they were mitigated in the context of the UAE commercial banks.
5. Case summaries (section 4.6) - discusses the common themes and differences 
between the banks based on the cross-case analysis.
6. Critical incidents (section 4.7) - discusses the application of critical incidents to 
validate the data analysis results.
7. Summary (section 4.8) - provides a summary of the Chapter.
The sequential flow of parts 1 - 4 of this Chapter is shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: Sequential Flow of Research Findings
Quantification and
ififfig o 
ORM in the organisation ....... .4.7]
Role of the ORM Function ..... 4.2.3
ORM techniques ................. 4.2.4
Operational risk identification... 4.2.5 
tional risk Appraisal.........4.
Tactics..................4.3.2
Deciding what to do. 4.3.3 Quantification .4.4.1 Training ....... .4.4.2
The Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis
Source: Developed by the author
This diagram provides a roadmap for this Chapter of the thesis and the part under 
discussion of the diagram will be included at the beginning of each sub-section to help the 
reader follow the sequence of the findings.
The reader should be aware of one important point before examining the rest of the 
Chapter. Delta bank was implementing its operational risk framework during the time the 
author engaged with them. The author was aware of this when they were chosen and 
selected them on the basis that they represented a newcomer to the field and would, 
therefore, bring a different perception to the phenomenon (Atkinson et al. 2007).
168
4.2 Operational Risk Management
4.2.1 Defining Operational Risk
Defining operational risk... 4.2.1
It has been previously illustrated that operational risk is a broad area encompassing a range 
of risks that typically fall outside of the market, credit, strategic and reputational risk areas. 
This definition of operational risk has certainly been adopted by many organisations 
(Moosa 2007, Dorfman et al. 2008, Hubbard and Douglas 2009). The four banks in this 
study had, however, adopted Basel II definition of operational risk; with minor variations in 
some cases to accommodate specific bank requirements. Table 16 illustrates this point and 
provides further analysis relating to the definition.
Table 16: Definition of Operational Risk
























Source: Analysis of survey data
The Basel definition had been adopted by the end of the study. 
The Basel definition had been adopted by the end of the study.
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The Basel II definition used by two of the banks was cited in 1. 1.3 and is rc-statcd here for 
completeness and easy reference:
"Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, hut excludes 
strategic and reputational risk" (Basel II, p. 140).
The other two definitions were:
"Operational risk is the exposure to financial or other damage arising through failure in
the Group's operational processes/systems. "
"Operational Risk is the risk that deficiencies in information systems or internal controls 
will result in unexpected loss. The risk is associated with human error, system failures and 
inadequate procedures and controls. "
These definitions are similar, although they do not explicitly refer to external events as 
being a source of potential operational risk. Evidence 53 from these two banks does, 
however, support the notion that such events are included.
One Head of Operational Risk described how he has two definitions of operational risk, 
one which is used from a purely 'measurement perspective' and the other quoted above
53 Specifically, Alpha bank has external events on its high level risk schedule and Beta bank has external risks 
as an operational risk category.
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from a 'responsibility perspective'. This particular Operational Risk Unit is in the process 
of developing its approach to operational risk quantification (or measurement).
All managers (Table 16) were aware of their bank's definition and agreed that it described 
their own understanding of operational risk. As one interviewee put it:
"It is as good as it can be when you try to be concise about something which is so 
large."
The research found that the exclusion of strategic and reputational risks under the umbrella 
of operational risk was not consistent across the banks. The precise definition of strategic 
risk was not discussed although it was broadly seen as risks relating to the strategies being 
adopted by the bank. Alpha bank provided the most interesting analysis of this area as the 
author noted differences of opinion within the organisation. One Alpha bank manager 
believed that strategic risk could feed into operational risk when, for example a particularly 
high growth risky strategy was being adopted, thus creating new risks and affecting the 
impact and probabilities of existing ones. A similar argument was used by another Alpha 
bank manager in the context of environmental risk, which does fall within the definition.
"You could use a set of words to describe environmental risk in a way that it could 
be seen as an operational risk, but you could also see it as a credit risk. For 
example, if you've got contaminated land with a commercial loan, people walk 
away from the site, that is a credit risk, but you can also think of ways that 
environmental risks can be translated into operational risk."
4.2.1.1 Main Findings
The finding are consistent with the previous observations in the literature review to
defining operational risk: there is a generally accepted definition (Basel II) and whilst all
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banks exclude market and credit risk, certain other types, in this case strategic and 
reputational may or may not be excluded. All managers were aware of their bank's 
definition and agreed that it described their own understanding of operational risk.
4.2.2 Operational Risk Management in the Organisation
erational risk ..... 4 2.1 
ORM in the organ -.1.2
This section examines the organisational arrangements for ORM within the case studies. 
Table 17 provides the findings of the analysis.
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Table 17: Operational Risk Management Functions in the Organisation
Organisation
Corporate OR unit reporting lines
Internal Audit reporting lines
Relationship: OR vs. Internal Audit
Size of Corporate OR Knit
Establishment of Corporate OR Unit
Use of Business Unit ORJV1
Business Unit ORJV1 reporting lines


























































Source: Analysis of survey data
The research found that the establishment of a Corporate Operational Risk Function was a 
relatively recent phenomenon. One of the units had been established several years ago, two 
had just been established when this research study started and one was established during 
the research study. This finding is important because it confirms the relative newness of 
explicit operational risk management in the UAE commercial banks and further supports
This was developed by the end of the study.
55 Reporting to the Corporate Operational Risk Unit was introduced towards the end of the study.
56 Reporting to the Corporate Operational Risk Unit was introduced towards the end of the study.
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the methodological approach undertaken. Some of the reasons given for the creation of 
these units were:
"CBUAE requirement."
"...grew out of the need to separate a role which combined operational risk, 
business continuity planning, corporate governance and one or two odd jobs."
"...greater recognition that we suffered 'incidents'...that were not credit or market 
risk by nature."
"...provide more of a 'front end focus' to operational risk management, i.e. what 
could happen to the business if we take this decision?"
The use of local Operational Risk Managers in the Business Units is at different stages of 
development in the banks. Gamma bank had six at the time of interviews, together with 
some risk officers57 , whilst Delta had two (one of whom was doing the role on a part-time 
basis) but were in the process of appointing more. None of the local Operational Risk 
Managers reported to the Corporate Operational Risk Function although they had close 
links and maintained regular contact. All the local Operational Risk Managers interviewed 
stressed that they were part of the Business unit:
"...my role is to facilitate the business units to be able to address operational risk 
and give them the tools to do so."
"...mentor and coach on all matters relating to operational risk in the Business 
Unit."
57 The risk officer was only part-time in the sense that the individual had other responsibilities
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All of the Corporate Operational Risk Units reported up through the Group Risk line, 
ultimately to a Group Risk Director or Chief Risk Officer (CRO). In all but one of the 
banks the Internal Audit function had a similar reporting line. This is an interesting finding 
because it leaves open the question as to how the Internal Audit function can independently 
review the work of the Corporate Operational Risk Unit if they both report to the same 
executive. The relationship between the Corporate Operational Risk Unit and Internal 
Audit has been assessed by the author in subjective terms and is seen as very close at one 
bank and close at the other three. Alpha bank, where the relationship was judged to be very 
close, initially established its operational risk unit within Internal Audit before separating 
the two. This links into another interesting finding: in all of the banks, at least one person 
working in the area of operational risk had an Internal Audit background. This could have 
influenced the development of the working relationship, although there were other 
comments, which indicated a relative proximity of the objectives of the two functions:
"...operational risk framework helps the business to define what its policy towards 
operational risk should be... .. .Internal Audit's role is to stand outside of the
corporate governance framework and look in at it and actually give an overall level 
of assurance to the Board at the end of the day that all those things that have been 
created by management, including the operational risk framework, are actually an 
effective set of controls."
"Internal Audit is there to be a monitor of the actual implementation of operational 
risk management framework and the effectiveness of the controls that sit in that 
environment."
"We meet regularly. I don't think there are any issues. There is always the concern 
of overlap, but I'm quite clear about the distinction."
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The development of an Operational Risk Committee was, in some cases, more advanced 
than others amongst the banks. It was outside the scope of this research to examine the role 
and effectiveness of operational risk committees and how they may be structured to provide 
the most effective contribution to the ORM framework.
4.2.2.1 Main Findings
The research found that establishment of a Corporate Operational Risk Function was a 
relatively recent phenomenon, which again confirms the relative newness of explicit ORM 
in the UAE commercial banks.
The development of Operational Risk Committees was, in some banks, more advanced 
than others. Given the relative newness of the Operational Risk Function, it suggests that 
this is an area that will continue to evolve.
The use of local operational risk managers in the Business Units was at different stages of 
development in all of the banks.
All of the Corporate Operational Risk Units reported to a Group Risk Director or Chief 
Risk Officer (CRO). Internal Audit function had a similar reporting line in most of the 
banks. There is a close relationship between the Corporate Operational Risk Unit and 
Internal Audit.
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4.2.3 The Role of the Operational Risk Management Function
ORM in the organisation...... 4.2.2
Role of the ORM Function.—4.2.3
This section concentrates on the role of the Corporate Operational Risk Function. The 
previous section discussed how the organisation of ORM had developed with two specific 
roles: the Corporate Operational Risk Manager and the Business Unit or local Operational 
Risk Manager. The early analysis of the data highlighted that whilst both have a role to 
play in the overall risk management framework; the corporate function was the driver 
behind the policy and overall strategic direction of ORM. The Business Unit Operational 
Risk Managers operate at the 'sharp end' and are much more involved in the day-to-day 
management of operational risk.
The results of the data analysis in this area indicate that there is a reasonable degree of 
commonality amongst the banks in the general role that the Corporate Operational Risk 
Function undertakes (see Table 18). Whilst this might initially seem somewhat surprising 
given that the creation of these departments is relatively recent, it may reflect the 
developments that have taken place in other risk (principally market and credit) areas 
within the bank, which are believed to be more mature. It may also be that managers
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involved in the establishment of the ORM function had discussions (at an informal level) as 
the generic problems they face in managing operational risk are similar across the banks.
Table 18: Role of the Corporate Operational Risk Functions





Custodians of the framework
Assurance on 'key' risks
Aggregating OR's
Mitigating OR's which span the 
Business Unit
Maintenance of loss data base
Corporate Operational Risk Unit 
works with Business Unit ORM
Corporate Operational Risk Unit 



















































Source: Analysis of survey data
A number of managers captured concisely the role of the function:
"...to act as a catalyst, to provide a framework, a process, facilitation, to gain 
people's appreciation that operational risk exists."
' By the end of the study, environmental risk had been included in the scope of the role. 
Work had begun on this by the end of the study.
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"...embedding risk management culture in the business units so they all become 
much more risk aware on an everyday basis."
"...giving these Operational Risk Managers as much guidance and support and 
general mentoring as to what it is we expect of them, how they should do their work 
to the best effect, and how they should in turn interact with the business in a 
positive way and be seen to be helpful and adding value rather than burden that the 
business has to bear."
The scope of the role was expected to be all operational risks as prescribed in the relevant 
definition. This was the case in all of the banks with the exception of Delta bank where 
environmental risks were managed in another area for what appeared to be partly historical 
reasons (the operational risk function grew out of a unit that originally included 
environmental risks) and partly due to the emphasis which the bank placed on managing 
this particular risk.
Different business units have different risk profiles and aggregating these profiles at the 
group level was done by all of the Group Operational Risk Functions. This aggregation of 
all the risks should provide the clearest vision of where the key operational risks in the 
organisation may be found. This is an important finding because it illustrates how the 
Corporate Operational Risk Function acts as a conduit between the Board and the various 
Business Units on significant operational risk matters. Their independence from the 
Business Unit enables this to be done in an objective fashion.
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The mitigation of operational risks that span the Business Units60 was in two cases 
coordinated by the Corporate Operational Risk Function. Some managers described it as 
"coordinating mitigation where it's economic to do so." The specific responsibility for 
these types of risk activities would lie with a specialist area (e.g. IT Security) or another 
Business Unit (e.g. Personnel) and the Corporate Operational Risk Function would act as 
the interface with these units ensuring that the mitigation actions were in place. The other 
two banks operated a different model: one had other specialist risk areas in Group risk that 
picked them up; the remaining bank used the hierarchical Business Unit structure to 
escalate such risks to a level where they could be managed. This is an interesting finding 
because it highlights specific differences of approach to mitigating operational risk that 
span the Business Units, suggesting that operational risk mitigation has still to mature in 
some areas.
Emphasis on the maintenance of operational loss data bases (Basel II) occurred earlier to 
commencement of the research. Excluding Delta bank, evidence was found to support the 
notion that the maintenance of these databases is undertaken by the Corporate Operational 
Risk Functions. This finding is consistent with the description of the roles of the Corporate 
Operational Risk Function that have appeared in the literature review (Coleman 2007).
The interface between the Corporate Operational Risk Function and the Business Units also 
revealed differences of approach. In Gamma bank, very close liaison existed amongst 
operational risk personnel both at the Corporate and Business Unit levels. This has been a
Examples of such risks include business continuity, misuse of the internet and loss of key staff.
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deliberate strategy and reflects the needs of the Corporate Operational Risk Function to 
work through the Business Unit Operational Risk Managers if they are to discharge their 
responsibilities. As Delta bank was piloting the implementation of their operational risk 
framework, the interface was still developing although evidence seen concerning the roles 
and responsibilities suggest that they will operate on a similar basis to Alpha and Beta 
banks.
Evidence drawn from the cases suggests that the core responsibilities of the Corporate 
Operational Risk Function are as follows:
1. Policy: establishing operational risk policy;
2. Aggregation: providing a 'portfolio' view of the operational risks in the group;
3. Reporting: high level reporting of operational risk;
4. Assurance: monitoring levels of operational risk and providing assurance that key 
operational risks are being managed;
5. Framework: providing the Business Units with the right tools and techniques to 
manage operational risk;
6. Measurement: developing the techniques for quantifying operational risk.
7. Loss data: maintenance of loss data base.
4.2.3.1 Main Findings
The results of the data analysis indicate that there is a reasonable degree of commonality 
amongst the banks in the general role that the Corporate Operational Risk Function 
undertakes. The core responsibilities of the Corporate Operational Risk Function are:
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policy setting, aggregation of operational risk profile, high level reporting, assurance, 
framework setting, operational risk measurement and loss data maintenance.
4.2.4 Operational Risk Management Techniques
ORM in the organisation.....4.2.2 
Role of the ORM Function...4.2.3
In all of the banks studied a form of operational risk mapping technique was being used. 
The end result of the risk mapping process is a 'register of risks' although the objective was 
seen to be much broader than just this:
"One of the things that obviously we're trying to drive forward with this risk 
management framework is implementing a risk culture. This is different from 
having a risk process. I think what a lot of organisations have traditionally done as 
far as operational risk is concerned is they have created these centralised units 
which are stuffed up with, don't get me wrong, fairly good and knowledgeable 
people, but they are divorced from the business."
"We aim to enable businesses to do business according to the terms that they find 
acceptable. It is not about precluding people from doing business; it is enabling 
them to do business within a safer environment. So, if you think of it in terms of 
walking out into the water they can actually go in deeper and take more risk than 
they might otherwise have done, but they arc ultimately safer than they would have 
done because they have gone through a conscious process of evaluating and 
determining what is acceptable and what are the controls and what is the other 
criteria they wish to put round it."
"Our risk-mapping framework actually covers a number of areas which credit and 
market risks do not tend to cover, such as research and development, looking at
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how organisational structures might be out of place, communication on operational 
risk issues."
The risk framework was the principal tool used to manage operational risk and was built 
around the generic management process model identified in the literature review. Table 19 
provides further analysis of the data.
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Source: Analysis of survey data
Three of the banks use a framework based on a 'bottom up' 62 approach. The exception to 
this was Alpha bank, whose approach was initially 'top down', as it began with discussions 
with the Business Unit Management about the key risks that most concern them in running 
their operation (identification process). This was followed by workshops with the 
operations staff to determine the other exposure to key risks identified by Management.
' Work had begun on this part by the end of the study.
"The term 'bottom up' implies the risk process is driven from the lowest level in the organisation and the 
results are filtered up to executive management.
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Any additional risk would also be picked up at this stage. This finding suggests that the 
starting point may be different but the desired end result is the same. The author undertook 
further analysis in this area examining the actual data output from the process in order to 
establish similarities as well as differences. The results are shown in Table 20.
Table 20: Risk Mapping Frameworks - Data Output










































































Source: Analysis of primary data documents
Further differences are apparent which indicate that whilst the process follows the ORM 
process model, there are matters of detail that differ resulting from the different emphasis 
that a particular bank places on the phase in the process. This finding is interesting because
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it would appear to demonstrate that banks still have opportunities to rcfmc and possibly 
improve their risk mapping approaches.
A further finding that emerged during the study was the extent to which the risk mapping 
process had been implemented within the bank (sec Table 19). As has been previously 
mentioned, Delta bank was piloting the process and still has some way to go before the 
whole bank has been subjected to the framework. Alpha bank had completed around 50% 
of the process whilst both Beta and Gamma had done at least one complete cycle. 
The risk management of significant change projects63 was covered by all of the banks (see 
Table 19). Processes were in place to assess project risks; some of them being fairly recent 
developments resulting from the introduction of the operational risk framework.
"We have recognised that there is a need to give a particular focus to that area of 
business because I think it is an area that has been perhaps not as well recognised or 
as well identified or as well managed than it has been in the past. But we regard the 
project risk process as very much a subset of the operational risk mapping exercise 
as a whole."
The final piece of analysis in Table 19 highlights the common use of key risk indicators to 
monitor operational risk in all banks and the use of incident loss data bases in all but one of 
the banks (although Delta bank indicated it was developing one). Key risk indicators were 
seen as an important feature in the ongoing monitoring of operational risk. One manager 
described how the use of such indicators would move managers out of their 'comfort 
zones' when it came to mapping operational risk as they would have to be more proactive 
in taking action when indicators were moving in the wrong direction. This finding is
"There is no definition of what constitutes a 'significant 1 project but new product developments was 
mentioned a number of times.
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important because the use of key risk indicators to monitor operational risk is a key issue in 
preventing the manifestation of operational risk.
The operational loss data base has taken on a new importance since banks were invited to 
contribute to an anonymous pooling of data on risk incidents (Basel II, ORX Association 
2010). The findings suggest that the banks view this as an important ORM tool.
4.2.4.1 Main Findings
The results of the data analysis indicate that all of the banks use a form of operational risk 
mapping framework, and in most of them, the framework is based on the 'bottom up' 
approach. The framework is the principal tool used to manage operational risk and is built 
around the generic management process model identified in the literature review.
All of the banks use key risk indicators to monitor operational risk, and most of the banks 
use incident loss databases in order to be more proactive in taking action before an 
operational risk manifests itself. Key risk indicators and loss database are seen as important 
ORM tools.
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4.2.5 Operational Risk Identification
ORM in the organisation........... 4.2.2
Role of the ORM function......... 4.2.3
ORM techniques........................4.2.4
Operational risk identification has been described as perceiving hazards, identifying 
failures, recognising adverse consequences (White 1995, Parker 2005). It is the first stage 
in the ORM process. An analysis of the data revealed that the risk identification process 
can be split into three phases:
1. Responsibility: Who is responsible for identifying operational risk?
2. Process: What processes are used to identify operational risk?
3. Data: What data sources are used to identify operational risk?
The results of the data analysis are shown in Table 21.
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Source: Analysis of survey data
Responsibility: The initial discussions that took place in this area concerned the 
responsibility for operational risk identification, and as Table 21 illustrates there was a 
common view that this responsibility rested with the 'people who manage the processes
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and systems' or the managers in the Business Unit. One manager pointed out how the 
framework had been developed in such a way to highlight who must take responsibility:
"Operational risk identification is a business unit responsibility. It doesn't matter 
how you divide it within your business unit or whom you give it to. That's one of 
the things we're doing with the methodology."
It was, however, pointed out in all of the banks that other units do get involved in their 
various specialist roles, for example, Internal Audit was seen as key to helping identify 
operational risk by "matching the risks with the systems of internal control and where 
there are weaknesses reporting them." This they do as part of their audits of the various 
Business Units. This finding supports the view of Basel 11 and others that the responsibility 
forORM, and therefore, identification of operational risks lies with the Managers within 
the Business Units. Furthermore, according to Basel II, to the extent that the audit function 
is involved in oversight of the ORM framework, the Board should ensure that the 
independence of the audit function is maintained. This independence may be compromised 
if the audit function is directly involved in the ORM process. The audit function may 
provide valuable input to those responsible for ORM, but should not have direct ORM 
responsibilities.
One interviewee pointed out that this responsibility is effectively delegated down from the 
Board that is ultimately accountable for risk management in the organisation. This is in line 
with the view of Spira and Page (2003) and Basel II.
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Process: The process of risk identification does not take place in a vacuum and results of 
the analysis indicate that for three of the banks the initial focus is the Business Unit 
objectives.
"Each business unit is asked during its risk assessment to identify what it feels to be 
the key risks, the ones that are most important to it in terms of failing to achieve its 
objectives."
The starting point for Alpha bank was slightly different in that the process begins with a 
discussion with the directors and Senior Management in the Business Unit on what they 
consider to be the risks that most concern them. Materiality emerges as a key word in the 
risk identification process for all of the banks. "Trivial risks", as they were referred to by 
one bank, may be captured but are not seen as the key focus. This is particularly interesting 
finding because it illustrates how the processes of identifying and appraising the 
operational risks are done simultaneously, i.e. managers in identifying their operational 
risks are also assessing them as 'key' or otherwise. The risk-mapping framework described 
in section 4.2.4 is used to capture this data.
The processes mentioned by the managers that were used to identify operational risk are 
quoted in Table 21. The most common, used in all of the banks, are workshops, scenario 
analysis, KRI's and the Internal Audit process. The workshops can involve a number of 
different people including Operational Managers, Operational Risk Managers, Internal 
Auditors and specialists. The Internal Auditors interviewed confirmed that they used a risk
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based unit approach64 (McNamee 1997, Krishnamoorthy 2002). A number of other 
processes were mentioned but perhaps the most interesting one (mentioned in two of the 
banks) is networking, both internally and externally. Whereas the other approaches 
mentioned tend to be more formal and structured, however, networking is more informal:
"I wouldn't say it was a structured thing. It definitely works as an informal thing." 
"We do rely to an extent on our network of contacts."
Three out of the four banks mentioned the product development process in the context of 
operational risk identification. Such a process is seen as key in the Treasury function 
because of the potential financial impact that an operational risk could have. The only bank 
where the product development process was not mentioned was Alpha. It does, however, 
have a well-defined and documented product approach, which includes a risk management 
activity.
All four banks have recently deployed a form of operational risk software application. 
However, none of the banks is utilising the application as intended. The application in all 
banks is mainly used for loss data storage and retrieval. Never the less, operational risk 
software applications can be utilised for a multitude of activities such as (Ciborra 2009, p. 
41):
• Integration of the processes pertaining to: risk assessments, internal audits, 
compliance initiatives and corporate governance.
M Instead of looking at the business process in a system of internal control, the internal auditor views the 
business process in an environment of risk (McNamee 1997).
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• Risk analysis and tracking.
• Key risk indicator early warning.
• Reporting on risk.
• Monitoring evolving risk profiles in real-time by centralising data in one risk 
library.
• Risk communication and training.
The findings indicate that a number of formal processes exist to identify operational risks. 
Other processes mentioned appear to supplement and support the core processes. These 
formal processes combined with the informal networking processes provide a wide range 
of opportunities for operational risk to be captured and the fact that a number of different 
processes are used supports the argument that operational risk is broad and diverse in 
nature.
These findings must also be viewed against the current background of ORM which, it has 
already been confirmed, is still developing in UAE commercial banks. It may be that as the 
ORM processes mature, the focus of operational risk identification will change. At present, 
the use of KRI's and workshops serves to capture new risks and re-assess any old ones. A 
growing trend is to use frequent monitoring of potential operational risk sources and 
scenario analysis to capture any new risks and to assess existing ones. In future, the use of 
Software applications, combined external and internal loss data and intensive training, are 
also likely to have a leading role in this part of ORM.
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Data: The research found that the main data source used to identify operational risks was 
the skill and experience of the people involved in the identification process. Where these 
people are bank employees, they represent probably the most valuable asset that the banks 
have in both identifying and managing operational risks. One manager pointed out the 
importance of having a 'varied skill base' particularly where the project/product 
development process was involved in examining a new operational risk situation.
"If you are looking at a fairly mature area, then you probably do not need anything 
much more than the people who are actually working there who understood the 
process, because they will have a good understanding of what they are dealing with. 
If you're talking about a new venture, then I think it's very different because what 
we are trying to do is brainstorm what the things that might be potential risks are."
Table 21 also shows that three of the banks use their incident loss database as a data source 
for identifying operational risk. The database currently captures only internal events within 
the Business Units. These events, however, can be shared across other Business Units to 
establish whether they have been identified and assessed correctly. This finding illustrates 
the importance of people in operational risk identification and, as a consequence, the 
inherent subjectivity that they will bring into the process. Another source of data was 
circulars by specialised organisations (such as ORX Association). This source is of extreme 
importance due to the fact it provides up-to-date real data on losses, amounts, frequency 
and related sources of operational risk.
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4.2.5.1 Main Findings
Analysis of the data revealed that the risk identification process can be split into three 
phases: responsibility, process and data.
Responsibility: The responsibility for operational risk identification rests with the people 
who manage the processes and systems. The Internal Audit function may provide valuable 
input to those responsible for ORJvl, but does not have direct ORM responsibilities.
Process: The findings indicate that a number of core processes (such as workshops. Kill's 
and networking) exist to identify operational risks. The processes of identifying and 
appraising the operational risks are done simultaneously. The analysis also indicates that 
for most of the banks, the initial focus for operational risk identification is the Business 
Unit objectives. A growing trend is to use frequent monitoring and scenario analysis of 
potential operational risk sources.
Data: The research found that the main data sources used to identify operational risks were 
the skill and experience of the people involved in the identification process, incident loss 
database and circulars by specialised organisations.
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4.2.6 Operational Risk Appraisal
"operational risk 
ORM in the organisation ..... ....4.2.2
Role of the ORM Function ......4.2.3
ORM techniques ..................4.2.4
Operational risk identification...4.2.5
The risk management process model identifies the two phases following identification as 
evaluation and estimation. These two phases have been identified by White (1995) and 
Parker (2005) in almost similar ways as:
• Estimation: Estimating risk probabilities, describing the risk, quantifying the risk;
• Evaluation: Estimating the impact of the risk, judging acceptability of the risk, 
comparing risks against benefits.
Following the pilot case study it was noted that these two phases were being done 
concurrently, and not sequentially as suggested in the model. The output from each phase 
had a different emphasis with one focusing on probabilities (estimation) and the other on at 
least financial impact (evaluation) but the two were combined to give an overall risk 
profile. The author has, therefore, grouped these two phases together and referred to it as 
'Risk Appraisal.'
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As with operational risk identification, analysis of the data revealed that the risk appraisal 
process can be split into three phases:
1. Responsibility: Who is responsible for appraising operational risk?
2. Process: What processes arc used to appraise operational risk?
3. Data: What data sources are used to appraise operational risk? 
The results of the data analysis are shown in Table 22.
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Responsibility: The results in Table 22 show that the responsibility for operational risk 
appraisal mirrors that of operational risk identification. The Managers in the Business Units 
have the responsibility for appraising operational risk although they may be aided by 
specialist resource when the situation demands so. One manager in Beta bank, however, 
pointed out that in his view, Business Unit Managers had a 'lesser responsibility' and were 
influenced by the Corporate Operational Risk Function who acted as facilitators to this 
process using the standards and parameters (for appraising operational risk) that are agreed 
by the Board:
".. .this is where I see the Operational Risk Group has helped to facilitate 
operational risk appraisal. Just as the Market Risk Group facilitates Value at Risk, 
and Credit Risk Group tries to somehow put a number on credit risk. However, it's 
more difficult for operational risk and I've got a lot of sympathy for that."
This finding probably reflects the framework within which the Business Units are 'obliged' 
to operate, although a manager in one of the other banks (Delta) considered that there was 
still some way to go in terms of ensuring that the Business Units clearly understood their 
responsibility:
"You'll find sometimes that the Business Unit Managers consider that the 
Corporate Operational Risk Function has responsibility for some of these things, 
when in reality they don't. This is because they need the business knowledge to 
know what the level of exposure is in order to know the level of mitigation needed."
To further reinforce the role that the Corporate Operational Risk Function plays in this 
area, within Gamma bank they have specific responsibility for performing a 'health-check' 
on the results for any irregularities or apparent contradictions.
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The findings in this area suggest that whilst the primary responsibility appears to be well 
articulated, the Corporate Operational Risk Function is more influential in the results that 
are produced. This may be a reflection of the subjective and judgemental nature of the 
appraisal process (discussed in the next section) and the need to have some form of control 
over the results.
Process: In all of the banks the process used to appraise operational risks involved a 
subjective or judgemental assessment of the probability and impact of the risk, primarily 
through the workshops.
"It is our experienced people who often help in the assessment of the probability 
and impact of risk within the workshops."
"There are some gradings on the risk assessment form that we have and then we 
also ask them to assess what the likelihood of the risk occurring at that level would 
be, again bandings from very low up to very high. Using the combination of those 
two factors we then produce a risk rating on that. It's basically a two dimensional 
matrix, with the intention of giving the likelihood and the potential financial impact 
as a rating of how crucial that risk is if you like."
As can be seen in Table 22 each of the banks had developed a simple grading system from 
which an appraisal rating may be made. The probability assessment was straightforward 
being either on a scale, for three of the banks, or a % figure for the remaining bank. The 
impact assessment varied quite considerably with the simplest being Beta bank where a 
AED figure was allocated; and Alpha bank where a 1 to 5 scale was used within six 
different scenarios covering financial, media, regulatory, customer, shareholder and 
problem management.
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The emphasis on estimating a financial impact was summed up in the following comment 
from one of the managers:
"We try to encourage people to put a financial impact because I think, especially in 
banking, that is the only thing that still really gets people interested."
But the problems in doing this were equally recognised:
"The difficult thing with operational risk is that it's still quite a new discipline in the 
UAE."
Delta bank saw the output from the risk appraisal process as being an important way of 
making sure that managers in the Business Units were focusing their priorities in the right 
areas and avoiding them to concentrate on areas where they may have a particular interest 
or areas which they understand well and were, therefore, happy to manage. This is an 
important point and highlights the emphasis that needs to be placed on scaling so that the 
risks and the Business Units themselves can be judged and compared in relative rather than 
absolute terms.
In some cases, the role of Internal Audit - independently reviewing and challenging the 
appraisal ratings that had been established - was identified. Internal Audit would normally 
leave the area with an agreed audit report, which may necessitate changes to the risk map 
for that particular Business Unit or area within a Business Unit. This finding is important 
because it serves to reinforce the role of Internal Audit as the 'Board's guardians' of the 
ORM framework without direct involvement in the ORM itself.
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The analysis of the data in the risk appraisal process, whilst revealing some consistent 
patterns, also illustrates the importance of controlling the resultant output to ensure that 
consistent and meaningful conclusions can be drawn from what is an inherently subjective 
process. This will remain a constant challenge for banks if they are to ensure that they have 
correctly identified their key risks.
Data: The research found out that the principal source of data used in the risk appraisal 
process was the experience of those involved in the process (see Table 22).
"It's just a case of sitting down with the right people and trying to get out of them 
the knowledge they have in their heads."
Where workshops are used, the risk appraisal would typically have a number of different 
levels of personnel present to ensure a broad perspective was gained. This would help to 
remove the appraisal bias:
"The people who know the nuts and bolts are typically fairly junior but they don't 
know enough about the big picture to make that kind of assessment, and people that 
know about the big picture may have lost touch with some of the nuts and bolts."
"One of the things we have recognised is really making sure we get the right people 
at the workshops. If you get people who are too low down the management 
hierarchy then they don't necessarily see the bigger picture of bringing these things 
together. Yes, we've found we have had to put the groups together quite carefully."
This finding reinforces the subjective and judgemental nature of ORM, vis-a-vis, both 
identification and appraisal.
A further interesting finding of the study relates to the assessment of current operational 
risk mitigants as a source of data for appraising an operational risk exposure. Current
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mitigants are normally documented at this stage in the risk-mapping process and an overall 
view is taken on the impact and probability. This is not necessarily the end of the story, 
however, as other data sources are included (see Table 22) which in aggregate aid the 
development of a more robust appraisal of the operational risk. The external environment 
data source and circulars by specialised organisations arc interesting examples involving 
'keeping an eye on what is going on/ Events of this nature can have important influences 
on the operational risks faced by a bank and could easily affect the appraisal rating in terms 
of either impact or probability. Such events can occur in a variety of places, for example, 
regulatory pronouncements, changes to legislation, technology issues and product 
developments. External events are recognised as a potential source of operational risk in 
Basel II and banks must ensure that they figure them prominently in the risk appraisal data.
The output from this part of the process involves summarising the data on the identified 
risks together with their appraisal ratings thereby producing a total picture of the overall 
operational riskiness of the Business Unit or area within a Business Unit. These are referred 
to in different ways by the banks but in essence they equate to the same thing.
4.2.6.1 Main Findings
Analysis of the data revealed that operational risk estimation and evaluation were being 
done concurrently. The output from each phase had a different emphasis with one focusing 
on probabilities (estimation) and the other on at least financial impact (evaluation). The risk 
appraisal process can be split into three phases, responsibility, process and data.
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Responsibility: Analysis of the data revealed that the primary responsibility for operational 
risk appraisal mirrored that of operational risk identification. The managers in the Business 
Units had the responsibility for appraising operational risk although they might be aided by 
specialist resources when the situation demands so. Nevertheless, the Corporate 
Operational Risk Function is more influential in the results that are produced.
Process: hi all of the banks the process used to appraise operational risks involved a 
subjective or judgemental assessment of the probability and impact of the risk, primarily 
through the workshops, with emphasis on estimating the financial impact.
Data: The research found out that the principal source of data used in the risk appraisal 
process was the experience of those involved in the process. A further finding of the study 
relates to the assessment of current operational risk mitigants as a source of data for 
appraising an operational risk exposure. External environment data source and circulars by 
specialised organisations were examples involving 'keeping an eye on what was going on.'
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4.3 Operational Risk Mitigation
4.3.1 Responsibility for Operational Risk Mitigation
the organi 
Role of the ORM Function ..... 4.2.3
ORM techniques ................. 4.2.4
Operational risk identification... 4.2.5
The first set of questions that this research set out to explore were (section 1.2.3):
• Who is responsible for operational risk mitigation?
• If more than one functional unit has the responsibility, on what basis is the 
operational risk exposure assigned to the unit concerned?
There emerged a consistent pattern with previous sections in terms of responsibility for 
operational risk mitigation, namely, it remains the Managers of the Business Units. This 
can be seen in Table 23, which shows the results of the data analysis.
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Comments from the managers interviewed did, however, indicate that the managers of the 
Business Unit would be supported in their mitigation responsibilities:
"...who can best assess the value of the mitigant?"
"...draw on certain reservoirs of expertise..."
"...use as many people as you can!"
"...there are quite a lot of specialist areas that you can go to..."
Table 23 identifies the factors that would influence the Managers in the Business Unit to 
seek support. The complexity (type/scale) of the risk and control issues are common 
elements mentioned in all four of banks. This is not surprising given the range of potential 
operational risks that exist. For example, the introduction of a control to improve the 
segregation of duties in a process is a relatively simple exercise to undertake. At the other 
end of the scale would be the operational risks associated with the introduction of the single
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GCC currency, where a number of people would be involved and a project team would 
probably be set up. As the Business Units are responsible for mitigating the risks, it is the 
Business Units who would initiate the call for assistance. Such assistance could be from a 
variety of sources:
"Sometimes external consultants can act as the catalyst to get the change 
(mitigating action) in place"
"Sometimes even just asking from the technology side 'have you got a package that 
could help?"
"1 would certainly encourage managers to approach Risk Managers if they are 
making major changes to what they are doing in the business in order to discuss 
some of these implications on their control framework."
Returning to the research questions, the findings suggest that it is the Business Units that 
have sole responsibility for operational risk mitigation. As a result, the assignments of 
operational risk to different functions is not carried out, although there is evidence to 
indicate that the Business Units will seek assistance to mitigate operational risk depending 
upon the nature and scale of the risk involved.
4.3.1.1 Main Findings
The analysis of the data indicates that there emerged a consistent pattern with previous 
sections in terms of responsibility for operational risk mitigation, namely, it remains the 
responsibility of the Business Unit Managers. There are factors that influence the managers 
in the Business Unit to seek support such as the complexity of the risk and control issues.
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4.3.2 Operational Risk Mitigation - Exploring the Tactics Used
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Operational risk Appraisal. ... .4
Tactics.............4.3.2
The second set of questions that this research set out to explore were (section 1.2.3):
• What tactics are considered before being used to mitigate operational risk 
exposures?
• How are these tactics established?
• What commonality exists across banks in their risk mitigation tactics, i.e. what may 
be viewed as core practice?
At this stage in ORM process the managers in the Business Unit should already have 
identified the operational risks and appraised them by assessing the current mitigants (if 
any) that are already in place. The dilemma that the managers in the Business Unit face is 
deciding what, if anything, to do to further reduce the current level (probability/impact) of 
risks to a level which is more acceptable and tallies with the risk aptitude of the bank.
"...it's not a case of everything requires additional control. In fact there is a very 
fine balancing act that is being constantly addressed."
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Table 24 shows the results of the data analysis.


































































Source: Analysis of survey data
The mitigation tactics shown equate to those of (Kaple and Gregory 2006), thus:
• Terminate: Avoidance - decide that the risk is too great to follow the course of 
action.
• Treat: Reduction - decide to reduce the probability and/or impact.
• Take: Assumption - decide to accept the risk and do nothing further.
65 The reader will note that the tactics all begin with the letter T. One of the managers inlerv.ewcd introduced 
4e fourT's to the author and due to simplicity these words had been used throughout the rest o» the text.
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• Transfer: Transfer - decide to transfer the risk to a third party.
• Other: Combination - such as risk exploitation and risk relaxation.
Kaple and Gregory (2006) did, however, propose another mitigation strategy, namely 
'Hedging', which involves reducing risk through the operation of future markets.
All of the banks use the four T's as mitigation tactics and Table 24 indicates when a 
particular tactic is used. The following comments are illustrative of some of the scenarios 
described: 
Terminate
"It would be more of a strategic issue but if you looked at some of our more recent 
disposals... ... ... some of which you might say would be high in operational risk
and, therefore, perhaps there was a factor in that."
"... there are major impacts across the whole of the operational risk review because 
if you move to that type of scenario, it actually changes the materiality of a lot of 
your operations and how they are controlled and mitigated. So, yes there are times 
when the risk may be so high that the trigger is we actually don't want to do this."
Treat
Take
"Controls have to be viewed in the wider context of what is it that is absolutely 
essential to achieve a certain outcome as opposed to that which is nice to have but 
really perhaps doesn't justify the cost."
"... can we segregate things better, can we move things into other areas, can we add 
an automated check, do we need a visual check?"
"...one of the key risks is systems with a single point of failure... you would look at 
avoiding risks by having in place some contingency routing mechanism."
"Let's take for instance, IT security. You're always going to have people who can 
have access to every part of your system. There is no computer system that has been
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built that can remove that risk. Therefore you have to accept that risk to some 
extent."
Transfer
"...if you can't offset it, you have to guard against financial loss. You may take out 
some sort of insurance."
"Can I get assistance from anywhere in the business to help with any of that? Part 
of-1 suppose - bundling the risk up, we're not only talking about insuring the risk 
internally, but are there internal areas of the business who can help me with this? 
Can I outsource it to another area of the business because they have expertise in that 
area? That is certainly looked at."
These findings indicate that the tactics that may be used to mitigate an operational risk are 
in line with those quoted in the literature. The 'Treat' option was the most often quoted (a 
point also confirmed by the critical incident analysis - see section 4.7) and this finding 
confirms the view of Basel II that operational risk is practically addressed through a firm's 
internal control framework.
An interesting issue raised in Delta bank relates to the overall level of controls in a given 
risk situation compared to the appraisal of the risk.
"Where something is a low priority, and it looks like you are over controlling it, I 
would like to think the Business Unit will begin to strip out of the unnecessary 
layers of control, which I think a big organisation like this has built up over history 
and controls get layered on top of each other without really questioning why they're 
being done."
The author has referred to this as 'risk relaxation' as the objective is to reduce rather than 
increase the number of controls (Palfi 2007). This is an important finding as it demonstrates
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how the operational risk mapping process may be used as a tool to enhance the overall 
efficiency of the internal control processes in operation.
The final tactic noted by one respondent in Gamma bank was exploitation of the 
operational risk. The specific example quoted was using leading edge technology where the 
bank may evaluate that the business benefit outweighs the operational and strategic risks 
involved. This tactic is the other side of the coin to risk avoidance and illustrates the 
positive side of risk-taking.
4.3.2.1 Main Findings
The analysis of the data indicates that there are a number of tactics available to all of the
banks in mitigating operational risks, although the core tactics may be represented by the 
four T's (Terminate, Treat, Take and Transfer), with the Treat' option being the most 
commonly used. These tactics have been established as part of the development of the risk- 
mapping framework and are based on those found in the literature.
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4.3.3 Operational Risk Mitigation - Deciding What to Do
ORM in the organisation .........4.2.
Role of the ORM Function..... ...4.2.3
ORM techniques ...................4.2.4
Operational risk identification.. .4.2.5
The third set of questions that this research set out to explore were (section 1.2.3):
• What is the process used for deciding upon the risk mitigation strategy to adopt?
• What is the process used to ensure that the risk mitigation decisions are adequately 
communicated and reported?
The focus of the discussions in this area of operational risk mitigation was on who decides
the mitigation tactic to employ, what is the process used for selecting and implementing the
tactic and what follow-up procedures are used to track the efficiency of the action taken.
Consistent with the previous phases of the risk management process, the decision maker
was mainly the Business Unit (see Table 25). This situation arises because it would
ultimately depend upon a number of factors relating to the risk and the authority of the
Manager in the Business Unit:
"...the scale of what is being decided."
"...for significant issues the Risk Management Committee would be involved."
"...within discretionary levels of expenditure."
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"...anything which is going to involve a project going into AHD I million will go up the 
line."
Table 25: OR Mitigation Selection Procedure and Follow-up
Mitigation: Selection 
























































Source: Analysis of survey data
An escalation procedure existed in the banks when the Business Unit could not unilaterally 
decide on the course of action. This escalation procedure was linked to a number of factors 
(see Table 25), which appeared to be well understood in the banks. The scale of the risk 
was a common factor as was cost, i.e. the estimated amount required to mitigate the risk. 
Where a cost was involved in taking appropriate mitigation action (normally for 'Treat' as 
per Table 24) then a costftenefit justification would normally be prepared. This finding is 
interesting because it illustrates the constraints that managers face in mitigating their
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operational risks. These constraints are imposed upon them by the internal environment 
(policies and rules) of the bank in which they operate and will vary from bank to bank. A 
tight command control structure will impose different and more sever constraints to a less 
formal empowerment regime. This issue can be extended further to take into account the 
manager's own perception of the risk (in terms of what can be done to mitigate the risk 
down to an acceptable level). Where a tight command control structure exists this 
perception is of less relevance than in environment regime where managers are able to 
exercise more personal discretion.
None of the banks had a system of formal procedures for selecting a particular mitigating 
action (see Table 25). The nature of the operational risk being mitigated combined with the 
appraisal that has previously been carried out will normally determine by default the 
mitigation action that needs to be taken. The selection order usually began with an 
examination of the control environment:
"hi practice, I would say if you took any risk issue the first thing is to look at the 
level of controls you have around that and if you can improve your internal controls 
that generally is the most cost effective mechanism."
This finding confirms the comments of Basel 11 that most operational risks are managed 
within the internal control environment.
The final phase in the risk mitigation process that emerged from the data analysis was the 
follow up action that was in place to ensure that the mitigation tactic/action plan was being 
implemented. There was little consistency across the banks in this area (see Table 25). In 
two of the banks, the follow up was informal at the Business Unit level. Internal Audit
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involvement was mentioned in one bank but this was not 'systematic' and linked to the 
action plan as part of normal audit procedures. The evidence in Gamma bank indicated that 
it had a structured approach:
"...we also have a record of all the action plans in place, besides all the risks, which 
we keep on our central data base. So that, every quarter currently, we ask for a re­ 
visit exercise, to go back and see what's happening with the action plans, has it 
been implemented, has it lapsed, is it no longer relevant, etc, to give a status report 
on how they are going about it."
At the time of the interviews, 86% of the action plans in Gamma bank had been 
implemented and the controls were in place and the other 14% had not yet been 
implemented. This finding is important because it suggests that, with the exception of 
Gamma bank, effective follow-up procedures may not yet be in place to monitor actions to 
mitigate operational risks, thus leaving the other banks with possible exposures.
4.3.3.1 Main Findings
Analysis of the data indicates that the Business Unit is responsible for deciding the 
mitigation tactic to deploy. The findings also indicate that the process used in the selection 
of the appropriate mitigation tactic is informal and based upon the nature of the risk 
involved. The follow-up process in most banks is not well structured. An escalation 
procedure existed in the banks when the Business Unit could not unilaterally decide on the 
course of action due to constraints imposed by the internal environment.
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4.3.4 Operational Risk Mitigation - Barriers/Problems Faced by Management
Risk
ORJV1 in the organisation ........ .4.2.2





Deciding what to do......4.3.3
Barriers/Problems... ....4.3.4
The fourth set of questions that this research set out to explore were (section 1.2.3):
• What are the major barriers to implementing operational risk mitigation actions? 
The result of the analysis in this area can be found in Table 26.











































Source: Analysis of survey data
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The research found that cost (or more precisely cost versus benefits not being justified)
linked to budget constraints (in case of Gamma bank) was a common theme. Additionally,'
ignorance' was mentioned as a barrier in all of the banks:
"...lack of risk awareness"
"...lack of understanding of risk in the particular environment"
"...ignorance of how particular risk mitigation techniques may be implemented"
Reputation was also identified to be a barrier in all banks. This is due to the fact that
culturally speaking; the UAE commercial banks are owned by wealthy people who would
not want to be exposed to a deteriorating reputational profile:
"...it is a reputational issue..."
"...it is not in favour of the owners' reputation."
Table 26 illustrates the other barriers that were identified by managers. The fact that there 
are a number of barriers is probably indicative of the broad nature of operational risk. 
From a mitigation point of view, this suggests that operational risk can be adversely 
influenced by a whole range of factors. The risk appetite mentioned at Gamma bank was 
particularly interesting:
"I think something interesting in the corporate arena is that the actual appetite for 
risk is not clear in some cases. It may be clear to the strategic thinkers at the centre, 
and they may have a good idea, but it's not that helpful to the practitioners if they 
are not aware what the appetite is for accepting operational risk."
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4.3.4.1 Main Findings
The analysis of the data indicates that cost linked to budget constraints is a common 
barrier, besides resource, ignorance and reputation.
The findings are important because they identify the types of problems that managers face 
in mitigating operational risk. The decision as to how to mitigate a particular operational 
risk will have to take due consideration of the barriers or constraints that exist within the 
organisation. Business Units will have different needs in terms of risk mitigation based 
upon their inherent risk profile. There is no 'one size fits all' way to mitigate operational 
risk and the interplay of the various 'actors and factors' involved is an area where further 
developments will be required if the organisation is to 'guarantee' its level of residual risk.
4.4 Operational Risk - Quantification and Training
This section discusses the findings in two areas important to ORM: quantification and 
training. Quantification has received a lot of attention in the practitioner's literature as a 
result of banking regulatory requirements, which require capital to be put aside to cover 
potential operational risk losses (discussed in section 2.3.4.7). Training was identified as an 
important area that needs to be thoroughly covered, and can be an area for further research.
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4.4.1 Quantification
ORM in the organisation ........ 4.2.2
Role of the ORM Function ..... 4.2.3
ORM techniques ................. 4.2.4
Operational risk identification... 4.2.5 
Operational risk Appraisal......... 4.2.C>
Tactics................... 4.3.2
Deciding what to do... 4.3.3 
Barriers/Problem........4.3^ Quantification... 4.4.1
The results of data analysis for quantification can be seen in Table 27. All of the banks had 
a formal methodology for calculating their total operational risk exposure as per Basel II 
recommendation, and there was general recognition that there was still a lot to do in this 
area. The plan is to 'improve as you move' on a continuum from the B1A, through the 
TSA and ultimately to the AMA within 3-5 years. Again, this is in line with Basel II 
recommendations and the CBUAE mandate (see section 2.4.2.1).
Table 27: Operational Risk Quantification: Data Analysis
Quantification
Methodology










Worth doing, but still 








Mixed, depends on 
the risk
Source: Analysis of survey data
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Support for quantifying operational risk was 'mixed' with a majority of the managers 
interviewed believing it would not help them in their day-to-day management of 
operational risk. Nevertheless, it is a regulatory requirement by the CBUAH. Those who 
worked in the Corporate Risk Function, who would probably be responsible for carrying 
out the work, were generally more inclined to accept quantification as something that had 
to be done:
"At the end of the day, it will make operational risk decisions much easier. At the 
moment, there is far too much analysis, and thought processes having to go around 
a decision and not enough hard evidence that we can actually sit back and say 'let's 
make this decision based on the right criteria."
"I think it is possible for financial organisations to value operational risk by 
following what Basel II came up with about quantification and then trying to 
impose something from top down to quantify operational risk. That is certainly 
what we do using financial methods but I don't think it is an accurate reflection of 
what the risks are within the bank."
For the other managers and particularly those who operated at the 'sharp end' there were 
generally adverse comments towards the idea and in some cases contradictory points of 
view:
"I am sure there are means of devising measures of it, but you have got to bear in 
mind that any measures might be used in order to take business decisions and if 
measures are inaccurate you get inaccurate decisions, and I think there is a huge risk 
of that happening."
"I think you may have greater control over operational risk if you actually put aside 
the hurdle of quantification and simply recognise these are major risks the banks 
can be running with a certain amount or resource has to be put into controlling 
them."
"Spending a great deal of time and money on coming up with a number is not 
necessarily going to get any institution to concentrate on improving its controls."
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"...with some operational risks, my personal view is that you are better not doing it 
at all because it might be quite misleading."
One manager offered some advice to the regulators:
"If I were a regulator, I would be looking for distinct evidence that there was a 
decent operational risk management framework in place. That there was a decent 
amount of risk awareness in place in the organisation where the risks are likely to 
occur and that any quantification was built from a view that the organisation had of 
their potential vulnerability of those risks occurring."
These findings are particularly significant as they confirm the view that some banks are not 
well positioned in relation to developing a methodology for quantifying operational risk 
using the advanced methods (TSA and AMA) but more importantly, they reflect the views 
of others who have written on this subject (Ong 1998) that operational risk is more of a 
management issue and less a quantification issue. This may imply that operational risk 
prevention (management) and measurement (quantification) should be seen as mutually 
exclusive since a financial loss will result from inadequate management control rather than 
a lack of measurement techniques.
4.4.1.1 Main Findings
The results of the data analysis (see also section 4.2.3.1) indicate that the responsibility of 
operational risk quantification rests with the Corporate Operational Risk Function. The 
results of data analysis for quantification also indicate that all of the banks have a formal 
methodology for calculating their total operational risk exposure as per Basel II 
recommendation using the BIA, and there is general recognition that there is still a lot to do 
in this area, with the intention to move on a continuum from the BIA, through the TSA and
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The results of the data analysis for training can be seen in Table 28. The research found 
that there is no consistency across the banks in terms of their approach to operational risk 
training. Alpha bank had developed a formal operational risk awareness training course 
consisting of two modules for both staff and management. At the other end of the scale, 
Delta bank had not yet considered training, reflecting the pilot stage of their operational 
risk framework development.
























Source: Analysis of survey data
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There were many comments in support of training:
"...training needs to be focused more on the meaning of'managing operational 
risk' and particularly around people's personal responsibilities."
"...educating staff to understand what controls are and where they are required." 
"I think the Bank could benefit from some sort of coordinated risk training."
"...enabling within the organisation at every level an appreciation of the 
consequences of actions or inactions."
In three of the banks the risk-mapping framework was seen as an 'informal' or indirect 
training tool for the managers in the Business Unit. Comments from managers who worked 
in the Business Units indicated that training was seen as an important area:
"We are moving towards getting them (staff in the Business Unit) to think risk. 
We've acquired some operational risk training packages ... ... in the sense of
ticking: here are your key control processes and here are your risk processes."
But there were other factors that needed to be considered in raising the awareness of 
operational risk:
"Whatever risk-mapping process you put in place, if you don't have enough 
experienced people around in the business long enough to understand where the risk 
is, and if you have a lot of turnover, and if you are not training your people right, 
you introduce risk and the soft factors are quite important in looking at that, 
training, development and retention of staff."
The findings are particularly important in the context of the problems that managers face in 
managing, and, therefore, mitigating operational risk. Ignorance (see Table 26) was cited 
by all of the banks as being an important barrier to effective operational risk mitigation and
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it could be argued that the best way to overcome this is through an effective training 
programme.
4.4.2.1 Main Findings
The results of the data analysis for training reveal that there is no consistency across the 
banks in terms of their approach to operational risk training. Most of the banks see the risk- 
mapping framework as an informal or indirect training tool. Comments from managers who 
worked in the Business Units indicated that training was seen as an important area.
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Training ...........4.4.2Deciding what to do... 4.3.3 
arriers/Problems.........4.3.4
The Financial Crises and Dubai Crisis
This section discusses the findings in relation to operational risk and the Financial Crisis 
and Dubai Crisis (Financial Crises) discussed in section 2.4.1. This topic has received a lot
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of attention in the literature as a result of the consequences of the Financial C'rises and the 
banking regulatory requirements (FSF 200X, Lilco 2008, 1-lliott 200X, Saif and Choucair 
2009). The detailed causes of the Financial Crises are outside the scope of this study, 
however, the operational risk that contributed to these Financial Crises in the context of the 
UAE commercial banking will be discussed in more detail.
Due to their descriptive nature, the results will not be presented in a tabular form. The 
aggregate feedback analysis will be presented after each area discussed with the 
interviewees without reference to a specific bank. Some important quotes will also be 
presented, and will be followed by analysis of the feedback. The following are the areas 
discussed with the interviewees and the related feedback:
Financial Crises Predictability and Recurrence Prevention Measures:
"...the Financial Crises were predictable since the economy became too dependent 
on financial services leading to a credit crisis with severe implications..."
"The UAE banks were extending loans to finance property purchases at exaggerated 
pricing."
"Severe decrease of property price in Dubai was due to increased supply and 
reduced demand due to lack of purchasing power or liquidity caused by the 
Financial Crisis."
The above quotes shed light on the issues that prompted the Financial Crises. The data 
analysis indicates that the Financial Crises were predictable since financial institutes, 
including the UAE commercial banks, were extending loans to finance property and other 
purchases at extremely high or bubble pricing. Hence, the economy became too dependent 
on financial services without due consideration to the instigated risks.
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"The UAE banks need to develop cutting-edge risk management structures across 
credit risk, market risk and integrated ORM to stay ahead of the competition, 
counteract crises and ensure they are on top of new regulations..."
Another issue that has been pointed out is that the UAE commercial banks need cutting- 
edge or robust risk management structures and integrated ORM frameworks in order to 
counteract Financial Crises, stay ahead of competition and ensure they are on top of new 
regulations. They need to ensure that the ORM identifies the drivers of the operational risk 
events and measures their impact across the banks over time. This could be done using 
predictive models based on macroeconomic conditions, market and credit risk data, and 
key risk indicators; supplemented by stress testing, business environment monitoring and 
internal control factors. Thus, the vulnerabilities or gradual build up of imbalances related 
to funding mismatches can be identified.
"It boils down to ensuring the right risk aware culture..... .this is a Board
responsibility..."
One more important point that the data analysis revealed is that an operational risk aware 
culture must be integrated into the culture of the bank, and this will need to include 
mandate, leadership and commitment from the Board. The Board must translate risk 
strategy into operational objectives, and assign risk management responsibilities 
throughout the organisation. It should support accountability, performance measurement 
and reward, thus promoting operational efficiency at all levels.
"Operational risk management and the business need to work hand in hand to create 
what you can call risk aware culture..."
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Another issue highlighted is the need for ORM and Businesses to work together to create a 
more conscious risk culture within the bank.
"...healthy corporate governance is the driver..."
"...what is needed is a more prudent and transparent regulatory regime that 
encourages better ORJV1..."
To conclude, the Financial Crises were predictable, and there is obviously a great need to 
focus more attention on cutting-edge or robust risk management structures, healthy 
corporate governance, risk aware culture in the banks and more effective regulation in 
order to avoid recurrence of such Financial Crises.
The Operational Risks that Contributed to the Financial Crises:
"...too much liquidity leads to too much credit...what about the operational risks 
behind that? Can the current setup cope..?"
This quote captures the operational risks behind the Financial Crises. The data analysis 
indicates that the operational risks that contributed to the Financial Crises included 
allowing large credit growth nourished by a long period of low interest rates and abundant 
liquidity which increased the amount of operational risk that borrowers and investors took. 
The increase in credit growth outpaced ORM capacity to manage the associated risks, 
which is an operational risk in itself.
"... banks are reactive to operational risk management. We need is to be truly 
proactive..."
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One more important point that the data analysis revealed is related to adopting reactive 
rather than proactive strategies of operational risk monitoring and detection, thus, the 
business model for banking moved towards an equity culture with a focus on faster share 
price growth and earnings expansion, which lead the banks to focus mainly on the expected 
return side of their investment leaving the operational risks to manifest themselves.
"...the biggest failures of risk management arc due to weak risk governance 
structure, weak vision of risks and lack of a well defined capital allocation 
strategy..."
The significant bank failures are mainly due to inappropriate risk governance structure, 
disaggregated vision of risks and lack of a defined capital allocation strategy. Most banks 
used to grow their lending portfolios at bubble conditions driven by market demand 
without a clear capital allocation strategy. A capital allocation strategy should be 
thoroughly defined for the short and long term using a risk appetite framework to specify 
the bank's risk capacity (maximum risk tolerance) and risk appetite (desired risk tolerance).
"...Ultimately, more regulation is crucial. However, we have to guarantee it is 
going to function well."
"...what is needed is a more practical and transparent regulatory system that 
encourages better ORM..."
Finally, a 'weak' regulatory framework based on the belief that banks could be trusted to 
regulate themselves is among the operational risk sources of the Crises.
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To conclude, the operational risk that contributed to the Financial Crises included 
extending excessive credit without addressing the operational risks instigated, weak 
operational risk governance structures, adopting reactive rather than proactive ORM 
strategies, disaggregated vision of risks, lack of a well defined capital allocation strategy 
and week regulatory frameworks.
The Impact of the Financial Crises on the UAE Commercial Banks:
"...borrowers could no longer pay..., you can call it bad debts..."
"You need more liquidity to keep the momentum, customers have 
expectations...you do all you can to maintain customer faith..., it is all about 
customers..."
The data analysis indicates that as a result of the Financial Crises, the UAE commercial 
banks suffered many consequences, such as bad debt accumulation, lack of liquidity for 
lending, loss in asset value, loss of faith in the banking system by the general populace and 
withdrawal of foreign depositors' money resulting in more liquidity shortage.
Mitigation of the Operational Risks that Contributed to the Financial Crises:
"...yes, the UAE Government intervention was very timely..."
The data analysis indicates that the Government of the UAE supplied liquidity to all 
National banks, guaranteed depositors' money and guaranteed interbank loans. This 
intervention by the CBUAE has arrested the panic, effectively stabilised the UAE financial 
system, and helped restore depositors' confidence. On the other hand, there was no 
evidence that the banks themselves took any measures to mitigate the operational risks that
contributed to the Financial Crises. This is an important point since it reveals that the UAE
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commercial banks were too dependent on the UAE Government measures, leaving their 
ORM systems to evolve at the normal pace. The author would contend that this is an 
operational risk in itself that needs to be addressed in order to be prepared for future 
Financial Crises, should they occur.
Stress Testing in the UAE Commercial Banks:
"We are looking positively at stress testing, after all this is a measure to help us to 
put things right..."
The data analysis reveals that stress testing has not yet been conducted in the UAE 
commercial banks. However, it has been mandated by the CBUAE and is planned to 
commence within the next year in all commercial banks.
Some Managers gave optimistic and comforting comments:
"The UAE banks are not too global; hence, they did not suffer so much from the 
Financial Crises."
"Capital adequacy in the UAE banks is more than BCBS requirements. This is a 
reputation issue..."
"Cost of capital in the UAE banks is very low because many people do not take 
interest due to Islamic reasons, resulting in high profit margin."
The three comments are of particular interest sense they are indicative of some comfort as 
to the lesser extent the UAE banks were affected by the Financial Crises. Nevertheless, the 
author would argue that the intervention of the CBUAE to mitigate the risk by pumping 
sufficient liquidity in the UAE commercial banks was the main comforting issue when it 
came to restoring confidence in the UAE banking sector.
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The research findings above indicate that the fallout from the Financial Crises has 
illustrated that many sources of risk were triggered or at least propagated by vulnerabilities 
in ORM, which has not kept pace with financial innovation. At the same time the study 
revealed that the UAE banks are at immature stages of ORM development and show 
considerable dispersion in ORM practices while falling short of integrating operational risk 
as a vital process.
Worldwide, the scale of the Financial Crisis has revealed major shortcomings in ORM, and 
triggered an avalanche of reforms in response to the apparent failure of the existing 
regulatory framework.
Against the background of new sources of threats to financial stability, operational risk is 
becoming a salient feature of risk management in the banking industry. Amid the 
turbulence of the Financial Crisis, operational risk has become well recognised in the 
banking industry. The increase in scope of operational risk is largely explained by noting 
that operational risk amplifies system wide risk levels and has a greater potential to 
manifest itself in more harmful ways than many other sources of risk, given the increased 
size, interconnectedness, and complexity of banking industry.
The findings are particularly important in the context of the ORM shortcoming in the UAE 
commercial banks and what needs to be done to mitigate these shortcomings in order to 
prevent the recurrence of such Financial Crises.
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To conclude, the analysis of the findings indicates that the UAE commercial banks need to 
enhance ORM in order to counteract Financial Crises, stay ahead of competition and 
ensure being on top of new regulations. The author would argue that the way forward to 
achieving a sustainable level of excellence in this regard, is by adopting an integrated ORM 
framework. This topic will be discussed in detail in the next Chapter where the drivers for a 
proposed integrated framework are addressed (section 5.2.4).
4.6 Case Summaries: Common Themes and Differences
The cross-data analysis identified a number of emerging themes and important differences 
between the banks. This section discusses the results of the analysis in this respect.
4.6.1 Common Themes
The following themes appear to be the most common across the banks:
1. All four banks were negatively impacted by the Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis.
2. The definitions of operational risk used by the banks were either (two cases)
identical to Basel II or (two cases) adapted Basel II. All the managers interviewed 
were aware of the definition and had a good understanding of it.
3. All four banks have recently deployed a form of operational risk software
application. However, none of the banks is utilising the application to the maximum 
efficiency. The application in all banks is used mainly for data storage and retrieval. 
Training on the use of the application is on-going in all banks.
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4. All the Corporate Operational Risk units within the four banks reported to the
Corporate Risk Function and had a good working relationship with Internal Audit.
5. All four banks used a tailored risk-mapping framework to manage operational risk, 
although Delta bank was piloting its use in two Business Units at the time the study 
was undertaken.
6. All banks had some form of key risk indicators to monitor operational risk 
exposures.
7. Responsibility for ORM (all phases) was found to be with the managers in the 
Business Units. The broad nature of operational risk meant that they could be 
helped by specialists when the need arose. The factors that would influence them to 
seek assistance with mitigating an operational risk were various, but revolved 
around the complexity of the risk and the control issues involved.
8. The processes involved in ORM were subjective and judgemental and relied heavily 
on the skills and experience of the people involved in the process in all four banks.
9. The core tactics used to mitigate operational risk appeared to be similar in all four 
banks. The most commonly used tactic emerging from the study is reducing the risk 
(probability and/or impact) by improving the internal control framework.
10. All banks recognised a number of barriers or constraints in mitigating operational 
risk. The two which appeared to be the most important for the banks were (1) cost, 
in the context of cost versus benefit; and (2) ignorance, meaning the lack of risk 
awareness of the 'Management and Staff.'
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Considering the fact that there is a central body (CBUAE) providing guidance and a 
common approach on how to manage operational risk, it is hardly surprising to find that the 
frameworks for ORM are so similar. Indeed, all of the banks' operational risk frameworks 
are aimed at managing rather than measuring operational risk. The four banks involved in 
this study have been focusing their attention on implementing a framework to solve the 
problem of explicitly managing operational risk rather than actively pursuing a 
measurement strategy which should, in theory, help them to achieve better capital 
allocation.
4.6.2 Major Differences between the Banks
Despite some commonalities in approach, there were nonetheless some important
differences. These have been summarised in Table 29.
233





Use of Business Unit in ORM 
Other OR risk roles 
Operational Risk Committee
Role of Corporate Function
Mitigating OR's which span BU's 
OR Unit works with BU ORM 
OR Unit works with Business Unit
ORM techniques
Extent of coverage





















Mainly formal plus 
informal 




Informal at Business 
at Unit level
Various, mainly 









































AED: 1 - 6 scale 
Risk > AED 1 m: 
1 - 4 scale
Exploitation 
Tracking system at 
Business Unit level 
with review
Various, mainly 
















AED: 1 -6 scale 




Informal through IA 
reviews, 
KPIs and personal 
objectives
Various, mainly 




Source: Developed by the author
The differences tend to be variations on a theme rather than specific differences in 
approach, for example, the impact assessment of an operational risk used different scales to 
measure the financial impact. In some cases it appears that a bank has developed a 
particular area to a high degree of resilience. For example, the tracking system in Gamma 
bank seemed to be very robust and offered a high degree of certainty that the agreed
mitigation would be implemented.
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A discussion of the data analysis was presented in this section highlighting the common 
themes and major differences between the four banks.
4.7 Critical Incidents and Triangulation
As discussed in section 3.3.3, Triangulation has been employed in this study using Critical 
Incident Techniques (CIT's) to validate the results (Scrcnko 2006), since CIT's provide 
data that can be used to either substantiate or reject the data analysis findings. The 
approach is consistent with the fourth type of triangulation as identified by Stake 
(2005).The author has selected four from those listed to illustrate the problems that 
managers face in dealing with operational risk incidents (Note: The incident number refers 
to Appendix C). The table after each incident depicts further critical incident data analysis 
results compared to the study findings. The figure on the left side corresponds to the sub- 
suction in this Chapter where that area of ORM was analysed based on the study data.
Incident No. 5 - File of Transactions Transferred
According to Basel II classification (Basel II, p. 257), this critical incident is an example of 
the seventh source of operational risk (see section 2.3.4.2): Execution, Delivery and 
Process Management - data entry errors, accounting errors, failed mandatory reporting and 
negligent loss of client assets.
A file of outstanding transactions was transferred from one Business Unit to another 
(following an acquisition by the bank). The Business Unit in charge discovered that the
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record keeping of the original Business Unit was unsatisfactory, and as a result, errors in 
the transactions were appearing. This situation is still ongoing and the challenge for the 
bank, now that the risk had been identified, is to assess whether the amount of work 
involved in totally mitigating the risk is cost effective and worth the effort involved. As the 
manager put it:
"We're weighing up at the moment whether the risk warrants the effort to go back 
in and review every one of those thousands of transactions and go on through them 
all again in detail and highlight whether any of them has been improperly filed. 
That is an issue on my desk today. I have asked how many transactions there are. 
How long would it take to do it? Or, do we accept that we should have some reserve 
for occasional losses which might occur?"
This comment reflects the need to put some form of measure on the risk before deciding 
how to mitigate it. The two possible tactics being considered by the Business Unit are 
'Take' - accept there are errors and live with them - and 'Treat' - check all the deals and 
remove those that have been improperly filed.
This incident supports the data analysis findings mainly concerning the need to assess the 
scale of the risk and the remedial cost before deciding the appropriate course of action.
Table 30: Critical Incident No. (5) Data Analysis vs. Study Data Analysis







• The operational risk in this incident is included in the 
definition of operational risk.
Operational Risk Management in the Organisation
• Operational Risk Managers operate in the Business Units.
The Role of the Operational Risk Management Function
• The Corporate Operational Risk Function was not involved in

















this incident since the core responsibilities of the Corporate 
Operational Risk Function are: policy setting, aggregation of 
operational risk profile, high level reporting, assurance, 
framework setting, operational risk measurement and loss data 
maintenance.
Operational Risk Management Techniques
• The banks use an ORM framework.
Operational Risk Identification
• The responsibility for operational risk identification rests with 
the people who manage the processes and systems. 
• The main data sources to identify operational risks are the skill 
and experience of the people involved in the identification 
process. 
• Operational risks identification and appraising are done 
simultaneously. 
• Frequent monitoring of both potential operational risk sources 
to assess existing operational risks. 
• The Audit Function was not involved in this incident since the 
Audit Function may provide valuable input to those 
responsible for ORM, but does not have direct ORM 
responsibilities.
Operational Risk Appraisal
• Operational risk estimation and evaluation are done 
concurrently. 
• The output from each phase has a different emphasis with one 
focusing on probabilities (estimation) and the other on at least 
financial impact (evaluation). 
• The responsibility for operational risk appraisal rests with the 
Managers in the Business Units. 
• The operational risk appraisal process is subjective or 
judgemental assessment of the probability and impact of the 
risk. 
• The main data source to appraise operational risks is the 
experience of the people involved in the process.
Operational Risk Mitigation
Responsibility for Operational Risk Mitigation
• The responsibility for operational risk mitigation rests with the 
Managers in the Business Units.
Operational Risk Mitigation - Exploring the Tactics Used
• The main operational risk mitigation tactics used are: 
'Terminate', 'Treat', 'Take' and 'Transfer'.
Operational Risk Mitigation - Deciding What to Do
• The Managers in Business Units are responsible for deciding 
the mitigation tactic to deploy. 
• The process used in the selection of the appropriate mitigation 
tactic is informal and based upon the nature of the risk 
involved.
Operational Risk Mitigation - Barriers Faced by Management
• The main operational risk mitigation barriers are cost, resource, 
ignorance, customer reaction and reputation.
Operational Risk - Quantification and Training ————











• The responsibility for operational risk quantification rests with 
the Corporate Operational Risk function.__________
Training
• Training was seen as an important tool in all ORM phases.
Key. Y = Yes, the critical incident tallies with the data analysis results of the study. 
N = No, the critical incident data does not tally with the data analysis of the study.
Source: Developed by the author
Incident No. 9 - Uncleared Cheques
According to Basel 11 classification (Basel 11, p. 257), this critical incident is an example of 
the second source of operational risk (see section 2.3.4.2): External Fraud- theft of 
information, hacking damage, third-party theft and forgery.
This type of fraud was few years ago understood to be quite common in commercial banks 
and involved customers attempting to draw on cheques, which had not yet been cleared. As 
such, it is a well-known risk, which always existed:
"It was always a part of our training, part of our processes to check. Historically 
we'd known what the losses were, but they'd been accepted by management."
The last sentence indicates that the mitigation tactic used for this risk was Take', i.e. to 
accept the risk. What happened in this particular case was that the amount of losses started 
to rise significantly, i.e. the impact moved up. As a result, additional technical connectivity 
(virtual private networks) and procedures were introduced by the Business Unit in an 
attempt to reduce both the probability and impact. This was, however, seen only as a short- 
term measure whilst a full-scale change management technological project was instigated
to resolve the problem. This latter course of action becomes necessary in banks when any
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changes to systems and procedures could potentially have an impact on customers. In the 
meantime losses continued to escalate, i.e. the mitigation tactic was not working effectively 
and fraudsters were finding new ways to beat the system. A further procedure was 
introduced which curtailed the fraudulent activity and reduced losses to an 'acceptable 
level'. The end solution to the problem, however, involved the change management project 
team developing technical intranet verification changes that the ineffective procedures 
could be removed.
This is an example of'Treat' being used to iteratively mitigate an operational risk 
exposure. Crucially, the incident illustrates the importance of having follow-up procedures 
once the risk mitigation decision has been taken in order to ensure that the tactic is 
working. Another important aspect of this incident is the recognition that there will always 
be some residual risk (acceptable loss) which will be accepted by the Business Unit, since 
removing the risk, by including, rigorous control procedures, could have a negative impact 
upon customer relations.
This incident supports the data analysis findings mainly concerning the constraints (cost 
and customer reaction) imposed upon the managers when mitigating an operational risk as 
well as the findings related to the need to ensure adequate follow-up measures are in place.
Table 31: Critical Incident No. (9) Data Analysis vs. Study Data Analysis
Operational Risk Management Area Conformance to the Data Analysis
Operational Risk Management
jj.l | Defining Operational Risk ^^^^^^^^^^,
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• The operational risk in this incident is included in the 
definition of operational risk.
4.2.2 Operational Risk Management in the Organisation
Operational Risk Managers operate in the Business Units.
4.2.3 The Role of the Operational Risk Management Function
• The Corporate Operational Risk Function was not involved in 
this incident since the core responsibilities of the Corporate 
Operational Risk Function are: policy setting, aggregation of 
operational risk profile, high level reporting, assurance, 
framework setting, operational risk measurement and loss data 
maintenance.
4.2.4 Operational Risk Management Techniques
• The banks use an ORM framework.
• The ORM framework is based on the 'bottom up' approach.
• The banks use incident loss data in order to be more proactive 
in taking action before an operational risk manifests itself.
4.2.5 Operational Risk Identification
• The responsibility for operational risk identification rests with 
the people who manage the processes and systems.
• The main data sources to identify operational risks are the skill 
and experience of the people involved in the identification 
process.
• Operational risks identification and appraising are done 
simultaneously.
• Frequent monitoring of both potential operational nsk sources 
and key risk indicators to assess existing operational risks.
• The Audit Function was not involved in this incident since the 
Audit Function may provide valuable input to those 
responsible for ORM, but does not have direct ORM 
responsibilities.
4.2.6 Operational Risk Appraisal
• Operational risk estimation and evaluation are done 
concurrently.
• The output from each phase has a different emphasis with one 
focusing on probabilities (estimation) and the other on at least 
financial impact (evaluation).
• The responsibility for operational risk appraisal rests with the 
Managers in the Business Units.
• The operational risk appraisal process is subjective or
judgemental assessment of the probability and impact of the 
risk.
• The main data source to appraise operational risks is the 
experience of the people involved in the process.
4.3 Operational Risk Mitigation
4.3.1 Responsibility for Operational Risk Mitigation
• The responsibility for operational risk mitigation rests with the 
Managers in the Business Units.
4.3.2 Operational Risk Mitigation - Exploring the Tactics Used
• The main operational risk mitigation tactics used are: 
____'Terminate'. Treat', Take' and 'Transfer'.
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4.3.3 Operational Risk [Mitigation - Deciding What to Do
• The Managers in Business Units are responsible for deciding 
the mitigation tactic to deploy.
• The process used in the selection of the appropriate mitigation 
tactic is informal and based upon the nature of the risk 
involved. 
Adequate follow-up measures should be in place.
4.3.4 Operational Risk Mitigation - Barriers Faced by Management
• The main operational risk mitigation barriers arc cost, resource, 
____ignorance, customer reaction and reputation.__________
4.4 Operational Risk - Quantification and Training
4.4.1 Quantification
• The responsibility for operational risk quantification rests with 
the Corporate Operational Risk Function.______
4.4.2 Training
• Training was seen as an important tool in all QRM phases.
Key: Y = Yes, the critical incident tallies with the data analysis results of the study. 
N = No, the critical incident data does not tally with the data analysis of the study.
Source: Developed by the author
Incident No. 11 - Incorrect Payment Remittance
According to Basel II classification (Basel II, p. 257), this critical incident is an example of 
the seventh source of operational risk (see section 2.3.4.2): Execution, Delivery and 
Process Management -data entry errors, accounting errors, failed mandatory reporting and 
negligent loss of client assets.
The bank involved has a procedure in place to check the remittance on international 
payments. This was a double-check procedure before the remittance is made. Despite 
having a control in place to mitigate this risk, on one particular occasion it did not work 
and a large payment (several hundreds of thousands of AED) was mistakenly sent to the 
wrong party. When the incident came to light some of the dues were recovered (but not all) 
and compensation had to be paid to the correct party. This risk had been identified but it
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was considered that there were adequate controls in place tor mitigation; and that it, 
therefore, represented a low probability event. Within the same Business Unit, another 
operational risk had also been identified relating to staff training/communication in this 
section, which was recognised as being weak and in need of improvement. A 
training/communication plan had been developed to mitigate the risk and was due for 
implementation a few months after the date of the incident. The training/communication 
risk had, therefore, been accepted for a short period and the mitigation action had been 
postponed. It was this latter risk which manifested itself in the remittance procedure not 
being undertaken correctly, thus causing the incorrect remittance to be made.
This is an interesting example of how one risk can cause another one to occur, despite the 
fact that adequate mitigating actions were in place for both of them. It also highlights the 
behavioural side of operational risk, a particularly difficult area to manage and quantify. 
The tactic being used to mitigate these risks was 'Treat' although, as has been noted, the 
second risk had been 'Taken' for a short period of time. The subsequent decision taken has 
been to bring forward the implementation of the training/communication plan.
This incident supports the data analysis findings concerning the constraints imposed upon 
the managers when mitigating an operational risk and also illustrates the cross-linkages 
between operational risks themselves.
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Table 32: Critical Incident No. (11) Data Analysis vs. Study Data Analysis
Operational Kisk Management Area Conformance to the 
Data Analysis
4.2 Operational Risk Management
4.2.1 Denning Operational Risk
• The operational risk in this incident is included in (he 
____definition of operational risk._____________
4.2.2 Operational Risk Management in the Organisation
Operational Risk Managers operate in the Business Units
4.2.3 The Role of the Operational Risk Management Function
• The Corporate Operational Risk Function was not involved in 
this incident since the core responsibilities of the Corporate 
Operational Risk Function are: policy setting, aggregation of 
operational risk profile, high level reporting, assurance, 
framework setting, operational risk measurement and loss data 
maintenance.
4.2.4 Operational Risk Management Techniques
• The banks use an ORM framework.
• The banks use incident loss data in order to be more proactive 
___ in taking action before an operational risk manifests itself.
4.2.5 Operational Risk Identification
• The responsibility for operational risk identification rests with 
the people who manage the processes and systems.
• The main data sources to identify operational risks are the skill 
and experience of the people involved in the identification 
process.
• Operational risks identification and appraising are done 
simultaneously.
• The Audit Function was not involved in this incident since the 
Audit Function may provide valuable input to those 
responsible for ORM, but does not have direct ORM 
responsibilities.
4.2.6 Operational Risk Appraisal
• Operational risk estimation and evaluation are done 
concurrently.
• The output from each phase has a different emphasis with one 
focusing on probabilities (estimation) and the other on at least 
financial impact (evaluation).
• The responsibility for operational risk appraisal rests with the 
Managers in the Business Units.
• The operational risk appraisal process is subjective or
judgemental assessment of the probability and impact of the 
risk.
• The main data source to appraise operational risks is the 
experience of the people involved in the process.
Operational Risk Mitigation
4.3.1 Responsibility for Operational Risk Mitigation








Managers in the Business Units.
Operational Risk Mitigation - Exploring the Tactics Used
• The main operational risk mitigation tactics used are: 
'Terminate', Treat', Take' and Transfer'.
Operational Risk Mitigation - Deciding What to Do
• The Managers in Business Units are responsible for deciding 
the mitigation tactic to deploy. 
• The process used in the selection of the appropriate mitigation 
tactic is informal and based upon the nature of the risk 
involved.
Operational Risk Mitigation - Barriers Faced by Management
• The main operational risk mitigation barriers are cost, resource, 
ignorance, customer reaction and reputation.
Operational Risk - Quantification and Training
Quantification
• The responsibility for operational risk quantification rests with 
the Corporate Operational Risk Function.
Training






Key: Y = Yes, the critical incident tallies with the data analysis results of the study. 
N = No, the critical incident data does not tally with the data analysis of the study.
Source: Developed by the author
Incident No. 18 - Deed Store
According to Basel II classification (Basel II, p. 257), this critical incident is an example of 
the sixth source of operational risk (see section 2.3.4.2): Business Disruption and Systems 
Failures - utility disruptions, software failures and hardware failures.
This incident came to light as a result of a competitor having a fire in their deed store with 
an associated cost of around AED 8 million. Following this incident, the risks and controls 
relating to the deed store in the bank were examined and it was discovered that the fire 
prevention system would not have worked had a fire occurred. The problem was traceable 
back to the halogen gas fire prevention system, which requires a certain pressure to be
effective. It was discovered that this pressure did not exist, but the Business Unit
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responsible for the deed store had already decided to remove this system and replace it with 
a water-based one, which requires no pressure to be maintained. However, because of costs 
and budget constraints, a decision was taken not to replace the halogen gas and at the same 
time a new conveyer belt was installed necessitating drilling a large hole in the wall 
directly into the store, which reduced the pressure even further. The Business Unit was 
unaware of the potential risk it had created, and the decision not to move forward to a water 
based system had not properly been communicated. The net result was the financial impact, 
had this risk occurred, would have been catastrophic (estimated at AED 18 million). There 
would also have been a significant impact on 20 members of the staff who worked in the 
area, as a result of the halogen gas fire prevention system being ineffective due to the hole 
that had been made for the conveyer belt.
The risk division became involved in mitigating the risk that now existed and a report was 
prepared for the Board recommending the installation of a sophisticated water-based 
system at a cost of around AED 1 million. The recommendation was accepted by the 
Board.
This is an example of 'Treat' being used to further reduce the likelihood of the operational 
risk occurring. In this particular case the risk had also been 'Transferred' (via insurance) 
but this would have been void because the problem with the pressure in the deed store had 
not been resolved.
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This incident supports the data analysis findings because it highlights the importance of 
monitoring external events and stress testing them in the bank's own environment. The 
incident also confirms the escalation process that takes place in deciding upon the risk 
mitigation action (the scale and the cost of the mitigation action meant the final decision 
was taken at the Board level) and further emphasises the 'ignorance' constraint as one of 
the key problems facing management.
Table 33: Critical Incident No. (18) Data Analysis vs. Study Data Analysis
Operational Risk Management Area Conformance to the 
Data Analysis
4.2 Operational Risk Management
4.2.1 Defining Operational Risk
• The operational risk in this incident is included in the 
____definition of operational risk._____________
4.2.2 Operational Risk Management in the Organisation
• Operational Risk Managers operate in the Business Units.
4.2.3 The Role of the Operational Risk Management Function
• The Corporate Operational Risk Function was not involved in 
this incident since the core responsibilities of the Corporate 
Operational Risk Function are: policy setting, aggregation of 
operational risk profile, high level reporting, assurance, 
framework setting, operational risk measurement and loss data 
maintenance.
4.2.4 Operational Risk Management Techniques
• The banks use an ORM framework.
• The banks use key risk indicators to monitor operational risk.
• The banks use incident loss data in order to be more proactive 
in taking action before an operational risk manifests itself.
4.2.5 Operational Risk Identification
• The responsibility for operational risk identification rests with 
the people who manage the processes and systems.
• The main data sources to identify operational risks are the skill 
and experience of the people involved in the identification 
process.
• Operational risks identification and appraising are done 
simultaneously.
• Frequent monitoring of both potential operational risk sources 
and key risk indicators to assess existing operational risks.
• The Audit Function was not involved in this incident since the 
Audit Function may provide valuable input to those 
responsible for ORM, but does not have direct ORM 
responsibilities.
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4.2.6 Operational Risk Appraisal
• Operational risk estimation and evaluation are done 
concurrently.
• The output from each phase has a different emphasis with one 
focusing on probabilities (estimation) and the other on at least 
financial impact (evaluation).
• The responsibility for operational risk appraisal rests with the 
Managers in the Business Units.
• The operational risk appraisal process is subjective or
judgemental assessment of the probability and impact of the 
risk.
• The main data source to appraise operational risks is the 
experience of the people involved in the process.
• The external environment and loss data are other data sources 
to appraise operational risks.
4.3 Operational Risk Mitigation
4.3.1 Responsibility for Operational Risk Mitigation
• The responsibility for operational risk mitigation rests with the 
____Managers in the Business Units.________________
4.3.2 Operational Risk Mitigation - Exploring the Tactics Used
• The main operational risk mitigation tactics used are: 
'Terminate', 'Treat', 'Take' and 'Transfer'.
4.3.3 Operational Risk Mitigation - Deciding What to Do
• The Managers in Business Units are responsible for deciding 
the mitigation tactic to deploy.
• The process used in the selection of the appropriate mitigation 
tactic is informal and based upon the nature of the risk 
involved.
• An escalation procedure existed in the banks when the 
Business Unit could not unilaterally decide on the course of 
action due to constraints.
4.3.4 Operational Risk Mitigation - Barriers Faced by Management
• The main operational risk mitigation barriers are cost, resource, 
ignorance, customer reaction and reputation.__________
4.4 Operational Risk - Quantification and Training
4.4.1 Quantification
• The responsibility for operational risk quantification rests with 
____the Corporate Operational Risk Function.___________
4.4.2 Training
• Training was seen as an imoortant tool in all ORM phases.
Key: Y = Yes, the critical incident tallies with the data analysis results of the study. 
N = No, the critical incident data does not tally with the data analysis of the study.
Source: Developed by the author
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As discussed above, in all the critical incidents and those in Appendix (C), the phases of 
ORM were in line with the data analysis findings. Further, the critical incident analysis 
results support the study data analysis findings; however, with very few exceptions.
4.8 Summary of Findings
The most significant finding of the research is that all of the banks in this study are 
developing their risk management framework in accordance with the requirements of the 
Basel II accord. There remains much to be done, however, on the measurement side of 
operational risk with all of the banks being in the embryonic stages of development. The 
study confirmed previous findings vis-a-vis the definition of operational risk. There is a 
common understanding of the broad areas that operational risk covers with strategic and 
reputational risks being excluded, as per Basel II definition of operational risk.
There are two types of Operational Risk Managers present in all banks: the Corporate 
Operational Risk Manager and the Business Unit Operational Risk Manager. The roles of 
the two appear to be clearly articulated and they have close working relations although 
there is no direct reporting line between them. This is not necessarily a problem but it 
highlights the issue of maintaining good communication channels between the individuals 
if both are to do their jobs efficiently (minimise any overlap) and effectively (sharing best 
practices). The same comments may be said of the relationship between the Operational 
Risk Managers and Internal Audit. The study found that the reporting lines of Internal 
Audit and the Corporate Operational Risk Function were identical in three of the banks.
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This in turn could cause problems with independence, when Internal Audit has to review 
the work of the Operational Risk Function.
The study found that a risk-mapping framework was present in all of the banks, though the 
system was being piloted in Delta bank at the time the work was carried out. The phases 
within the framework were found to be consistent with the literature although there are a 
number of variations in the modus operandi and documentation produced reflecting the 
adapted development of these frameworks and the individual preferences of the banks. All 
the frameworks were used to manage as opposed to measure operational risk. Whilst the 
Corporate Operational Risk Functions were the owners of the framework, the responsibility 
for managing (identification, appraisal and mitigation) operational risk was found to be 
with the managers in the Business Unit, a responsibility that was in effect delegated down 
from the Board.
One of the key findings of the study is that managers in the Business Units rely on help 
from both internal and external specialists in discharging their responsibility. This is the 
case for all phases in the ORM process and again reflects the broad scope of what is 
defined as operational risk. Identifying when they need help and who can help them is a 
crucial element in the process.
Turning specifically to operational risk mitigation and the focus of this study, the findings 
indicate that the mitigation process for an operational risk varies from a simple 
improvement to an internal control procedure to the complexity of establishing a project
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team to resolve the matter. The tactics used were found to be broadly in line with the 
literature of operational risk, which is principally found in an organisation's internal control 
environment (Basel II). Another important finding of the study is in relation to the barriers 
or constraints that exist in mitigating operational risk. While the issue of cost is 
unsurprising, more worrying is what was described as 'ignorance' or lack of awareness of 
operational risk. One of the key ways to improve this is through training and the study 
found that whilst there was widespread support for the development of formal training, 
very little had actually taken place.
The findings are particularly important in the context of the operational risks that 
contributed to Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis, the impact on the UAE commercial banks 
and how to mitigate these risks in order to prevent recurrence of such crises in the future. 
The analysis shows that the focus of attention shall be imbedded ORM culture, health 
Corporate governance and the need for cutting-edge or robust risk management structures 
across credit, market and integrated ORM.
The cross-data analysis identified a number of emerging themes and differences between 
the banks. An important commonality is that the banks' operational risk frameworks are 
aimed at managing rather than measuring operational risk. 
Despite some commonalities in approach, there were nonetheless some important 
differences. However, the differences tend to be variations on a theme rather than specific 
differences in approach.
250
Critical incidents were used to triangulate the study findings. The result shows that the 
phases of ORM were in line with the data analysis findings. Further, the critical incident 
data analysis supports the study data analysis findings.
This next section (Chapter 5) considers the implications of the findings of the study for the 
management and mitigation of operational risk in the UAE commercial banks.
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5. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT - STUDY 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
5.1 Introduction
This section considers the implications of the findings or" the study (Chapter 4) for the 
management and mitigation of operational risk in the DAK commercial banks. The 
experiences of the managers from four of the leading banks involved in ORM arc used to 
draw lessons for others who may be embarking on a similar path. This section opens with a 
discussion of the organisational implications, followed by an examination of the 
implications for Operational Managers, the Operational Risk Function and Internal Audit, 
the three main players identified in the management of operational risk. Finally, 
conclusions about the research problem are discussed and a proposed model is offered.
5.2 Organisational Implications
5.2.1 Implications for the Board
Evidence in this study indicates that UAE commercial banks are facing a changing external
environment and that management will need to keep abreast of the changes that are 
occurring and the operational risks that they may bring. Part of the management process 
requires looking ahead, planning for expected and unexpected outcomes, organising 
adequate resources, and controlling the work done. The operational risks associated with 
the future intent of the bank in this turbulent environment, will require effective mitigation 
strategies. Management behaviour in dealing with these risks must take account of any 
delusions of control that may exist and the development of appropriate performance
measurement systems to monitor operational risks will assume increasing importance.
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This is a point endorsed by Masli and Peters (2009) and Hopkin (2010) whose studies of 
the relationship between risk management and organisational control indicate that a system 
of effective risk management can redirect the emphasis of control towards prevention 
rather than cure, and thus impact directly on the performance of the organisation.
Basel II placed risk management and internal control firmly on the agenda of the Board. 
The Boards of banks have a particular interest in managing operational risk because of the 
requirements to set aside capital to cover unexpected losses. Banks are unique in this 
respect and tying up capital in this way reduces the amount of money that is available for 
distribution to shareholders. There can be little doubt that the Board has an influential role 
in managing operational risk by creating a culture of risk awareness and distilling it down 
to the Operational Managers in the Business Units. The following comment from one of 
the managers seems to capture the context:
"I believe you should start at the top, and have a clearly defined policy and then 
make sure that is properly understood, communicated down and adhered to in the 
business."
The Board carries the ultimate responsibility for the risk management activities that are 
undertaken. Previous high profile ORM failures (such as Barings, Societe Generate, 
Indymac) have given rise to criticisms of Boards for their failures to establish effective 
internal control environments and monitor adherence to laid down procedures. Operational 
risk is embedded within a banks internal control environment (Basel II). It is a complex 
issue and the explicit management of operational risk will demand continuous Board
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attention as risk profiles change due to changes in internal and external circumstances. The 
following comment from one of the managers seems to capture the mood:
"I would probably suggest that a lot of the major operational losses occurred 
because management turned a blind eye."
Turning a blind eye never has been an excuse, and if it continues then it will remain an 
important cause for why operational risk incidents occur. So, what should Boards be doing 
to ensure that they are managing their risks effectively? The following comment from one 
of the managers seems to shed light on this area: 
"Boards should know their main risks."
This is probably the minimum that could be expected. If every member of the Board is 
unaware of the most significant risks that the bank faces, then their chances of being able to 
manage them effectively are severely diminished. Basel II outlines the criteria that Boards 
should be following. For example, Basel II proposes that banks should publicly, and in a 
timely fashion, disclose more detailed information about the process used to control their 
operational risks and the regulatory capital allocation technique they use. The financial 
reporting of risk was proposed to encourage better risk management, help reduce the cost 
of capital and provide enhanced reporting to investors.
The UAE commercial banking business involves more than just banking as has been noted 
in Chapter 2. All of the banks in this study, for example, have large insurance operations, 
which contribute to the banks' overall profitability and risk profile. The breadth of 
operations and, therefore, the breadth of operational risks, are large. Boards need to 
recognise this and ensure that they maintain sufficient expertise to understand and manage
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these risks. A final consideration for the Board is the amount of money that the Bank 
spends or should spend on managing operational risk:
"The Group spends virtually all their expenses on managing operational risk in one 
form or another whether it be by the Business or us centrally."
This observation from one of the Heads of Operational Risk suggests it is not just a 
question of the direct costs of the operational risk employees that should be considered, but 
a large amount of the bank's overall budget as everyone has a role to play in managing 
operational risk.
5.2.2 Risk Management Committee
As the results of the study have shown, the use of an ORM committee (or even a risk
committee) to oversee operational risk is by no means consistent in the banks. There is 
little in the literature discussing operational risk committees (Spira and Page 2003). The 
breadth and newness of operational risk in relation to the UAE commercial banks appears 
to be a strong pointer towards establishing such a committee or including it within a 
generic risk management committee. Whilst the research did not examine this area in detail 
there are a number of issues arising from the study that are worthy of further consideration.
An ORM committee could normally be created as a sub-committee of the Board and could 
fulfill a number of roles in helping to manage and measure operational risk. For example, 
matters of policy may be decided, establishing the boundaries and categories of operational 
risk, overseeing key projects, deciding upon mitigation actions which span business units 
and receiving regular reports on operational risk. Where a risk committee is already in
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existence, then there could be a strong argument lor extending the terms ot" reference of this 
committee to include operational risk:
"One of the problems with operational risk is that it literally covers the operation 
from beginning to end. In reality, all activities have operational risk elements in 
them."
Credit risks could be added to this, as there are operational processes involved in assessing 
the credit worthiness of an individual/organisation. Market risk could be added, too. 
Equally, the inclusion of the scope of operational risk in a generic risk management 
committee would help to ensure that all risks in the bank are being managed. Strategic and 
reputational risks within the context of operational risk remain the subject of some debate:
"...it was all about getting management to see that what they thought was a really 
good strategy was actually flawed, and it's flawed not because it's not a good thing 
to do; it's flawed because you're not managing the operational risks that go with 
exactly what you are doing."
"Turning around to a division and saying the next year we want to increase your 
volume by 200% has operational risks and quite often, what you will find is the 
operational risk has been assessed based on a static organic growth."
Whilst Basel II has specifically excluded strategic and reputational risks from the 
measurement debate, these still remain risks and as such need to be managed explicitly. 
This raises some interesting problems about whether strategic and reputational risks should 
be quantified. If not, then the 'holy grail' of being able to quantify a bank's total risk 
exposure will never be reached. If so, then the question is how should it be done?
The Risk Management Committee could also take an overall responsibility tor the 
measurement of operational risk and the subsequent allocation of the capital set aside to
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Business Units, thus reflecting the amount of operational risk they are carrying. This latter 
point is set to be a potential problem area unless a fair and reasonable method can be found 
to allocate capital.
Finally, the Risk Management Committee could help set the tone for ORM in the bank by 
ensuring that a consistent message is filtered down to the Business Unit. The results of the 
study indicate that the message behind good ORM is about being more operationally risk 
aware rather than being risk averse. This message can be communicated in a number of 
ways, including for example, training (see section 5.3.3).
5.2.3 The Operational Risk Manager
The research found that there are two types of Operational Risk Manager in the banks 
studied. These are the Corporate Operational Risk Manager and the Business Unit 
Operational Risk Manager. The roles have been well defined and there is evidence that the 
two work closely together. The Corporate Operational Risk Manager role has developed 
into the central monitoring role where a high level and aggregate view of the operational 
risks being faced by the bank can be assembled. Out of what appears to be a growing need 
to help the Business Unit improve its management of operational risk, the Business Unit 
Operational Risk Manager role has evolved. These managers arc part of the Business Units 
and work with them on a day-to-day basis facilitating, helping and enticing the others into 
achieving the desired level of operational risk.
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The existence of these roles in any organisation is confirmation of the explicit nature of 
ORM. They effectively add value by ensuring that the organisation manages the 
operational risks and not the other way round. As such, they are similar to the Internal 
Auditor: they are there to prevent something bad from happening. It was beyond the scope 
of this study to examine the skills and experience required to be an Operational Risk 
Manager but it is certainly a possible area for further research:
"I think to do operational risk well; there is no substitute for having been an auditor 
first, preferably an Internal Auditor."
The author is not surprised that one of the Operational Risk Managers interviewed made 
this comment as Internal Auditors focus their efforts on the internal control systems where 
operational risks are principally found. The challenge for the Operational Risk Manager is 
in ensuring that the managers with whom he works understand the difference between 
his/her role and that of the Internal Auditor. This is particularly so where the reporting lines 
of both units are the same.
5.2.4 Integrated Risk Management
"I think operational risk as a term has not really been widely used within the bank 
until it became much more popular in the last few years. Up until then the focus was 
certainly very much towards credit and market risks, although in reality, many of 
the issues about credit risk were actually operational risk issues."
"We must take risks as a bank."
"Banks are in the business of risk... ...at a price.'
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Risk management is an ongoing process and of fundamental importance to a bank because 
of the regulatory requirements in relation to capital. Therefore, it makes good sense to 
develop an approach to risk management which combines all the major forms of risk66 : 
market, credit and operational. Whilst the nature of these risks may be different, 
operational risk is the common denominator as operational processes exist in both market 
and credit risk transactions. As a result, the boundaries are sometimes blurred.
Developing an integrated risk management approach across credit, market and operational 
risk could be difficult to achieve because of the inherent differences in the nature of the 
three risks and ways in which they need to be managed, and, therefore, mitigated. Credit 
Risk Managers are proactive in performing up-front analysis of company and economic 
data (Kevin 2005), whilst market risk managers analyse risk in multiple transactions after 
they have been taken (Kevin 2005). Operational Risk Managers on the other hand assess 
the risk profiles of Business Units. Whilst it makes intuitive sense to have a similar 
reporting line, the approaches adopted to manage these risks will remain different.
One feature of operational risk that differs from credit and market risk is the number of 
people who have the opportunity to help manage it. The research indicates that everybody 
has a role to play since operational risk exists in every procedure used in the bank. This 
suggests that an integrated form of ORM is an objective worthy of further consideration. 
Looking at this from the point of view of the main players there would be five pieces of the
"The reader is reminded that there are other forms of risk inherent in banking act.vit.es such as liquidity risk. 
Many banks describe their positions on these risks in their annual reports.
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'jigsaw puzzle' that would have to fit closely together for an integrated and effective 
approach to be adopted. This is shown in Figure 14.














Source: Developed by the author
What are the drivers behind making the jigsaw fit together? Based on the study findings, 
the author would offer the following (see section 5.5):
• Developing cutting-edge or robust risk management structures across credit, market 
and operational risk in order to help ensure that the operational risks resulting from 
credit and market risks are captured and managed.
• Ensuring soundness of the corporate governance structure.
• Integrating operational risk conscious culture into the culture of the organisation via 
mandate, leadership and commitment from the Board.
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• Monitoring the macroeconomic conditions, business environment, market and 
credit risk data, key risk indicators, and performing continuous internal control 
review.
• Focusing on proactive rather than reactive ORM.
• Defining a well designed and embedded risk appetite framework, specifying the 
bank's risk capacity (maximum risk tolerance) and risk appetite (desired risk 
tolerance) following the guidelines proposed by the Board.
• Reviewing the business critical risk challenges with ORM as a tool to drive the 
business objectives.
• Creating sustainable value from ORM by improving business performance and 
safeguarding business continuity.
• Complying with what regulators expect from the commercial banks, and 
transforming regulatory requirements for ORM into competitive advantage.
• Ensuring that the information presented to regulators and management is consistent
• Retaining experienced well-trained staff.
• Ensuring market confidence.
• Conducting stress testing on regular basis as directed by the regulators.
Most of these drivers will be the foundation to the operational risk model proposed in 
section 5.6.1.
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5.3 Implications for Operational Management
5.3.1 Operational Risk Management
The research confirmed that the responsibility for ORJVI lies with the managers in the 
Business Unit, i.e. operational management.
"The whole idea is that every risk within the organisation has a home and someone 
who is responsible for it."
Risk-mapping identifies the risk owner in the sense described above and has moved ORM 
from being informal and implicit to formal and explicit. In short. Operational Managers 
who have always managed operational risk as part of their day-to-day responsibilities, now 
find that they do it with a better understanding of the problems involved. It is vital that 
Operational Managers recognise the pivotal role they play in this process and the demands 
that are now being placed upon them when explicitly managing such a complex area. 
Some of the issues that have been identified in the study include:
1. The need to consider the effect that one risk can have on another - see Appendix C, 
critical incident no. 11;
2. The need to focus on managing the key risks and not the risks that Operational 
Managers like or find easy to manage;
3. The need to establish a well-defined risk appetite for the bank and the different 
business units;
4. The need to look for support (either internally or externally) when Operational 
Managers are unable to manage an operational risk by themselves;
5. The need to emphasise the vital role that other bank staff play in helping to manage 
operational risk on a day-to-day basis.
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Operational risk-mapping is not a one-off exercise. It is a continuous process that must be 
done in addition to the ongoing management of the operational risks that are found the 
moment the manager sits at his desk. New operational risks can appear from a variety of 
sources:
"Centralised processing, telephone banking, internet banking and mobile banking 
are all new operational risks."
Operational Managers must be alert to these new threats and react accordingly. The 
research also identified the opportunities that exist with ORM, particularly the opportunity 
to challenge the amount of control that is being exercised in relation to the risks involved. 
Control processes, which have been in place for some time, need to be continually 
reviewed and checked to make sure they are still valid and appropriate. Operational risks 
can be over-controlled (control inefficiency) as well as under-controlled (control 
deficiency). The challenge for the Operational Manager is balancing the two control 
elements.
Operational Managers also need to understand that they have a vested interest in creating 
an operational risk environment with a low level of residual risk. One of the drivers behind 
this is the capital charge that Business Units are likely to suffer since operational risk 
measurement has become firmly embedded in the bank. The allocation of capital should, in 
theory, reflect the riskiness of the Business Unit.
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Finally, in focusing their attention on their operational risks the managers must recognise 
the importance of working within a defined frame of reference. Specifically, this is likely to 
be the Business Unit objectives. Their efforts to manage operational risk need to begin with 
an assessment of their objectives from a risk perspective and a clear understanding of how 
these risks are currently being managed.
By responding positively to the benefits offered by the risk-mapping framework, 
Operational Managers can help protect themselves from the dangers that ineffective ORM 
can bring. The critical incidents reported in Appendix C bear witness to some of the 
problems that can be caused when managements are unable to effectively mitigate 
operational risks.
5.3.2 Operational Risk Mitigation
The focus of this research has been in the area of operational risk mitigation and a number
of findings have implications to Operational Risk Managers. Firstly, recognising that there 
are a number of different ways to mitigate an operational risk, although the most common, 
treating the risk, is likely to be the most appropriate given that most operational risks are 
embedded in the internal control environment. Secondly, their decision to mitigate will be 
constrained by a number of factors inherent in the way the organisation works and their 
own perception of the risk and knowledge of what can be done. Thirdly, mitigation is one 
area where other specialist units can have an important role to play in advising and 
implementing on the most appropriate course of action. Fourthly, the decision taken on 
how the risk will be mitigated should include an agreed action plan which is capable of
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being monitored, as a basis for ensuring the desired level of residual risks is being 
achieved.
A checklist for mitigating operational risks has been drawn up by the author. This is shown 
in Appendix E. The reader should note that this checklist is based on the data analysis 
undertaken by the author and may be seen as a practical roadmap that may be used by 
managers when faced with an operational risk mitigation situation.
This checklist is seen as an important contribution since it offers practical 
recommendations to improve existing practice and is of use not only to the banks in the 
study but to others who wish to enhance their risk mitigation process.
53.3 Training
The author considers that training in ORM is an important challenge for banks. The 
research indicated that the managers felt that there was still work to be done in this area. 
The current informal training that is given via the risk-mapping exercise is only half of the
story:
"They, managers of business units, are all risk aware when we all sit around and 
have a discussion but they don't think it is necessary when they are doing their 
plans and budgets and that kind of thing."
The development of a formal training programme with the emphasis on operational risk 
awareness could be an important part of the bank's armoury in defending themselves 
against operational risks. The author would, therefore, contend that demonstrating a formal
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training programme would be a great asset for the banks when dealing with regulators. The 
risk-mapping process relies on people throughout and it is their knowledge, skills and 
experience, which will determine the robustness of the results. Training in risk 
management should not, therefore, be seen as an 'optional extra' in the development of 
staff, but as a 'standard feature/
Training may be focused and specific to the needs of management and staff within the 
bank. An important part of the process would be to ensure that the new starters are given 
sufficient training as part of their induction programme. The development of a training 
strategy in the area of operational risk would be a key factor in helping to: 
"...increase the acceleration rate of risk management knowledge."
5.4 Implications for the Operational Risk Function
5.4.1 Risk-mapping Framework
"What we have got to be careful about in putting any process in place for 
operational risk is that you don't switch off the common sense. We have seen it in 
dealing. You give dealers appealing software to become a mathematical genius, but 
they will still lose money because they forget to think."
The above comment from an operational manager has an important message behind it. The 
risk-mapping processes that the banks in this study are installing, or have installed, are not 
designed to be used as 'checklists' for managing operational risks. All staff who contribute 
to the process must think 'outside the circle' particularly in the first phase of OR.M where 
risks are being identified. Where workshops are used, the selection of a range of people
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will help to remove risk bias and the skill of the facilitator in extracting the data from 
participants will be key to the success of the process.
The study found that the risk-mapping process itself is still relatively new within the banks 
studied. Once the risk map becomes a complete compendium of the operational risks faced 
by the banks, then the emphasis on the risk mapping process will move towards updating 
the risk profiles and capturing any new risks arising from, for example, major 
developments in the Business Unit and Financial Crises. As the ORM process matures, 
there is likely to be more emphasis placed on internal and external monitoring of the key 
risks and developments of the operational risk incident database. It is unlikely that a 
generic ORM framework will develop given the nature of those used in the banks studied 
and also the increasing developments in software applications for ORM. Of particular 
interest are the approaches at Gamma bank and Delta bank which request the risk to be 
documented in terms of event and causes.
"What we are trying to do is give the Business Unit Managers a structure which they can 
break down and understand more."
The author was unable to establish if the risk-mapping process had been applied carte 
blanche across the banks being studied. For example, have the operational risks within the 
Corporate Operational Risk Function been mapped? Is there a role for Internal Audit to 
play in completing this task (see section 5.5.1)? Have the operational risks in Internal Audit 
been mapped? The evidence in this study suggests that these aforementioned functions play
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a pivotal role in assisting operational management in managing their operational risks. If 
their work cannot be relied upon67 , a question mark must hang over the whole process.
5.4.2 The Role of the Operational Risk Function
The Operational Risk Managers, whether they operate at the Corporate or the Business 
Unit level, have an important role to play in maintaining an acceptable level of operational 
risk in the bank. The study found that the primary vehicle for arriving at this desired level 
was the implementation of an agreed action plan to mitigate the risk. If this is to be 
effective then a tracking procedure must be implemented. Gamma bank appeared to have 
the most comprehensive procedure.
"The tracking procedure is essentially through the operational risk manager being 
alert to action plans and delivery dates on these action plans and prompting business 
areas where they may have passed these dates with nothing happening or not 
enough happening. We here at the centre are also able to take an overview of how 
these plans are being progressed and are in a position to escalate them where 
necessary to Executive level."
Operational Risk Managers must recognise the growing importance that will be placed on 
managing this follow-up process.
The role of the Operational Risk Function appears to be well defined in the banks studied 
and there is a degree of commonality in the functions they undertake. Nevertheless, good 
open communication channels need to be maintained with other units such as Internal 
Audit.
67 Internal Audit were criticised over the Barings fiasco for not being resilient enough and Basel 11 found that 
Internal Audit was ineffective in many problem banking organisations.
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5.4.3 Quantification
As is evidenced by this study and the literature review, the measurement of operational risk 
remains the biggest challenge for banks. Basel II has proposed three methodologies in this 
regard. The Heads of Operational Risk from the four leading UAE commercial banks 
interviewed in this study have assumed responsibility for developing and installing an 
appropriate methodology. Seeing the benefits of quantification further down the lines 
within the Business Unit is open to question. There is evidence in this study that, 
sometimes, those at the 'sharp-end' of ORM see the quantification debate as irrelevant to 
them.
The implications, both from the research and literature, for the Operational Risk Function is 
that they are likely to have to bridge the gap between expectations of the regulators and the 
expectations of the bank.
5.5 Implications for the Internal Audit
5.5.1 The Role of the Internal Audit
"People take this comfort factor from saying Internal Audit are happy with the 
proposal."
The evidence from this study indicates that the Internal Audit function has an important 
role to play in the ORM, nevertheless, without direct involvement. As a function, it is 
charged with providing an independent opinion on the adequacy of the internal control
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environment, which is designed to mitigate all risks. It is not just interested in operational 
risk mitigation but in all forms of risk mitigation. Much of its focus will be on auditing the 
adequacy of internal controls for ORM.
One of Internal Audit's responsibilities is auditing the work of all the Operational Risk 
Managers and how effectively they do their jobs:
"...if you can't rely on operational risk management doing its job, all the reports 
that they produce for you are next to useless."
It could be argued that one of the most important risks a bank faces is having an inadequate 
ORM framework. The most logical unit that is in a position to form an opinion on this is 
the Internal Audit. Through its reporting line to the Audit Committee, it provides comfort 
to the Board that the ORM framework that is in place is adequate and appropriate for the 
needs of the bank. Basel II makes specific reference to the role of Internal Audit as being to 
conduct regular reviews of the ORM framework.
Whilst regular is not defined, it suggests that Internal Audit should plan to review the work 
of Operational Risk Function on an ongoing basis in order to help satisfy the bank and the 
regulatory requirements. Based upon the work undertaken in this study, the author has 
drawn up a checklist for use by Internal Audit when it reviews the work of the Operational 
Risk Function. This can be found in Appendix D.
The identical reporting lines of both the Corporate Operational Risk Function and the 
Internal Audit in three of the banks in this study are a potential source of difficulty. There
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are two reasons for this. Firstly, it could easily lead to confusion in the eyes of auditees 
about the precise roles and responsibilities of the two functions. Secondly, it compromises 
the independence of Internal Audit when it is reviewing the work of other Operational Risk 
Function (since both functions have the same reporting line). This is a matter that Senior 
Management should consider carefully, particularly in light of Basel II requirements, which 
requires the Board to continually review its Operational Risk Function scope of work, 
authority and resources. Basel II emphasises the fact that the Internal Audit has an 
important role to play in ORM; nevertheless, it should not assume the responsibility of 
ORM.
5.6 Proposed Operational Risk Mitigation Model
The main research problem that the study set out to answer was:
How do the UAE commercial banks mitigate their operational risk exposures?
In formulating this question, the author was interested to see how the current practice of 
operational risk mitigation compares to theoretical models and the expectations of the 
regulators. The Regulators (Basel II) have emphasised that they will continue working 
with the industry on risk mitigation concepts. Further, the author had some early 
discussions with one of the UAE regulators in the CBUAE, and it was apparent that their 
focus was on providing guidance on how to manage and measure operational risk.
Against this background, the remainder of this section discusses a proposed model on 
operational risk mitigation, how the move from implicit to explicit ORM in the UAE
271
commercial banks has affected the pre-mitigation and mitigation phases of the ORM model 
and what problems exist in mitigating operational risk.
Based on the evidence from this study, the following can be stated about OR mitigation:
1. There is no single best way to mitigate operational risk (based on contingency 
theory);
2. Managers mitigate operational risk by diagnosing the risk and selecting an 
appropriate mitigation tactic based on their internal environment (based on the 
theory of bounded rationality) and their own perception/knowledge of risk (based 
on prospects theory).
3. The action managers take to establish the correct implementation of a mitigation 
tactic should enable the organisation to guarantee its residual level of operational 
risk to be in line with the organisation's risk appetite (based on control theory).
4. The implementation of a mitigation tactic should lead to improvements to the 
internal control environment and a reduction in the level of operational risk (based 
on complexity theory).
5. Any mitigation actions should address first the cause of an operational risk and not 
only the event itself (based on complexity theory).
The author has argued that ORM in the UAE commercial banks has moved from being 
implicit to explicit. Such change in emphasis is important in building a model to illustrate 
the above conclusions because, whilst there are a number of key phases with implicit 
ORM, additional components may be added to demonstrate explicit ORM. The study has
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found that these components, however, are not just limited to the mitigation phase of ORM, 
but are also found in the pre-mitigation phases. Looking at the mitigation phase in isolation 
would not give the whole picture and the author has, therefore, proposed a model which 
considers all the phases and components.
The proposed model will be presented in two complementary parts in order to shed more 
light on the related components:
1. Core ORM framework - shown in Figure 15.
2. ORM model including implicit and explicit phases, with the Core ORM Framework 
embedded - shown in Figure 16.
Further, the resulting ORM cycle is depicted in Figure 17.
5.6.1 Proposed ORM Model
The analysis of the results in this study indicates that ORM is at the core of a bank's
operations, necessitating the integration of the ORM practices into all processes, systems 
and the bank's culture. The value of ORM is in supporting and challenging the Board to 
align the business control environment with the bank's strategy by measuring and 
mitigating operational risk exposure for optimal contribution to return for the stakeholders.
It further indicates that ORM keeps its people up-to-date on problems that have happened 
to other banks, allowing them to take a more proactive approach. The goal is to make the 
employees look at ORM as a business stakeholder and a shareholder, involve them at all
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levels and bring stability into their jobs. However, and to start with, a bank needs to 
implement an ORM framework that encompasses all sources of potential risks as outlined 
by Basel II (see section 2.3.4.2).
5.6.1.1 Proposed Core ORM Framework
As noted earlier, there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach to ORM framework since every
bank needs to follow a framework that is specific to its own internal operating 
environment. The implication is that there is no 'standard' standard. Ultimately, the 
operational risk framework should not merely be Basel-compliant; it should also provide 
the bank with mechanisms for improving the overall operational risk culture and behaviour 
towards ORM. Based on the analysis of the study results, the author proposes the Core 
ORM framework shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 15: Proposed Core ORM Framework
Risk Appetite | | Communication
Source: Developed by the author
The proposed Core ORM framework consists of the following core, main and other 
important components:
5.6.1.1.1 Core Components
• Governance: It is the process by which the Board defines key objectives for the 
bank and oversees progress towards achieving those objectives. It defines the 
overall operational risk culture in the organisation, and sets the tone as to how a 
bank implements and executes its ORM strategy. A successfully executed
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operational risk strategy often results in operational risk culture being firmly 
embedded in the vision, strategies, tools, and tactics of the organisation. 
Governance sets the precedence for Strategy, Structure and Execution.
• Strategy: A bank's strategy for operational risk drives the other components within 
the ORM framework and provides clear guidance on operational risk appetite or 
tolerance, policies, and processes for day-today ORM.
• Structure: When designing the ORM framework structure, the bank's overall 
operational risk scenario should serve as a guideline, including initiatives like 
laying down a hierarchical structure that leverages current operational risk 
processes and developing operational risk measurement models to assess regulatory 
capital vis-a-vis the actual operational risks confronted. Centralised aggregation of 
operational risk information collected across the organisation, further, provides 
useful insight for the desired hierarchical structure. The implementation of these 
concepts allows operational risks to be handled consistently throughout the 
organisation.
• Execution: Once the ORM framework structure has been established by an 
organisation, adequate procedures should be designed and implemented to ensure 
execution of and compliance with these policies at Business unit level. The first 
step includes identification of the operational risks inherent in the day-to-day 
processes of the bank. After the identification of the inherent operational risks, 
target tolerance limits of these risks should be established; an activity which is 
commonly accomplished by calculating the probability (estimation) of 
materialisation of the operational risks, by considering the drivers or causes of the
276
risks together with the assessment of their impact (evaluation). In the proposed 
ORM model, the estimation and evaluation will be referred to together as diagnosis. 
The result of the operational risk diagnosis process enables the bank management to 
compare the operational risks with the bank's operational risk strategy and policies, 
identify those operational risk exposures that are unacceptable to the bank or are 
outside its operational risk appetite, and select and prioritise appropriate 
mechanisms for mitigation selection and implementation.
5.6.1.1.2 Main Components
• Risk Appetite Strategy: A sound ORM framework ensures that the organisational 
behaviour is driven by its operational risk appetite. Adopting an operational risk 
strategy aligned to operational risk appetite leads to informed business and 
investment decisions.
• Communication: An organisation's top management must identify, assess, decide, 
implement, audit and supervise their strategic operational risks. There should be a 
strategic policy at the Board level to focus on managing operational risk at all levels 
and conscious efforts should be made to ensure that these policies are 
communicated at all levels and across the entire value chain.
• Periodic Evaluation Based on Internal and External Environments: A robust 
ORM framework puts the improvement of operational risk performance on a 
competitive level with other important mission concerns, while periodically 
evaluating the ORM performance goals in light of the internal and external factors.
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• Training: The development of a formal training programme with the emphasis on 
operational risk awareness is an important part of the bank's armoury in defending 
themselves against operational risks.
• Operational Risk Conscious Culture: An operational risk conscious culture must 
be integrated into the culture of the bank, and this will need to include mandate, 
leadership and commitment from the Board. The Board must translate risk strategy 
into operational objectives, and assign risk management responsibilities throughout 
the organisation. It should support accountability and reward, thus promoting ORM 
efficiency at all levels.
• Reporting (Disclosure) - External and Internal: A bank should publicly and 
internally, and in a timely fashion, disclose more detailed information about the 
process used to control their operational risks and the regulatory capital allocation 
technique they use. The financial reporting of risk is key to encouraging better risk 
management, helps reduce the cost of capital and provides enhanced reporting to 
investors.
• Key Risk Indicators and Loss Data: These are important tools that enable the 
bank to monitor operational risk in order to be more proactive in taking action 
before an operational risk manifests itself.
5.6.1.1.3 Other Important Components:
• Establishing effective linkage with credit risk and market risk managements
in order to manage the operational risks resulting from credit and market 
risks. There are operational processes involved in assessing the credit
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worthiness of an individual or organisation. Meanwhile, market risk 
managers analyse risk in multiple transactions after they have been taken. 
Both of these activities have their associated operational risks.
J Ensuring compliance with the regulatory requirements;
S Monitoring the macroeconomic conditions and business environment
S Conducting regular stress testing.
These components (section 5.2.4) play an important role in the overall ORM process in 
order to ensure that the operational risks are predicted, kept under control and mitigated 
in a timely manner.
5.6.1.2 Embedding the Core ORM Framework into the Proposed Overall ORM 
Model
The proposed ORM model with implicit and explicit phases is shown in Figure 16.
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Source: Developed by the author
The components of implicit ORM are shown as dark-shaded boxes along the horizontal line 
marked 'Phase'. These equate to the phases in the simple risk management model (see 
Figure 1) as per Table 34.
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Table 34: Phases of the Risk Management Models Compared













Source: Developed by the author
With the arrival of explicit ORM, the implicit components have been augmented by a 
number of additional components which are represented by further three horizontal lines:
• Process - the core operational risk framework is the driver behind the whole ORM 
effort and the processes are embedded within it;
• Elements - each of the phases has a number of distinct elements which act as the 
main driver for that phase;
• Result - there is an explicitly stated current level of operational risk and desired 
level of operational risk (risk appetite).
Turning to the two pre-mitigation phases:
1. Identification - the evidence from the study indicates that there is a combination of 
elements which support this phase. Operational risks are identified through the 
examination of internal and external events (incidents/losses) via a number of 
sources (workshops, questionnaires, and so on) specific to the bank;
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2. Diagnosis - the diagnosis of the risk is a crucial input into the mitigation phase and 
represents the assessment, which provides management with information pertinent 
to the current level and impact of risk. Kvidence from the study points to a number 
of elements being used to arrive at the diagnosis: the objectives of the Business 
Unit, the complexity of the risk, the risk appraisal (probability/impact), the current 
mitigants in place and the cross linkages that the risk may have to other risks.
Turning to the mitigation phase:
1. Selection - the decision phase when the manager examines the risk diagnosis and 
selects, from the options available to him, what action to take. The evidence from 
the study suggests that the elements that will influence his decision are the tactics 
available to him, the constraints imposed upon him by the bank, his own knowledge 
of ORM, and his knowledge of who may be able to help him to mitigate the risk;
2. Implementation - the evidence from the study indicates that this final phase, the one 
that guarantees the desired level of operational risk, is driven by the establishment 
of an action plan (based on the mitigation tactic selected), the use of adequate 
follow-up procedures and the ongoing monitoring of operational risk key risk 
indicators.
The reader will note that the model is in line with other decision-making models being a 
process for making logically sound decisions by following an orderly path from problem 
identification through to solution and is, therefore, well-rooted in existing theory (see 
Simon (1997) and Robins and Timothy (2008), section 2.2.3.)
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It is the opinion of the author that the development of an explicit system to manage and, 
therefore, mitigate operational risk should be based on a model of this type. The reader is 
again reminded that operational risk is a large and complex area and to reduce its 
management down to a few boxes in a model is not intended to trivialise the task ahead but 
merely to identify the building blocks from which a tailored solution to the bank's own 
particular circumstances may be constructed. The model represents core practice derived 
from four of the leading UAE commercial banks.
5.6.2 Operational Risk Management Cycle
Based on the proposed model, the resulting ORM cycle is depicted in Figure 17.
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Figure 17: Operational Risk Management Cycle
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Source: Developed by the author
Even with such a process in place, it should not be assumed that the universal remedy to 
ORM has been found. Drawing on the evidence from the four banks in this study, a number 
of issues relating to operational risk mitigation were noted:
1. The diagnosis of operational risk is not a straightforward process. In some cases 
there may be observed or historical information upon which the impact/probability 
appraisal may be carried out whilst in others there may be next to nothing, for 
example;
284
2. Any mitigation actions should address the cause of an operational risk and not only 
the event itself. Taking a simple example, having insufficient stocks of marketing 
material for customers should be due to lack of stock-checking procedures. In this 
case the solution is not to order more marketing material but to introduce improved 
stock checking controls;
3. Undertaking the cost/benefit analysis that is used to help decide on whether or not 
to mitigate a risk, is not always an easy task. For example, should the risks 
associated with web-site security breaches consider the reputational losses that the 
bank could suffer? If so, how should they be quantified?
4. Ensuring that managers are alert to the possibility of using help in mitigating an 
operational risk relies heavily on the individual judgement of the manager and his 
willingness to call for help. These types of factors may be difficult to manage 
because they rely on individual behaviours and personal relationships.
5.7 Summary and Conclusions about the Research Problem
This Chapter discussed the implications of the findings of the research for the bank 
management. Operational risk is a complex area and the problems inherent in managing it 
are spread across the whole of the bank's operational processes. Lessons leamt from this 
study of four major UAE commercial banks have been used to illustrate some of the issues 
that the bank management have to face in addressing how best to manage, and with it, 
mitigate operational risk. Implications for the organisation, operational management, the 
Operational Risk Function and Internal Audit were discussed.
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The starting point is the Board that must set the risk appetite not just for operational risk, 
but for all risks that the bank has to face. The Board is ultimately accountable for the 
operational risk exposures that the bank faces and although it delegates this responsibility 
to Operational Managers, it must retain a firm grip and understanding of what is already a 
fast evolving area.
The study found that the use of a Risk Management Committee to oversee operational risk 
is not consistent in the banks. Such Committee could be created as a sub-committee of the 
Board and could fulfill a number of roles in helping to manage and measure operational 
risk: matters of policy, overseeing key projects, mitigation actions which span business 
units and receiving regular reports on operational risk.
Credit risks could be added to this bouquet of activities, as there are operational processes 
involved in assessing the credit worthiness of an individual or organisation. Equally, 
market risk managers analyse risk in multiple transactions after they have been taken. Both 
of these activities have their associated operational risks. The inclusion of credit and 
market risks in the scope of the Risk Management Committee would help to ensure that all 
major risks in the bank are being managed.
The Risk Management Committee could also take an overall responsibility for the 
subsequent allocation of the capital set aside to Business Units, thus reflecting the amount 
of operational risk they are carrying. Further, the Risk Management Committee could help
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set the tone for ORM in the bank by ensuring that a consistent message is filtered down to 
the Business Unit.
The research found that there are two types of Operational Risk Manager in the banks 
studied: the Corporate Operational Risk Manager and the Business Unit Operational Risk 
Manager. The roles have been well defined and there is evidence that the two work closely 
together.
The existence of these roles in any organisation is confirmation of the explicit nature of 
ORM. They effectively add value by ensuring that the organisation manages the 
operational risks and not the other way round. Further, in focusing their attention on their 
operational risks, the managers must recognise the importance of working within a defined 
frame of reference. Specifically, this is likely to be the Business Unit objectives.
Some of the issues in ORM were identified. The research also identified the opportunities 
that exist with ORM, particularly the opportunity to challenge the amount of control that is 
being exercised in relation to the risks involved.
The focus of this research has been in the area of operational risk mitigation and a number 
of findings have implications to Operational Risk Managers. Firstly, recognising that there 
are a number of different ways to mitigate an operational risk, although the most common, 
treating the risk, is likely to be the most appropriate. Secondly, managers' decisions to
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mitigate will be constrained by a number of Factors inherent in the way the organisation 
works and their own perception of the risk and knowledge of what can be done. Thirdly, 
mitigation is one area where other specialist units can have an important role to play in 
advising and implementing on the most appropriate course of action. Fourthly, the decision 
taken on how the risk will be mitigated should include an agreed action plan which is 
capable of being monitored, as a basis for ensuring the desired level of residual risks is 
being achieved.
A checklist for mitigating operational risks has been drawn up by the author. This checklist 
is seen as an important contribution since it offers practical recommendations to improve 
existing practice and is of use not only to the banks in the study but to others who wish to 
enhance their risk mitigation process.
The research indicated that the development of a formal training programme with the 
emphasis on operational risk awareness could be an important part of the bank's armoury 
in defending themselves against operational risks. The author would, therefore argue that 
demonstrating a formal training programme would be a great asset for the banks when 
dealing with regulators.
The study found that the risk-mapping process itself is still relatively new within the banks 
studied. Once the risk map becomes a complete compendium of the operational risks faced 
by the banks, then the emphasis on the risk mapping process will move towards updating 
the risk profiles and capturing any new risks arising from, for example, major
developments in the Business Unit and Financial Crises. As the ORM process matures,
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there is likely to be more emphasis placed on internal and external monitoring of the key 
risks and developments of the operational risk incident database.
The Operational Risk Managers, whether they operate at the Corporate or the Business 
Unit level, have an important role to play in maintaining an acceptable level of operational 
risk in the bank. The study found that the primary vehicle for arriving at this desired level 
was the implementation of an agreed action plan to mitigate the risk, as cited above; 
however, the action plan needs to be coupled with an effective tracking procedure.
As is evidenced by this study and the literature review, the measurement of operational risk 
remains the biggest challenge for banks. There is evidence in this study that, sometimes, 
those at the 'sharp-end' of ORM see the quantification debate as irrelevant to them. The 
implication for the Operational Risk Function is that they are likely to have to bridge the 
gap between expectations of the regulators and the expectations of the bank.
The evidence from this study indicates that the Internal Audit function has an important 
role to play in the ORM, nevertheless, without direct involvement. As a function, it is 
charged with providing an independent opinion on the adequacy of the internal control 
environment, which is designed to mitigate all risks.
Based upon the work undertaken in this study, the author has drawn up a checklist for use 
by Internal Audit when it audits the work of the Operational Risk Function.
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Based on the evidence from this study, some operational risk mitigation conclusions were 
drawn. These conclusions were associated with the theoretical foundation discussed in the 
literature review: contingency theory (section 2.1.2), bounded rationality theory (section 
2.2.4), prospects theory (section 2.3.3) and control theory (section 2.3.4.4.1). Emphasis is 
placed on the fact that any mitigation action should address first the cause of an operational 
risk and not only the event itself.
The study found that operational risk is the common denominator between credit, market 
and operational risks; as operational processes exist in both market and credit risk 
transactions. However, developing an integrated risk management approach across credit, 
market and operational risk could be difficult to achieve because of the inherent differences 
in the nature of the three risks and ways in which they need to be managed and, therefore, 
mitigated. On the other hand, the study also indicated that everybody in the organisation 
has a role to play in ORM since it exists in every procedure used in the bank. This suggests 
that an integrated form of ORM is an objective worthy of further consideration. The drivers 
behind an integrated ORM were identified and used to propose an ORM framework.
The study has found that the implicit and explicit components of ORM are not just limited 
to the mitigation phase of ORM, but are also found in the pre-mitigation phases, and the 
author has, therefore, proposed a model which considers all the phases and components. 
The model consists of a 'Core' part (focusing on governance, strategy, structure and 
execution and other components) and an overall ORM model with the "Core 1 embodied,
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including the implicit and explicit components, employing the integrated ORM drivers 
concluded from this study.
Based on the proposed overall ORM model, the resulting ORM cycle was concluded. 
However, even with such a process in place, it should not be assumed that the universal 
remedy to ORM has been found.
To conclude, sound corporate governance should be at the heart of the ORM framework; 
with well designed strategy, structure and execution processes. Appropriate operational risk 
mitigation and internal control procedures should be established by the business units such 
that residual operational risks are mitigated to the acceptable level. Regular reviews must 
be carried out, to analyse the control environment and test the effectiveness of implemented 
controls, thereby ensuring that the business operations are conducted within acceptable 
operational risk limits. It is essential that the Board ensures consistent monitoring and 
controlling of operational risks, and that operational risk information is received by the 
appropriate people, on a timely basis, in a form and format that will aid in the monitoring 
and control. Stress testing and operational risk Key Risk Indicators should be established to 
ensure timely warning is received prior to the occurrence of an event. Key to effective 
KRI's lies in setting the threshold at the acceptable level of operational risk. The execution 
and implementation of an integrated ORM framework is key to setting up effective ORM 
environment ensuring that the business is conducted within appropriate operational risk 
tolerance limits.
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The final word in this section is left with one of the managers interviewed and his view on 
the value of ORM.
"The real value of what is emerging with operational risk management is the 
recognition that it is not wrong to have an operational risk exposure, as long as you 
understand it and can say it's not cost effective to the business to introduce more 
controls."
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6. SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH
6.1 Summary of the Research
Operational risk is a new topic in the UAl: commercial banking industry and this research 
examined the management of operational risk specifically in the UAH commercial banks. 
The study was focused on the mitigation phase of ORM where a number of key issues were 
reviewed: the responsibility for operational risk mitigation; the tactics that were used to 
mitigate an operational risk and the barriers that existed when deciding upon an appropriate 
operational risk mitigation strategy. The subject is highly topical in the UAE banking 
industry because of the regulatory requirements vis-a-vis operational risks that were 
proposed by Basel II, the Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis. The research looked at 
operational risk from the perspective of the Risk Manager, the Operational Manager in the 
Business Unit and the Internal Auditor and may thus be described as inter-disciplinary.
The literature review in Chapter 2 provided a high level overview of some of the theoretical 
propositions and current issues in the areas of Management and Organisation, Banking, and 
Internal Audit that are of relevance to ORM. ORM has become an important issue for the 
regulators and the banks themselves in each of these areas. Basel II accord, the upcoming 
Basel III and the regulatory regime were discussed in Chapter 2 along with a review of the 
theory in the generic area of risk management, with a section dedicated to operational risk. 
An important distinction was made between the management of operational risk and the 
measurement of operational risk, both of which are seen as important by the regulators.
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One of the drivers of this research was the early discovery by the author that little academic 
research had been done in the area of operational risk for financial services organisations in 
the UAE. On top of this, the regulators had begun to apply pressure on the UAE 
commercial banks to effectively manage operational risk and the Internal Audit profession 
was also moving their audit approach towards being 'risk based'. These were the initial 
impetuses for the research, and further endorsement was given by the Financial Crisis and 
Dubai Crisis, which have moved operational risk towards the top of the agenda for bank 
management.
The research design is described in Chapter 3. A case study approach was adopted as 
offering the best opportunity to answer the research questions. The design is qualitative and 
is based upon well-established techniques for case study research, particularly when the 
topic is new, the area has had no prior research (relating to the UAE commercial banking 
industry) and the research aims to build a model. Four cases were selected for study. Each 
case represents an example of a major player in the UAE commercial banking arena, a 
point that was important in the selection criteria, as the research was targeted at 
establishing best practices by looking at industry leaders.
The major findings of the research, summarised in Chapter 4, are that all of the banks in 
this study are developing their ORM frameworks in accordance with the requirements of 
the Basel II Accord. There remains much to be done, however, on the measurement side of 
operational risk with all of the banks being in the embryonic stages of development. The
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study found that a risk-mapping framework was present in all banks though the system was 
being piloted in one at the time the work was carried out.
The phases within the frameworks were found to be consistent with the literature although 
there are a number of variations in the modus operandi and the documentation produced 
reflecting the tailored development of these frameworks and the individual preferences of 
the banks. All the frameworks were used to manage as opposed to measure operational 
risk.
Turning specifically to operational risk mitigation and the focus of this study, the findings 
indicate that the mitigation process for an operational risk varies from a simple 
improvement to an internal control procedure to the complexity of establishing a project 
team to resolve the matter. There was general agreement that the barriers or constraints to 
mitigating operational risk are driven by either cost or ignorance. Whilst the issue of cost is 
unsurprising, more worrying is 'ignorance' or lack of awareness of operational risk. One of 
the key ways to improve this is through training and the study found whilst there was 
widespread support for the development of formal training, very little had actually taken 
place.
The study has made a number of important contributions which may be summarised as 
follow:
• Operational risk is acknowledged as being under researched in the UAE
commercial banking industry and the study has helped to chart and clarify some of
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the practical applications of ORM processes as well as proposing a model for the 
management of operational risks;
• Whilst the study focused on the UAE commercial banks, the findings and
implications of the research have international applications because BCBS, as the 
primary regulator in this area, is an international organisation responsible for 
setting, and ensuring compliance with, bank regulations;
• The operational risk that contributed to the Financial Crises, how these risks were 
mitigated and what should be done to prevent recurrence of these crises, from the 
perspective of the UAE commercial banking industry, were investigated. This is an 
important contribution and has implications in the UAE and at international level.
• The results of the study suggest that in some areas of operational risk mitigation the 
process is still immature in the UAE commercial banks. For example, the mitigation 
of operational risks which span the business units had no well defined and accepted 
process. This is an important contribution and provides the impetus for carrying out 
further targeted research;
• Current practices are defined in the research, and the checklist emerging from these 
practices provides practical advice and prescriptive recommendations about what 
can be done to mitigate an operational risk exposure;
• The evidence from the study suggests that Internal Audit role, another area which is 
acknowledged as being under-researched, is a crucial element in the management of 
operational risk. However, the Internal Audit shall not be responsible for ORM. The 
high level review document for auditing the Operational Risk Function is based on
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the findings of the study and contributes to the independent appraisal of the function 
required by Basel II;
• Studying the ORM process should assist banks to reduce their exposures and help 
to promote a more risk aware climate, where losses are minimised and cash flow 
enhanced;
• The study contributes to a better understanding of the risk management processes 
required and demanded under reporting initiatives, particularly in the UAE context 
with the CBUAE requirements;
• Methodologically, the study increases and contributes to the growing repository of 
case study research programmes in the generic area of risk management.
Practicing managers, whether they are in Risk Management, operational Management or 
Internal Audit should benefit from a number of the implications arising from the research. 
This in turn should lead to improvements at the organisational level as the firm becomes 
more aware of the causes of operational risk and the potential effects that they could have if 
adequate mitigation strategies are not put in place.
6.2 Limitations of the Research
One of the main limitations of the research was the lack of prior research in the area of 
operational risk in the UAE commercial banks due to the embryonic nature of the subject in 
the UAE. The author had to mainly revert to available literature on operational risk 
although it was not directly related to the UAE commercial banking industry.
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Operational risk in banking is a sensitive subject and access to individual bank data is 
difficult, specifically in the UAE where reputational issues can be a major concern. Also, 
confidentiality of the subject makes replication of the studies more difficult.
The broad nature of operational risk means that not all contextual factors have been 
considered in depth. For example, the use of IT support systems to manage and mitigate 
operational risk was not discussed thoroughly with the interviewees. This is, however, seen 
as a fruitful area for further research.
6.3 Suggestions for Further Research
There are a number of areas that the author has cited in the thesis that could usefully be 
examined by further research studies.
The use of qualitative techniques to develop the ORM model meant that further research 
could be undertaken to generalise the findings. This generalisation could be done across the 
broad area of financial services in the UAE or, alternatively, could be done across a broader 
spectrum of banks (such as Islamic banks). The replication of the study in this way would 
provide valuable insights into how the financial service industry as a whole is tackling 
ORM and mitigation.
The establishment of operational risk units and the systems that support them are still in the 
early days but further work could usefully be carried out on the costs involved. How much 
are banks willing to spend? How was the expenditure thus far incurred justified? What do
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managements perceive the expected benefits to be of their investment in ORM? Is the cost 
merely viewed as another regulatory cost?
There is an opportunity to explore further the relationship between ORM (the art) and 
operational risk measurement (the science). In theory there should be a high degree of 
correlation between the two, i.e. the better the management the lower the figure for 
quantified operational risk, and vice versa. This presents a particularly interesting 
opportunity for further research.
The relationship between operational risk and shareholder value presents an opportunity for 
further study. A capital charge for operational risk will have an effect on the required rate 
of return and, by definition, the value that may be created or destroyed. The explicit nature 
of ORM should, in theory, improve an organisation's cash flow by reducing potential 
losses thus providing a direct benefit to shareholder value. Additionally, if more explicit 
disclosure on how operational risks are being managed are presented in the Annual Report, 
then it would suggest that the market is 'better informed' about the organisation, a fact that 
should be taken into account in setting the share price.
The effective use of IT packages and Decision Support Systems in ORM systems is an area 
still under development where an important contribution could be made. It is important to 
establish how these systems are developed in banks and other financial services 
organisations and to what use they are being put. The integration of a system, which is able
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to both 'manage' and in some way 'measure' the risks, would provide a significant step 
forward in the future management of operational risk.
The personal characteristics, skills and experience of individuals who have to manage 
operational risk present an opportunity for further study. These factors are important points 
to recognise, since ultimately it is people who have to manage operational risk in an 
organisation.
Mobile banking (mBanking) is a new trend in the UAE commercial banks. There is one 
drawback; that is, with technology comes risk and in particular operational risk that needs 
to be addressed as early as possible. The literature review reveals that operational risks in 
mBanking have not been researched and, hence, can be an interesting area for future 
research.
The need to better understand bank risk-taking incentives and the implications of adopting 
new products and processes, as well as the need to better understand the relationship 
between competition and risk are under researched areas and recommended for further 
research.
The literature review revealed that there is notable clustering of cases of bank failure (in a 
country) around a few years rather than an even spread over time. The presence of clusters 
could be an indicator that the state of the macro economy is a contributory factor in bank 
failures. This presents an interesting opportunity for further research.
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Stress testing applied to the UAE commercial banks is an area that has not been explored. 
The testing is conducted under assumptions of deteriorating economic conditions, such as 
low Gross Domestic Product, higher unemployment rate and lower real estate prices. The 
purpose of the test is to ensure that banks have enough capital to survive.
Finally, BCBS published its third Capital Accord in December 2010: "International 
Frame\vorkfor Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring- Basel III" in 
response to the deficiencies in the financial regulation revealed by the Global Financial 
Crisis from liquidity risk perspective. The enforcement of Basel III and the consequent 
implications for ORM can be an interesting area for further nature research.
301
APPENDICES
Appendix A: The Credit Card Fraud Case - a Case Study
This incident is useful to examine because it is in the public domain, has a significant 
impact and provides a perfect opportunity to examine the mitigating tactic used.
The data for this case study has been obtained from one of the managers interviewed and 
the press (GulfNews, Sep. 16, 2008 issue, and critical incident number 1 cited in Appendix 
O and illustrates an operational risk that affected the public who used credit cards issued 
by some of the UAE commercial banks in 2008. This incident represents an operational 
risk, where the final cost was estimated at hundreds of millions of AED.
Introduction
In 2008, some of the UAE commercial banks noted excessive international use of 
customers' credit cards, coupled with some customer complaints that their credit card 
statements were carrying sums that were not used by them. Upon contacting samples of the 
customers whose cards have been excessively used, it turned out that most of these 
customers neither left UAE nor used their credit cards internationally. The Authorities and 
regulators were called upon to investigate the situation. The results of the investigation 
revealed that the concerned credit cards were hacked as follows:
A customer uses his credit cards via his Personal Identification Number (PIN) to access his 
account details, withdraw cash and make purchases at an Automatic Transaction Machines 
(ATM) or a Points of Sale (POS). The ATM or POS communicates with computers on a 
network used by the banks to execute the transaction.
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1. The computers on the network process the information sent to them from the ATM 
or POS to locate the bank that the account belongs to, verify that the customer is 
authorised to access the account and execute the transaction.
2. Hackers break into the network and insert programmes which capture the 
customer's account information and PIN while being processed.
3. Using the captured information, hackers duplicate the credit card to withdraw cash 
and make purchases on the customer's accounts.
The incident illustrates the 'External Fraud' type of the operational risks as classified by 
Basel II. The scale and complexity of the problem meant that the Authorities, the 
Regulators and the Banks themselves all became involved in the actions that followed. 
These actions, which have fallen principally on the banks involved, have necessitated a 
complete review of the banks' networks and computer technicalities with compensation 
payments made where customers lost money due to this kind of external fraud.
What are the operational risks involved?
With the benefit of hindsight, it was very easy to be wise about the operational risks that 
were either not identified or identified and ignored, i.e. no appropriate mitigation action 
was taken. From the data that has been collected on this case the following appear to have 
been the key operational risks that ultimately led to the external fraud being highlighted: 
1. Banks involved did not comply with the IT safety recommendations related to using 
advanced anti-hacking programmes (firewalls);
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2. Banks involved did not have a mechanism to verify the international transaction 
with the credit card holder at the time of transaction execution; 
3. There was an emphasis on producing quantity of business (credit card holders were 
incentivised to excessively use their credit cards internationally); 
4. Supervisory controls within the banks involved were ineffective in detecting the 
problem at an earlier stage. 
Another important operational risk to emerge has been the reputational risk of the banks 
involved. Only time will tell if public confidence in using credit cards internationally has 
been permanently dented by the debacle. 
Mitigating the risks involved 
Much of the work done on the credit card fraud case has been concerned with 
compensating affected customers (Take the risk). Further, the following mitigants (Treat 
the risk) were employed: 
1. Temporary restriction of international ATM and POS usage by credit cards. 
2. Deployment of powerful anti-hacker firewalls on all concerned computers and 
networks. 
3. Immediate cancellation and replacement of the involved credit cards. 
4. Establishment of setups by the banks to verify the credibility of international credit 
card transactions (by calling the concerned user or sending him a short message on 
his mobile phone at the time of the transaction.) 
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The involvement of so many high profile players has meant that some mitigating actions 
are almost being imposed on the Business Unit Managers. The tactics are, therefore, aimed 
at risk reduction, specifically looking at reducing the probability of the event recurring.
Given the current estimates of this fraud case (AED 300 million), it is one example of an 
operational risk that cannot be allowed to happen again.
Table 35: Credit Card Fraud Critical Incident Data Analysis vs. Study Data Analysis









• The operational risk in this incident is included in the 
definition of operational risk.
Operational Risk Management in the Organisation
• Operational Risk Managers operate in the Business Units.
The Role of the Operational Risk Management Function
• The Corporate Operational Risk Function was not involved in 
this incident since the core responsibilities of the Corporate 
Operational Risk Function are: policy setting, aggregation of 
operational risk profile, high level reporting, assurance, 
framework setting, operational risk measurement and loss data 
maintenance.
Operational Risk Management Techniques
• The banks use an ORM framework.
Operational Risk Identification
• The responsibility for operational risk identification rests with 
the people who manage the processes and systems. 
• The main data sources to identify operational risks are the skill 
and experience of the people involved in the identification 
process. 
• Operational risks identification and appraising are done 
simultaneously. 
• Frequent monitoring of both potential operational risk sources 
to assess existing operational risks. 
• The Audit Function was not involved in this incident since the 
Audit Function may provide valuable input to those 
responsible for ORM, but does not have direct ORM 
responsibilities.


















• Operational risk estimation and evaluation are done 
concurrently. 
• The output from each phase has a different emphasis with one 
focusing on probabilities (estimation) and the other on at least 
financial impact (evaluation). 
• The responsibility for operational risk appraisal rests with the 
Managers in the Business Units. 
• The operational risk appraisal process is subjective or 
judgemental assessment of the probability and impact of the 
risk. 
• The main data source to appraise operational risks is the 
experience of the people involved in the process.
Operational Risk Mitigation
Responsibility for Operational Risk Mitigation
• The responsibility for operational risk mitigation rests with the 
Managers in the Business Units.
Operational Risk Mitigation - Exploring the Tactics Used
• The main operational risk mitigation tactics used are: 
'Terminate', 'Treat', 'Take' and 'Transfer'.
Operational Risk Mitigation - Deciding What to Do
• The Managers in Business Units are responsible for deciding 
the mitigation tactic to deploy. 
• The process used in the selection of the appropriate mitigation 
tactic is informal and based upon the nature of the risk 
involved.
Operational Risk Mitigation - Barriers Faced by Management
• The main operational risk mitigation barriers are cost, resource, 
ignorance, customer reaction and reputation.
Operational Risk - Quantification and Training
Quantification
• The responsibility for operational risk quantification rests with 
the Corporate Operational Risk Function.
Training








Key: Y = Yes, the critical incident tallies with the data analysis results of the study. 
N = No, the critical incident data does not tally with the data analysis of the study.
Source: Developed by the author
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Appendix B to the Case Study Protocol 
Appendix Bl: Semi-structured Interview Questions
Notes:
1. The questions in normal type were the main questions, whilst those in small type 
were supplements to the main questions.
2. The type in italics were 'triggers' drawn up by the author and were used as prompts, 
where necessary, to try and elicit a response.
PART 1: A
What is operational risk?
1. What is the bank's definition of operational risk?
2. Is the definition documented?
3. Who approved the definition of operational risk? Based on what?
(Board, Executive Committee. Audit Committee. Risk Management Committee. Other Committee - 
Which? Individual - Who?)
4. Which risks are included in your definition of operational risk (define each type)?
Internal fraud.
External fraud.
Employment practices and workplace safety.
Clients, products and business practice.
Damage to physical assets.
Business disruption and systems failures.






5. What do you know the history of operational risk and how the term came about?
6. How was operational risk managed in the past in your bank?
7. Do you have any idea how much your bank spends on managing operational risk Cost of the 
department, training, consultants, etc ?
8. What do you think about what the regulators are trying to do with operational risk?
(Valuing operational risk, liaison with them, etc.)
9. Does your operational risk unit have terms of reference? Could I have a copy?
10. In terms of impact, do major operational risks have an owner to focus management
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attention? 
11. Why was the operational risk unit established and how was the structure determined?
PART 1: B
The Risk Management Framework
Risk Identification: is the process of perceiving hazards, identifying failures and
recognising adverse consequences.
1. Who is responsible for identifying operational risk exposures?
2. Is this responsibility clearly laid out in their job function?
3. Describe the process by which operational risks are identified.
(physical inspection, check lists, flow-charts, audit reporting. Management reporting, incident 
reporting)
4. How frequently are these processes used?
Risk Estimation: is the process of estimating risk probabilities, describing the risk, 
quantifying the risk.
5. Does the bank estimate operational risk exposures?
6. Who is responsible for estimating operational risk exposures?
7. What approach is used?
8. What is your roadmap for AMA implementation?
9. Describe the process by which operational risks are estimated.
10. Are there set criteria used to assess the exposure?
11. What data is used to estimate the risk?
12. Are the benefits of accepting the risk examined?
13. How is the risk judged as being acceptable or otherwise?
Risk Evaluation: is the process of evaluating the impact of the risk, judging 
acceptability of the risk, comparing risks against benefits.
14. Does the bank evaluate the impact of operational risk exposures?
15. Who is responsible for evaluating the impact of operational risk exposures?
16. Describe the process by which operational risks are evaluated.
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17. Are there set criteria used to assess the impact?
18. What data is used to evaluate the impact?
PART 2: A
Who mitigates operational risk?
1. What is the organisational structure of the bank?
2. Are there clearly identifiable business units?
3. What is the level of autonomy?
4. Within this structure who mitigates operational risk?
5. What is the structure of the Risk Management Unit?
6. Do they have approved Terms of reference?
7. Do they mitigate operational risk?
8. What is the structure of the Internal Audit unit?
9. Do they have approved Terms of reference?
10. Do they mitigate operational risk?
11. Are External Consultants used to mitigate operational risk?
12. Why and when are External Consultants used?
13. Are other internal Units used to mitigate operational risk?
14. How do the areas included in the definition of operational risk relate to the Units 
responsible for mitigation - Who mitigates what?
15. To what extent will the Business Unit Management call upon additional support given 
the pressures they are under? 
When an operational risk exposure is identified what tactics are used to mitigate the
risk? 
Avoidance (i.e. making the occurrence of the event impossible)?
a) Under what circumstances avoidance would be used?
b) Establish the types of risks that are/ have been mitigated this way (e.g. deliberately withdrawing
from a market because the operational risks involved are considered to be too great) 
Reduction/Suppression (Le. reducing the likelihood of occurrence of the event and/or reducing eventual 
loss)?
a) Under what circumstances would risk reduction/suppression be used?
b) Establish whether the following tactics are used:
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(Improving internal control procedures, redesigning the processes involved, training, separation of 
Personnel, ongoing monitoring (audil/compliance/reviews). improved reporting systems, external 
advice .improving qualin standards) 
Assumption/Retention (i.e. accepting the likelihood of the occurrence of the event and undertaking no
mitigating actions)?
a) Under what circumstances would risk assumption/retention be used? Is there a 
monetary limit used to guide the decision?
b) Establish the types of risks that are/ have been mitigated in this way (e.g. level of loss and
probability of occurrence is considered to be low) 
Insurance (i.e. accepting the likelihood of the occurrence of the event but reducing the
eventual loss by transferring the risk)?
a) Under what circumstances would risk insurance be used?
b) Establish the types of risks that are/have been mitigated this way (e.g. business interruption risks
are frequently insured) 
Combinations (of the above techniques)?
a) Under what circumstances would a combination of techniques be used?
b) Establish the types of risks that are/have been mitigated this way (e.g. risks mitigated through the
establishment of a captive insurance company) 
Others?
a) Under what circumstances would other techniques be used?
b) Establish the type of risks that are/have been mitigated in this way.
16. How are the mitigation tactics chosen and put into action?
17. Who decides the action to be taken?
18. Why is that person/function responsible for making the decision?
19. What procedures are in place to select a course of action? (Is OpVAR used as part of the data for 
making a decision?)
20. What procedures are in place to implement a course of action?
21. How do you ensure that the mitigation tactic is working?
22. What follow up procedures are in place?
23. Who carries out the follow- procedures?
24. Why is that person/function responsible for carrying out the follow-up procedure?
25. If the mitigation tactic is not deemed to be working satisfactorily, what procedures are
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in place to correct this?
26. Does that person/function carrying up the follow-up work have the authority to enforce changes?
27. How frequently are follow-up reviews undertaken?
28. What are the barriers to mitigating operational risk?
Political barriers: Organisational inertia, culture, risk maturit\:
Economic - Lack of cash, lack of other resources, impact on the bottom line.
Ignorance - Staff training. Inadequate communication about risk exposures. "It will not happen to us "
syndrome, unawareness of possible options.
Others - Practicality of the tactic involved, effect on the internal organisation - resistance to changing 
practices, effect on the external environment - reputation could he harmed. Government regulations, 
monitorability of the required action, required action not deemed to be effective in the timescale involved, 
(for example, because of changing environmental circumstances.)
PART 2: B
Critical Incidents: A recent example of an operational risk incident.
1. Who was involved in the discussions about how to solve it?
2. What actions were considered to mitigate the risk?
3. Who decided on what action to take?
4. Why did that person decide?
5. Why were certain tactics rejected?
6. How successful has the mitigation action been?
7. How was it followed up?
8. How representative is this incident of the risk mitigation process within the business?
9. Do you have any other examples of where the risk mitigation action was different?
10. Why was a different action taken?
Note: Discuss the credit card fraud case as a fall back example.
PART 3
The Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis
1. Could you predict the Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis? How can the recurrence of 
these Financial Crises be predicted and mitigated in a timely manner?
2. What are the operational risks that contributed to the Financial Crisis and Dubai
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Crisis?
3. What is the impact of the Financial Crises on your bank?
4. How were the operational risks that contributed to the Financial Crisis and Dubai 
Crisis mitigated in your bank?
5. Have you conducted stress testing in your bank? Are you planning for stress testing?
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AppendixB2: Coding System
Operational Risk Case Studies - Coding System
I ARE A
Internal Organisation
10: Operational Risk Definition
10: Operational Risk AREAS
10: Risk Management Structures


















Definitions of operational risk that are 
used by the banks
Areas that are included within the 
definition
Comments/perceptions relating to the 
bank's risk management structure
Comments/perceptions relating to the 
bank's risk management policy
Comments/perceptions relating to the 
bank's organisational structure
General information about the 
bank/risk management that helps to 
put the study into context
Comments relating to risk 
management training within the 
organisation
Current strategies for dealing with risk 
management within the organisation
Information relating to the use of a risk 









Comments on responsibility for 
operational risk identification
Information on the sequence of events 










Comments on responsibility for 
operational risk evaluation
Information to the sequence of events 
that lead to operational risk being 
evaluated








Information on the use of 
quantification risk measurement 
techniques
Indications of the ways of thinking that 
caused a decision on operational risk 











Comments on responsibility for 
operational risk estimation
Information on the sequence of events 
that lead to the impact of the 
operational risks being estimated
Types of data used in the operational 
risk estimation process
Indications of the ways of thinking that 
caused a decision on operational risk 



















Comments on the Business Unit role in 
operational risk mitigation
Comments on the Internal Audit role 
in operational risk mitigation
Comments on the Risk Management 
role in operational risk mitigation
Comments on the External Consultants 
role in operational risk mitigation
Comments on role of other internal 
units in operational risk mitigation
Information describing the collective 
way in which operational risk is 
mitigated
Information on the barriers to 
mitigating operational risk
Reported incidents on operational risk







Evidence to support avoidance being 
used as an operational risk mitigation 
tactic
Evidence to support 












operational risk mitigation tactic
Evidence to support 
assumption/retention being used as an 
operational risk mitigation tactic
Evidence to support insurance being 
used as an operational risk mitigation 
tactic
Evidence to support combination of 
the above being used as an operational 
risk mitigation tactic
Evidence to support other techniques 
being used as an operational risk 
mitigation tactic




















Comments on who decides on the 
course of action to be taken when an 
operational risk is being mitigated
Information relating to the process of 
selecting a suitable mitigation tactic.
Information relating to the process 
used in implementing a selected 
mitigation tactic
Information relating to the subsequent 
follow-up of implemented operational 
risk mitigation decisions
Noteworthy quotations for responsible 
use in the report
Comments related to the regulators 
including their role in operational risk 
mitigation








Information about the decision maker 
in the critical incident
Information concerning the action 
taken in the critical incident
















Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis.
Comments on the prevention of the 
recurrence of the Financial Crisis and 
Dubai Crisis.
Comments on the operational risks that 
contributed to the Financial Crisis and 
Dubai Crisis.
Comments on the impact of the 
Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis on 
banks.
Comments on the mitigation of the 
Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis.
Comment on stress testing.
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Appendix B3: Case Study Report
Case Study Report: Bank Alpha
Bank Specific Details
Name of the bank 
Number of branches 
Established
Net profit for the year 2009 
Net profit for year 2010 
Total Assets for year 209. 
Total Assets for year 2010. 
Number of employees 
OR current approach
Alpha








Introduction: Operational risk is an area that is not researched in the UAE, and is of 
growing importance to financial institutions because of regulatory requirements. The 
study examines an uncharted area in the UAE with a practical orientation towards 
managing operational risk on a day-to-day basis. The researcher aims at building 
a research model that would be of interest and use to policymakers, regulators and 
those in charge of the banking corporate governance, hi particular, this model is 
expected to contribute to the area of operational risk mitigation in the banking sector.
How do the UAE commercial banks mitigate their operational risk exposures?
Definition of Operational Risk
Source of definition Adapted Basel 11
Specific risk exclusions Market, credit
Level of understanding Good
Operational Risk Management in the Organisation
Corporate OR unit reporting lines Group Risk
Internal Audit reporting lines Group Risk
Relationship: OR vs. Internal Audit Very close
Size of Corporate OR Unit 5 persons
Establishment of Corporate OR Unit 2008
Use of Business Unit ORM Developing.4 Persons
Business Unit ORM reporting lines Local Management
Relationship: Business Unit ORM vs. Corporate OR unit Close
OR Committee No
Other OR roles None
itole of Corporate Operational Risk Function
'olicy setting Yes
Monitoring function Implicit in role
Scope of role All operational risks
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Custodians of the framework
Assurance on 'key' risks
Aggregating OR's
Mitigating OR's which span the Business Unit
Maintenance of loss data base
Corporate Operational Risk Unit
Corporate Operational Risk Unit
works with Business Unit ORM














Key risk indicators (KRl's)
Yes










































































Probability. 1 - 5 scale 



















Complexity of risk 

























Mitigation - Barriers __________ ———— ,
Main barriers 
————— ________^—— ̂ =^= ==————— =
Mainly Business Unit 
Scale of risk 




Nature of risk 
Priorities 
Amount of work 
Others involved
Informal at Business 
Unit level



























Operational Risk and the Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis
The Financial Crises were predictable
Recurrence Prevention Measures
Operational Risks that Contributed to the Financial Crises
The Impact of the Financial Crises on the UAE Commercial Banks










Large credit growth 
Reactive ORM 
strategies 




Bad debt accumulation 
Lack of liquidity for 
lending 
Loss in asset value 
Loss of faith in the 
banking system 
Withdrawal of foreign 
depositors' money







Not done yet. 
Planned during the 
next year.
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Case Study Report: Bank Beta
Bank specific Details
Name of the bank 
Number of branches 
Established
Net profit for the year 2009 
Net profit for year 2010 
Total Assets for year 209. 
Total Assets for year 2010. 
Number of employees 
OR current approach
Beta








Introduction: Operational risk is an area that is not researched in the UAE, and is of 
growing importance to financial institutions because of regulatory requirements. The 
study examines an uncharted area in the UAE with a practical orientation towards 
managing operational risk on a day-to-day basis. The researcher aims at building 
a research model that would be of interest and use to policymakers, regulators and 
those in charge of the banking corporate governance. In particular, this model is 
expected to contribute to the area of operational risk mitigation in the banking sector.
How do the UAE commercial banks mitigate their operational risk exposures?







Operational Risk Management in the Organisation
Corporate OR unit reporting lines
Internal Audit reporting lines
Relationship: OR vs. Internal Audit
Size of Corporate OR Unit
Establishment of Corporate OR Unit
Use of Business Unit ORM
Business Unit ORM reporting lines











Part of risk committee
None
Role of Corporate Operational Risk Function
Policy setting ________ —————————
Monitoring function ____ _________
Scope of role _____________ ————








Mitigating OR's which span the Business Unit
Maintenance of loss data base
Corporate Operational Risk Unit works with Business Unit ORM














































































































Complexity of risk 
Cost effectiveness 
Potential impact 



























Mainly Business Unit 
Scale of risk 
Cost benefit 




Nature of risk 
Current controls 
Tracking





















Worth doing, but still 









Operational Risk and the Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis
The Financial Crises were predictable
Recurrence Prevention Measures
Operational Risks that Contributed to the Financial Crises
The Impact of the Financial Crises on the UAE Commercial Banks










Large credit growth 
Reactive ORM 
strategies 




Bad debt accumulation 
Lack of liquidity for 
lending 
Loss in asset value 
Loss of faith in the 
banking system 
Withdrawal of foreign 
depositors' money







Not done yet. 
Planned during the 
next year.
324
Case Study Report: Bank Gamma
Bank Specific Details
Name of the bank 
Number of branches 
Established 
Net profit for the year 2009 
Net profit for year 20 10 
Total Assets for year 209. 
Total Assets for year 20 10. 
Number of employees 
OR current approach
(iamma 
79 in UAI-: and 9 international 
I96K 
A I-D 3.1 billion 
AI-D 3.7 billion 




Introduction: Operational risk is an area that is not researched in the UAE, and is of 
growing importance to financial institutions because of regulatory requirements. The 
study examines an uncharted area in the UAE with a practical orientation towards 
managing operational risk on a day-to-day basis. The researcher aims at building 
a research model that would be of interest and use to policymakers, regulators and 
those in charge of the banking corporate governance. In particular, this model is 
expected to contribute to the area of operational risk mitigation in the banking sector.
How do the UAE commercial banks mitigate their operational risk exposures?





Market, credit, strategic, 
reputational
Good
Operational Risk Management in the Organisation
Corporate OR unit reporting lines
Internal Audit reporting lines
Relationship: OR vs. Internal Audit
Size of Corporate OR Unit
Establishment of Corporate OR Unit
Use of Business Unit ORM
Business Unit ORM reporting lines




Role of Corporate Operational Risk
Policy setting ___________
Monitoring function _______
Scope of role _____________




















Mitigating OR's which span the Business Unit
Maintenance of loss data base
Corporate Operational Risk Unit works with Business Unit ORM







































































Internal loss data 
Specialised organisations.
List of risks
















IA process: challenging 
Operational risk (health- 
check)
Probability: 1 5 scale 
AI-D: 1 6 scale 














































Mainly Business Unit 




Nature of risk 
Current controls 
Previous action
Tracking system at Business 
Unit level with review

























Operational Risk and the Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis
The Financial Crises were predictable
Recurrence Prevention Measures
Operational Risks that Contributed to the Financial Crises
The Impact of the Financial Crises on the UAE Commercial Banks




Robust risk management 
structures 
Stress testing 




Large credit growth 
Reactive ORM strategies 
Lack of risk appetite 
framework 
Weak regulatory framework
Bad debt accumulation 
Lack of liquidity for lending 
Loss in asset value Loss of 
faith in the banking system 
Withdrawal of foreign 
depositors' money







Not done yet. 
Planned during the next 
year.
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Case Study Report: Bank Delta
Bank apecilic Details
Name of the bank 
Number of branches 
Established
Net profit for the year 2009 
Net profit for year 2010 
Total Assets for year 209. 
Total Assets for year 2010. 
Number of employees 
OR current approach
Alpha







Introduction: Operational risk is an area that is not researched in the UAE, and is of 
growing importance to financial institutions because of regulatory requirements. The 
study examines an uncharted area in the UAE with a practical orientation towards 
managing operational risk on a day-to-day basis. The researcher aims at building 
a research model that would be of interest and use to policymakers, regulators and 
those in charge of the banking corporate governance. In particular, this model is 
expected to contribute to the area of operational risk mitigation in the banking sector.
How do the UAE commercial banks mitigate their operational risk exposures?








Operational Risk Management in the Organisation
Corporate OR unit reporting lines
Internal Audit reporting lines
Relationship: OR vs. Internal Audit
Size of Corporate OR Unit
Establishment of Corporate OR Unit
Use of Business Unit ORJvl
Business Unit ORJvl reporting lines














Role of Corporate Operational Risk Function
Policy setting ______________ __








Custodians of the framework
Assurance on 'key 1 risks
Aggregating OR's
Mitigating OR s which span the Business Unit
Maintenance ot loss data base
Corporate Operational Risk Unit works with Business Unit ORM




























































































Probability: 1 - 6 scale 
















Type of risk 
Scale of risk 




























Mainly Business Unit 
Scale of risk 
Cost benefit
Informal 
Nature of risk 
Current controls
Informal through 





























Operational Risk and the Financial Crisis and Dubai Crisis
The Financial Crises were predictable
Recurrence Prevention Measures
Operational Risks that Contributed to the Financial Crises
The Impact of the Financial Crises on the UAE Commercial Banks










Large credit growth 
Reactive ORM 
strategies 




Bad debt accumulation 
Lack of liquidity for 
lending 
Loss in asset value 
Loss of faith in the 
banking system 
Withdrawal of foreign 
depositors' money







Not done yet. 
Planned during the 
next year.
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Appendix C: Critical Incidents
This Appendix provides a summarised analysis of the critical incidents discussed during 
the interviews. A brief description of the columns is given below:
Description of incident - the name of the incident together with a short sentence
describing what happened.
Type of operational risk - the category of the operational risks that are involved
according to Basel II classification (Basel II, p. 257). The figure indicates the type of risk.
Incident sensitivity - private indicates that the incident has remained within the confines
of the bank whereas public indicates that the incident has appeared at some time in the
public domain.
Supporting information - supporting information refer either to the incident or
subsequent actions. The type of supporting information available is quoted although this
has not always been seen (mainly due to the sensitivity of what is involved). The incidents
have been analysed using the interview material.
How identified - answers the question how the incident was picked up.
Mitigation tactic - identifies which of the four mitigation tactics, take, terminate, transfer,
and treat were used to mitigate the risk.


















Credit card fraud - hackers break into the network and capture customer's account information (see also Appendix A)





Treat Mitigation took place at bank 
and public levels
Foreign exchange dealer - trader ran up sizeable book and withheld information
Internal fraud ( 1 ) Private to the bank Not know Informal 
Networking
Treat Steps taken to improve the 
control system
Telephone banking operation - identification of lack of contingency planning
Business Disruption 
and Systems Failures 
(6)






CCC - payments were being mis-routed by correspondents.
Internal fraud ( 1 ) Private to the bank Internal 
documents 






Service is switched between the 
two operations on a regular 
basis
Mitigation of this nsk has 
provided important lessons for 
possible UAE entry into GCC 
single currency




Private to the bank Internal 
documents 








A cost benefit analysis was 
being undertaken to decide 
whether to assume the nsk (and 
do no further work) or correct















Joint venture finance company - systems were unable to cope with (underestimated) business size
Business Disruption 
and Systems Failures 
(6)
In public domain Press reports Customer 
complaint
Treat Competitors were able to leam 
from this incident and avoid 
making the same mistake
Electronic payments system - clerks/managers were able to input instructions and release funds
Internal fraud ( 1 ) Private to the bank Not know Risk review Take or 
Treat
Whilst segregation of duties 
was introduced, the risk was 
accepted as a low probability.
Insurance operation - a catalogue of 'bad management' practices was found
Business Practice (4) Initially private 
then in public 
domain
Press reports Regulators Treat A complete recovery 
programme was setup as well as 
regulatory fines being imposed
Uncleared cheques - cash being drawn on checks which have not been cleared




Treat Mitigation was an iterative 
process as those involved 
continued to find more ways to 
beat the system
Office fire - fire occurred but the business continuity plan did not work
Business Disruption 
(6)
Private to the bank Internal 
documents 




Treat Mitigation now involves testing 
the business continuity 
arrangements
Incorrect payment remittance - despite supervisory controls in place to prevent this from happening, poor training and 




Private to the bank Internal 
documents 






Training risk has been identified 
and assumed for a short period 
but manifestation of payment 
risk brought forward the action 
plan
Main Server unavailability - several instances of hardware/software being unavailable
Business Disruption 
and Systems Failures 
(6)
Private to the bank Internal 
documents 




Treat Ongoing incidents are 
investigated and the nsk and 
risk mitigants re-assessed




Private to the bank 
and the banking 
industry
Not know Industry 
process
Treat Controls had to be improved to 
protect the bank against any 
further incidents
Account limit excess - series of controls had lapsed enabling member of staff to set a large excess on his account
Internal fraud < 1 ) Private to the bank Internal 
documents 
believed to be 
available
Not know Treat Control framework had to be 
re-established
Wallet fund administration - unable to provide adequate service following large increase in volumes resulting from ambitious 








Risk initially avoided by 
stopping new business whilst 
more robust infrastructure was 
put in place













Treat Project team was established to 
resolve this issue as a number of 
external parties were involved
Call Centre - identification of lack of contingency planning urrangemcnls
Business Disruption 
(6)
Private to the bank Internal 
documents 







Risk still exists and a number of 
options are being considered
Deed store - halogen gas fire prevention system found lo be inoperative
Business Disruption 
(6)





Treat Lack of communication meant 
that this risk had been 
unwittingly assumed. Major 
work now in place to install 
new system
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Appendix D: High Level Review Document for Auditing the Operational Risk 
Framework and Function.
Audit objectives: to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the Operational Risk Function 
(ORF) and framework.
1. Organisation
• Establish the nature of the organisational arrangements (e.g. organisation chart for the 
ORF.
• Does the (corporate) ORF have a clear reporting line into the Risk Director?
• Does the (Business Unit) ORF have a clear reporting line into Senior Management in 
the Business Unit?
• Describe the organisational links between the corporate ORF and the Business Unit 
ORF. How does the relationship guarantee that the corporate ORF is made aware of 
all the important operational risk matters?
• Are the ORF's adequately staffed? - review the experience and qualifications of those 
involved.
• Are Operational Risk committees used to monitor the operations of the ORFs? 
Review the processes for completeness and ensure that action points are followed.
2. Objectives
• Are the objectives of the (corporate) ORF clearly defined and documented?
• Do they cover the main functions of the ORF? - policy making, risk-mapping, 
reporting arrangement, quantification, training, risk database maintenance and so on.
• Have the objectives been formally approved by the Risk Committee/ Board?
3. Planning
• How is the work of ORF planned in order to achieve their stated objectives?
• Are there adequate resources in place to achieve the plan?
• Is there a process in place to review the achievements of the plan?
• Describe the actions taken when changes to the plan are required - how are priorities 
established?
• How successful has the ORF been in achieving the plan?
4. processes
• Does the ORF use a (documented) risk-mapping approach?
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• Describe the risk-mapping approach and, in particular, the methods used to capture 
data on risks - do they appear sufficient?
• Does the risk-mapping approach cover the main phases of the risk management 
process - identification, appraisal (probability/impact) and mitigation?
• Does the risk-mapping approach extend to all areas of the bank?
• How is the documentation maintained up-to-date?
• Are there sufficient controls within the framework to ensure the resultant output is 
robust (particularly management controls - this is a particular important point as the 
process is subjective)?
• Is a loss/incident database maintained?
• How is the data base collected?
• Has a methodology for quantifying operational risk been adopted? Describe the 
methodology used and how is it ensured that it is in line with the requirements of the 
Regulators?
• How robust is the quantification methodology and do the results appear consistent 
with the views of management?
5. Reporting
• Does the ROF procedure produce reports on a regular basis?
• Do the reports include a summary of key risks and key risk indicators for monitoring 
the level of operational risk?
• Describe the action managements take on the reports where there is an unsatisfactory 
situation noted - does it appear sufficient?
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Appendix E: Checklist for Mitigating Operational Risk
Proactive ORM (risk has not materialised)
1. Has the risk been adequately diagnosed?
• Related to the business unit objectives?
• Adequately described? 
a. Risk category, 
b. Scale of risk, 
c. Cross linkage to other risks.
• Probability assessed?
• Impact assessed?
• Current mitigants noted?
2. Assess whether it is feasible to implement any mitigation actions:
• Should the risk be accepted? If so, why?
• Should the risk be accepted in the short term? If so, why?
• If the risk is to be accepted should the risk be re-reviewed at a later date? If so, when?
• Should the risk be avoided completely? If so, why?
3. Assess the action that may be taken to reduce the impact and/or probability:
• Has a draft cost/benefit analysis been completed and checked for accuracy? If not, 
why? Who needs to authorise the expenditure?
• For operational risks where the impact is high but the probability is low; establish 
whether transferring part of the impact via insurance is feasible. If not, why?
• Establish the desired level of risk that the organisation wishes to accept (risk appetite) 
and the current level that has been established through the probability/impact 
appraisal. How much work is likely to be involved in removing the 'gap' between the 
two? Can the work involved to close the 'gap' be managed within the business unit 
(see point 4 below)? Is a project team required to complete the work (see point 5 
below)?
4. Assess whether the mitigation work can be managed within the Business Unit:
• Should additional 'expertise' be used to help mitigate the risk? If not, why?
• Establish the action required to reduce the impact/probability (typically this would 
involve improving the internal control system)? For example, is more documentation 
required, are more resources required, is more training required, are more supervisory 
checks required, is a better segregation of duties required, does management reporting 
need to be enhanced, can other units be involved to share the risk, and so on?
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• Establish and document an action plan to effect the necessary changes. Who will be 
responsible for ensuring the action is carried out?
5. Assess whether the mitigation work needs to be managed by establishing a project team
• Establish the project team and appoint the project manager.
• Agree on the terms of reference and develop the project plan.
• Establish a reporting mechanism to keep the Business Unit management informed of 
the progress of the mitigation actions.
6. Monitor the progress of the action plan
• Ensure regular progress reports vis-a-vis the achievement of the action/project plans 
are in place, if they are not, what is the justification for this?
• Ensure follow up procedures are in place to take action when progress is considered 
to be unsatisfactory. Implement procedures as appropriate.
• When the work is complete, re-appraise the impact/probability in light of the 
improvements made and ensure the residual is acceptable.
• Update the risk map accordingly.
Reactive ORM (risk has materialised)
1. Examine the diagnosis of the risk - had it been identified? If so, review:
• Relationship to business unit objectives.
• Adequacy of description, 
a. Risk category, 
b. Scale of risk. 
c. Cross linkage to other risks.
• Adequacy of probability assessment.
• Adequacy of impact assessment.
• Adequacy of current mitigants.
2. Update the database with the details of the incident that took place
• What events caused the risk to materialise?
• How much direct and indirect loss is involved?
• What are the key lessons to be learned?
• Who needs to know about the incident? Prepare a report as necessary.
3. Assess whether it is feasible to implement any mitigation actions:
• Should the risk be accepted and no further action taken? If so, why?
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• If the risk is to be accepted should the risk be re-reviewed at a later date? If so, when?
• Given the reason why the incident happened, is it feasible to avoid the risk 
completely in the future? If so, why?
4. Assess the action that may be taken to reduce the impact and/or probability and prevent 
future occurrences:
• Has a draft cost/benefit analysis been completed and checked for accuracy? If not, 
why? Who needs to authorise the expenditure?
• Is there scope for using insurance to transfer part of the impact? If not, why?
• Review the causes of the incident and assess the additional work required to mitigate 
the risk down to an acceptable level. How much work is likely to be involved? Can 
the work involved be managed within the business unit (see point 5 below)? Is a 
project team required to complete the work (see point 6 below)?
5. Assess whether the mitigation work can be managed within the Business Unit
• Should additional 'expertise' be used to help mitigate the risk? If not, why?
• Establish the action required to reduce the impact/probability (typically this would 
involve improving the internal control system)? For example, is more documentation 
required, are more resources required, is more training required, are more supervisory 
checks required, is a better segregation of duties required, does management reporting 
need to be enhanced, can other units be involved to share the risk, and so on?
• Establish and document an action plan to effect the necessary changes. Who will be 
responsible for ensuring the action is carried out?
6. Assess whether the mitigation work needs to be managed by establishing a project team:
• Establish the project team and appoint the project manager.
• Agree the terms of reference and develop the project plan.
• Establish a reporting mechanism to keep the Business Unit management informed of 
the progress of the mitigation actions.
7. Monitor the progress of the action plan:
• Ensure regular progress reports vis-a-vis the achievement of the action/project plans 
are in place, if they are not, what is the justification for this?
• Ensure follow up procedures are in place to take action when progress is considered 
to be unsatisfactory. Implement procedures as appropriate.
• When the work is complete, re-appraise the impact/probability in light of the 
improvements made and ensure the residual is acceptable.
• Update the risk map accordingly.
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